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This doctoral thesis is composed of three chapters on economics of education and econo-
metric theory. Chapter 2 studies how students interact in teams and gives some guidance
to educators how to group students to increase their academic knowledge obtained from
teamwork. Chapter 3 provides some initial analysis which will be used in future research
to investigate whether teachers’ subjective assessments are driven by superior informa-
tion about pupils or by their biases and mistaken beliefs. It is important to disentangle
these two forms of teacher discretion, because they have different policy implications.
If teacher discretion stems from their biases or mistaken beliefs, educational institu-
tions may want to minimize the reliance on teachers’ assessments. On the other hand,
if teachers take into account abilities not captured by the standardized test, educational
institutions may prefer to give more weight to their assessments. Chapter 4 proposes a
new estimator for spatial sample selection models.
Chapter 2, “Achievement Peer Effects in Small Study Teams” (single-authored),
studies in which homework assignment teams students learn the most. Many universities
use homework assignments that students have to complete in small study teams as a
teaching tool. Yet, we know surprisingly little about the effect of team composition on
students’ knowledge obtained from teamwork. I study the effect of ability composition of
a student’s study team on her individual academic achievement. Peer effects are identified
using within-student variation in achievement across two similar courses, of which only
one has team homework assignments. I classify students to be either very high ability or
regular and find that the share of very high ability peers has a statistically significant
and sizable negative effect on regular students. The effect on very high ability students
is statistically indistinguishable from zero. These results are consistent with a model
where regular students are mainly affected by a negative free-riding effect, whereas for
very high ability students, the negative free-riding effect is offset by positive effects
stemming from peer pressure and mutual learning, but other models are also possible.
The results suggest that forming homogeneous ability teams might increase students’
individual performance.
Chapter 3, “Teacher Discretion in Educational Tracking” (co-authored with Jaap
H. Abbring), presents results from an empirical analysis of subjective assessments by
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teachers. In the Netherlands, subjective teachers’ assessments play an important role in
assigning graduating primary school pupils to secondary school tracks. If teachers have
information on pupils’ human capital beyond standardized test scores, such teacher dis-
cretion may improve the match between pupils and tracks. If they hold discriminatory
views or false beliefs about groups of pupils, it may alternatively lead to worse matches.
We first use rich administrative data to show that, for given test scores, teachers recom-
mend higher secondary school tracks to pupils with more educated parents. The relations
between teachers’ recommendations and immigration status as well as mother’s income
are weaker, whereas the relations with gender and father’s income are unsubstantial. We
then propose a method to disentangle whether teachers primarily act on superior infor-
mation about pupils’ potential performance in secondary education or on discriminatory
views and mistaken beliefs. We leave implementing this method for future work.
Chapter 4, “Estimation of Spatial Sample Selection Models: A Partial Maximum
Likelihood Approach” (co-authored with Pavel Č́ıžek), proposes a new estimator for spa-
tial sample selection models. To analyze data obtained by non-random sampling in the
presence of cross-sectional dependence, estimation of a sample selection model with a
spatial lag of a latent dependent variable or a spatial error in both the selection and out-
come equations is considered. Since there is no estimation framework for the spatial lag
model and the existing estimators for the spatial error model are either computationally
demanding or have poor small sample properties, we suggest to estimate these models by
the partial maximum likelihood estimator, following Wang et al. (2013)’s framework for a
spatial error probit model. We show that the estimator is consistent and asymptotically
normally distributed. To facilitate easy and precise estimation of the variance matrix
without requiring the spatial stationarity of errors, we propose the parametric bootstrap
method. Monte Carlo simulations demonstrate the advantages of the estimators.
2
Chapter 2
Achievement Peer Effects in
Small Study Teams
This chapter is based on the identically entitled working paper.
2.1. Introduction
Due to the widely held belief that students benefit from collaboration, teamwork has
become an important part of education (OECD, 2017). To facilitate students’ learning,
many universities use homework assignments that students have to complete in small
study teams as a teaching tool. Yet, there is very little evidence in which teams students
learn the most. A better understanding of peer effects in this setting is crucial to inform
educators how to group students into teams. My paper addresses this gap by studying
how a student’s academic knowledge obtained from teamwork depends on the ability
composition of her team and provides some guidance on the grouping.
The question is tackled using a dataset from Tilburg University, where in a statistics
course students have to form teams of at most four members in order to solve a team
assignment together and receive a joint grade. The dataset has unique features that are
particularly suited to address two main challenges stemming from my research question.
Firstly, although generally a measure of individual knowledge obtained from solving a
team homework assignment is unavailable, my dataset contains a grade of an individual
exam that is based on the same material as the team assignment, thus also capturing
how much students learned while solving the team assignment. Secondly, it is generally
difficult to uncover causal relations when students self-select into teams. My dataset,
however, has information about achievements in a mathematics course where grading is
based solely on individual performance. Hence, I am able to use within-student regres-
sions and exploit variation in grades between different courses to eliminate unobserved
characteristics that affect both the statistics and mathematics grades.1 Therefore, instead
1Lavy et al. (2012), Bandiera et al. (2010), Bietenbeck et al. (2017), and Murphy and Weinhardt (2016)
used a similar method to answer other questions in the economics of education literature.
3
Chapter 2: Achievement Peer Effects in Small Study Teams
of relying on variation across students, I rely on within-student variation and relate the
difference between the statistics and mathematics grades with peer characteristics. Fur-
thermore, I control for a rich set of covariates, including students’ prior achievements as
well as tutorial group fixed effects, that (partially) capture unobserved program-year spe-
cific shocks, tutorial group peer effects, and effects stemming from the tutorial teacher.
The underlying assumption necessary for identifying the causal effect is that students do
not self-select into teams based on course-specific unobserved abilities.
My results show that although the effect of the mean (and standard deviation) of
teammates’ abilities on a student’s individual performance is small and only marginally
significant, this finding masks a considerable degree of heterogeneity. Namely, when I
classify students to be either very high ability or regular, I establish that the proportion
of very high ability students in a team has a negative impact on regular students, whereas
the effect on very high ability students is positive though not statistically significant. The
estimates suggest that students’ academic achievement would increase if students were
sorted into homogeneous ability teams. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first
paper showing that students can benefit from homogeneous ability teams.
Although I cannot pin down the exact mechanisms that generate the findings, I ra-
tionalize my results by theoretical explanations. The effort a student exerts while solving
a team assignment may depend on the ability of her teammates in the following ways.
For example, consider a team of two students. If a low ability student has a high ability
teammate she might exert less effort compared to the situation when her teammate is of
low ability: the high ability teammate has lower marginal costs of exerting effort and can
solve the assignment faster. On the other hand, the high ability teammate may impose
higher social norms for the effort level. Hence, to avoid sanctions for not exerting enough
effort, such as being excluded from the team in future projects or weakening friendship
ties with teammates, the low ability student might increase her effort level. Further-
more, the low ability student might learn from explanations given by the high ability
teammate. Consequently, whether the negative free-riding effect is offset by the positive
effect of social pressure and mutual learning is an empirical question. My results are con-
sistent with the situation where regular students are mainly affected by the free-riding
effect, whereas for very high ability students, the free-riding effect is offset by positive
effects stemming from mutual learning and peer pressure. Other models, however, are
also possible.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 provides a literature review
and highlights my contribution. Section 2.3 discusses how peer effects could operate in my
setting, whereas Section 2.4 presents the institutional environment. Section 2.5 presents
the identification strategy, whereas Section 2.6 describes the data. Section 2.7 discusses
4
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the results, while Section 2.8 discusses the plausibility of the identifying assumption.
Section 2.9 exploits further potential mechanisms and provides a model that is consistent
with my results. Finally, Section 2.10 discusses the effect of the proposed regrouping
policy, whereas Section 2.11 concludes.
2.2. Related Literature
My study lies at the intersection of the literatures on achievement peer effects in educa-
tion and peer effects in team production.
2.2.1. Achievement peer effects in education
In a closely related study by Jain and Kapoor (2015), students from the Indian Business
School are randomly (conditionally on observed characteristics) assigned to teams of 4
or 5 students in order to work together on team assignments and receive a joint grade.
Their main finding is that the mean (and standard deviation) of teammates’ GMAT
scores does not statistically significantly influence students’ performance.
My study differs from theirs in a few important aspects. Firstly, in my study, stu-
dents self-select into assignment teams rather than being randomly assigned. Under
self-selection, the identification of peer effects becomes more challenging. Being able to
convincingly identify peer effects by exploiting within-student variation, I believe that
this challenge is worth undertaking because endogenous selection might provide us with
new insights that cannot be obtained by random assignment.
In particular, peer effects might depend on whether an individual is socially con-
nected to her peers. For example, Mas and Moretti (2009) find that supermarket cashiers
respond more in terms of productivity to the presence of coworkers with whom they fre-
quently interact compared to those with whom they interact less, whereas Bandiera et al.
(2010) find that the performance of workers picking soft fruits in a farm is affected dif-
ferently by the presence of coworkers who are also their friends compared to coworkers
with whom they do not have any social ties. In a setting more similar to mine, De Paola
et al. (2016) randomly assign students either to teams composed of friends or to teams
composed of individuals with no friendship relationships. In their case, the exam con-
sists of two parts, where one is based on the individual performance whereas the other
is based on the team performance. They find that students assigned to friends perform
significantly better than those assigned to teammates with no social ties. Moreover, the
ability to choose teammates per se might influence students’ performance. Babcock et al.
(2015), for example, compare productivity under three treatments - individual incentive,
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team incentive, and choice - where in the last treatment a subject can choose between
the individual and team incentive treatments. Although only 3% of the subjects choose
the team treatment, the productivity under the choice treatment is 27% higher than
under the individual incentive treatment. Furthermore, Kandel and Lazear (1992) argue
that the free-riding problem is less severe if a student can empathize with her teammate.
If students self-select into teams rather than being randomly assigned, empathy might
be stronger resulting in significant guilt or shame from not exerting enough effort.
Secondly, Jain and Kapoor (2015) observe only a final grade, which is a weighted
average of both the individual and team grade components, whereas I can disentangle
the two components. Assume that if a low ability student is in a team with a high ability
student, she exerts less effort and thus learns less. In that case the low ability student
would get a lower grade from the individual exam and a higher grade from the team
assignment compared to a counterpart who is in a team with a low ability student.
These effects might cancel out producing small estimates of peer influence, although the
low ability student is affected negatively by the high ability student.2
Thirdly, although Jain and Kapoor (2015) do not find any ability peer effects, this
does not necessarily imply that peers are not important in their case. There are many
ways to summarize a distribution of peer characteristics by a low dimensional vector
and the mean (and standard deviation) of peer GMAT scores, the two measures used
in their paper, is only one of them. I find that the effect of the mean of teammates’
previous year GPAs is only marginally statistically significant and it becomes statistically
indistinguishable from zero when the standard deviation is added. Contrary to Jain and
Kapoor (2015), I also estimate a model where peer characteristics are summarized by
the proportion of high ability students and find that this specification yields statistically
significant estimates.
The rest of the extensive literature on peer effects in education is based on individual
rather than team incentives (e.g., Carrell et al., 2009; Lin, 2010; Duflo et al., 2011;
Imberman et al., 2012; De Giorgi et al., 2012; Carrell et al., 2013; De Giorgi and Pellizzari,
2014; Lavy et al., 2012; Lu and Anderson, 2015; Feld and Zölitz, 2017; Booij et al., 2017;
Hong and Lee, 2017; Patacchini et al., 2017; Tincani, 2017). Hence, the following two
broad conclusions obtained from this literature, namely, that students benefit from high
performing friends (see Lin, 2010, and Patacchini et al., 2017) but their performance
increases if their classmates are of the same ability (see Duflo et al., 2011, and Booij
et al., 2017) cannot be directly applied to my setting because channels of peer effects are
likely to be different. For instance, although anecdotal evidence suggests that students
2This problem is partially addressed in Jain and Kapoor (2015)’s paper by considering courses with
high, medium, and low team assignment component of the final grade.
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form teams with their friends, the positive effect of high performing friends might be
offset by a negative free-riding effect (Holmström, 1982), which can arise in a team
production setting. Moreover, even though low ability students are hurt by high ability
classmates, they might increase their effort when working with high ability teammates
due to a greater scope of monitoring (Kandel and Lazear, 1992). Given that students
receive a joint team assignment grade, high ability students might exert more effort at
monitoring low ability teammates, and therefore, increase the performance of low ability
peers.
Contrary to the great majority of studies where peer groups are defined at the class-
room or grade (Duflo et al., 2011; Imberman et al., 2012; De Giorgi et al., 2012; Lavy
et al., 2012; Feld and Zölitz, 2017; Booij et al., 2017; Tincani, 2017), squadron (Carrell
et al., 2009, 2013), dorm room level (Sacerdote, 2011; Zimmerman, 2003), or based on
friendship networks (Lin, 2010; Patacchini et al., 2017) or sitting assignments within
classroom (Lu and Anderson, 2015; Hong and Lee, 2017), my peer group consists of at
most four other students who are in a student’s homework assignment team. Given that
a student is unlikely to be influenced equally by all her classmates or squadron members,
studies utilizing a broad definition of a peer group might fail at adequately capturing
peer effects in subgroups. Even though studies on peer effects among roommates utilize
a narrow definition of a peer group, roommates are not necessarily peers of potential
influence on academic achievement (Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner, 2006). Although in
this respect the studies employing friendship networks are closest to my paper, they are
based on individual rather than team incentives as is discussed above.
2.2.2. Peer effects in team production
The literature of peer effects in team production studies the relationship between pro-
ductivities of a worker and her co-workers. The main similarity of this strand of literature
and my study are channels of peer effects as both include free-riding, mutual monitoring,
and learning. In this respect, the two closest studies are by Mas and Moretti (2009) and
Chan et al. (2014) who examine peer effects, respectively, among supermarket cashiers,
where the effects operate through production externalities, and among salespeople in a
department store, where the effects operate through a team based compensation scheme.
The finding of both studies that workers benefit from high productivity coworkers might
not be applicable to my setting because Mas and Moretti (2009) and Chan et al. (2014)
study low-skill repetitive tasks, whereas I analyze high-skill tasks that have to be per-
formed only once. Hence, for high ability students in my setting, it might be less costly
to perform the tasks themselves instead of teaching their low ability teammates how
to perform the tasks and monitoring them, whereas this scenario is less plausible in a
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supermarket or a department store.
There are also studies that examine high skilled workers. For example, Azoulay et al.
(2010) show that a quality-adjusted publication rate of a researcher declines following
the death of a “super-star” coauthor, whereas Waldinger (2010) shows that academic
outcomes of a PhD student are positively affected by faculty quality. On the other hand,
Waldinger (2012) does not find any peer effects among university scientists. Instead of
looking at production of new ideas as in Azoulay et al. (2010) or Waldinger (2012) or
mentorship effects as in Waldinger (2010), my paper focuses on solving a team assignment
and analyzes peer effects that operate among individuals of the same hierarchical level.
2.3. Conceptual Framework
To estimate peer effects arising in my setting, a measure of a student’s knowledge ob-
tained from teamwork is needed. In my case, the final grade of a student is a weighted
average of the team assignment and individual exam grades. Questions in the individual
exam are very similar to the ones in the team assignment, and therefore, the individual
exam also measures a student’s knowledge obtained from teamwork. The main goal of
this section is to explore a few potential mechanisms how a student’s team composition
could influence her individual exam grade.
On the one hand, a student’s team composition could affect her effort devoted to
the team assignment. Given that students receive a joint team assignment grade and
individual efforts are not observable by the teacher, the team assignment production
process is prone to free-riding (Holmström, 1982). The intensity of free-riding might
depend on a team’s composition. If a student has high ability teammates, she might
exert less effort while solving the team assignment compared to her counterpart who
has low ability teammates. Furthermore, as is argued in Kandel and Lazear (1992), low
ability students could also increase their effort level under the presence of high ability
teammates if the latter group of students imposes social norms of a high effort level. The
negative effect on low ability students of having high ability teammates could also arise
if high ability students have high grade concerns and are willing to solve the assignment
themselves.
On the other hand, the composition of a student’s team could affect her effort level
devoted to the individual exam. If a student has high ability teammates, she is more
likely to get a high team assignment grade, and therefore, might decrease her effort level
while preparing for the individual exam, especially if her main goal is to pass the course.
Instead of affecting students’ efforts, the team’s composition may affect their knowl-
8
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edge of the subject directly. When students are jointly working on a team assignment,
there may be many opportunities for learning. Students could be positively affected by
high ability teammates who have enough knowledge about the subject and are willing
to give explanations.
The discussion above suggests that the effect of the composition of a student’s team
remains to be studied empirically because the sign of the effect depends on which mech-
anism dominates.
2.4. Institutional Environment
The data for this study comes from the Tilburg School of Economics and Management
of Tilburg University located in the Netherlands. Tilburg University is a public research
university specializing in social and behavioral sciences, economics, law, business sciences,
theology, and humanities. As I consider students from the BSc Business Economics and
BSc International Business Administration programs in my study, the first subsection
presents these programs, whereas the remaining two subsections introduce the Statistics
2 and Mathematics 2 courses, which will be used to analyze the effect of teammates’
characteristics on students’ individual performance.
BSc Business Economics and BSc International Business Administration programs
BSc Business Economics and BSc International Business Administration are three-
year programs with the study load of 60 credits each year. The courses taught in the
first two years of the programs are listed in Tables 2.A.2 and 2.A.3 in Appendix 2.A. The
language of instruction within the first two years of the BSc Business Economic program
is Dutch, whereas the courses in the third year are given in English. The courses of
the BSc International Business Administration program are given in English in all three
years. While the BSc Business Economics program is not subject to intake quotas and
selection, each year at most 150 students are selected to the BSc International Business
Administration program based on their grades and motivation.3 In order to continue
with the program, a student must obtain at least 42 credits in the first year. If less
than 42 credits have been obtained in the first year, a student may not continue with
the program. Moreover, she will not be readmitted to the program for a period of three
years. A student might be exempted from a course if she has successfully completed a
course that covers all of the educational objectives of the course at another university
or for another program at Tilburg University. The exemption might be granted up to
3175 students in the academic year 2014/2015.
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a maximum of 60 credits. If a student has been exempted from some first-year courses,
she has to obtain at least 70% of the remaining credits in the first year.
The programs are organized in two semesters per year. There are two opportunities
to take the exam during the academic year in which the course is offered: exam and
resit. The exams take place immediately after the instruction period. All the resits are
scheduled after exams in the Spring semester.4 If a student takes several examinations
for a course, only the highest grade will be included in her diploma. There is no limit
on the number of exams and resits of the same course a student can take. At Tilburg
University, a ten point system is used with a grade of 10 being the highest grade and 6
being the minimum passing grade. In general, exams are not graded on a curve.
There are two forms of teaching: central lectures where all students from the same
program are grouped together and tutorial classes where students are assigned to groups
of about 40 students. In the tutorial classes of the Statistics 2 and Mathematics 2 courses
discussed below, students solve and discuss exercises and ask questions. The tutorial
classes are typically given by PhD students. Students following the Business Economics
program can choose a tutorial group before the second year themselves, whereas the
International Business Administration students are divided into tutorial groups by the
program coordinator.5
Statistics 2 course
I consider students who took one of the Statistics 2 courses in the academic years
2013/2014, 2014/2015, and 2015/2016. There are two Statistics 2 courses: Statistics 2
for IBA and Statistics 2 (Dutch), which are compulsory second-year courses for the BSc
International Business Administration and BSc Business Economics programs, respec-
tively. Both courses are based on the same material, have the same assignments and
exams. The only difference is that the Statistics 2 (Dutch) course is taught in Dutch
while the Statistics 2 for IBA course is taught in English although the lecturers for both
courses use the same slides, which are in English (the lecturers are different though).
For this reason, I refer to both courses as the Statistics 2 course. The course is also
compulsory or elective for students from the Dual degree International Business Admin-
istration, BSc Economics and Informatics and several Pre-Master’s programs;6 exchange
students are eligible to take the course as well. The course covers such topics as tests
4In the academic years 2013/2014 and 2014/2015, the resits of the Fall semester of the first year were
scheduled directly after the first examinations of these courses.
5The main criterion of the division is to keep the number of international students the same across the
tutorial groups.
6A Pre-Master’s program is usually a one-year transfer program for a student who wishes to obtain a
Master’s degree but cannot be admitted directly.
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and confidence intervals for mean, proportion, and variance for one or two populations,
simple linear regression, multiple linear regression, model specification, etc.
For students who take the Statistics 2 course for the first time, there are three types
of examinations – team assignment, midterm, and final exam – with the final grade being
determined as a weighted average of these components. The weights depend on whether
a student attends the exam or resit. Students who obtained a grade from at least one
type of examination in the previous years are not allowed to participate in the team
assignment and their final grade is determined as a weighted average of the remaining
two components with the weights again being dependent on whether a student attends
the exam or resit (see Table 2.A.1 in Appendix 2.A for more details).
In this study, only students who take the Statistics 2 course for the first time and par-
ticipate in the team assignment are considered. For them, the final grade is constructed
as follows: 20% team assignment, 30% midterm, and 50% final exam (see Table 2.A.1 in
Appendix 2.A). The highest grade for each part of examination is 10. A student passes
a course if her final grade is at least 6. There is one additional rule that the exam grade
has to be at least 5; if the grade of the exam is less than 5, the highest final grade a
student can obtain is 5, i.e. she fails the course.
Students have to divide into groups of at most 4 members in order to solve the
team assignment together and obtain a joint grade. In principle a team has to consist of
students from the same tutorial group but the rule is not very strict. Anecdotal evidence
suggests that many students form teams with their friends. Each team is assigned one of
ten datasets. Using the assigned dataset, a team has to investigate some presuppositions
by conducting suitable tests and to interpret the test results. Data analysis is done
using SPSS and results are presented in a report. The team assignment consists of four
sections; for the time-line which shows when each section has to be handed in see Figure
2.A.1, Appendix 2.A. The grade of the team assignment is a weighted average of the
four sections with the weights being equal to 0.2, 0.23, 0.2, and 0.37 for sections 1–4,
respectively; the highest grade of each section is 10. Teams get points not only for correct
answers but also for the layout of the report as they are supposed to create their own
tables instead of copying output from SPSS.
The team assignment helps students to learn how to perform data analysis using
SPSS and how to formulate hypotheses and perform tests if they are given output. The
latter skill set is important for the midterm as in the midterm all relevant data summaries
needed for analysis are given. In contrary, both skill sets are equally important in the
exam (and resit) as students are given only datasets and they have to obtain relevant
output by themselves. Questions in both the midterm and exam are similar to those in
the team assignment. Hence, solving the team assignment helps students to prepare for
11
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both types of examination. The exam (and resit) covers all topics discussed during the
lectures, including the material tested already in the midterm.
Mathematics 2 course
To account for unobserved characteristics that are correlated with peer characteristics
as discussed in the introduction, the Mathematics 2 for IBA and Mathematics 2 (Dutch)
courses are considered. Similar to the two Statistics 2 courses, the major difference
between these courses is that the Mathematics 2 (Dutch) course is taught in Dutch
whereas the Mathematics 2 for IBA course is taught in English. For this reason, I will
refer to both courses as the Mathematics 2 course. The course is a second-year course,
which was given in the Fall semester in the academic years 2012/2013 and 2013/2014
and in the Spring semester in the academic year 2014/2015, whereas the Statistics 2
course was given in the Spring semester in the academic years 2012/2013 and 2013/2014
and in the Fall semester in the academic year 2014/2015 (see Table 2.A.3 in Appendix
2.A).
The Mathematics 2 course was chosen for the following reasons. Firstly, as students
from the BSc Business Economics and BSc International Business Administration pro-
grams are pooled together, ideally a course which is the same for both groups of stu-
dents is considered. This criterion is satisfied for the following set of courses: Statistics 1
(Dutch) and Statistics 1 for IBA, Mathematics 1 (Dutch) and Mathematics 1 for IBA,
Accounting 2: Management Accounting and Accounting 2 for IBA, and Mathematics
2 (Dutch) and Mathematics 2 for IBA (see Tables 2.A.2 and 2.A.3 in Appendix 2.A).
Secondly, it is more plausible that the identifying assumption discussed in the introduc-
tion is satisfied if considered courses are similar to the Statistics 2 course because it is
more likely that unobserved variables correlated with peer characteristics are eliminated
with individual fixed effects. As both the Mathematics 2 and Statistics 2 courses require
strong quantitative skills, they are to be preferred to the Accounting courses. Lastly,
the final grade of the Statistics 1 courses is a weighted average of individual and team
components. If the team compositions are not known it might be the case that Statistics
2 team characteristics act as a proxy for team characteristics in the Statistics 1 equation
and peer effects on the Statistics 2 grade are not identified.
2.5. Identification Strategy
In this study, there are two crucial issues regarding the identification of peer effects:




2.5.1. Endogenous group formation
The main challenge with identifying the effect of ability composition of teammates on
a student’s individual achievement when students self-select into teams is that variables
that determine peer composition might be correlated with a student’s unobserved char-
acteristics. This correlation could arise if, for example, high unobserved ability students
have high observed ability teammates. Similarly to Bandiera et al. (2010), Lavy et al.
(2012), Bietenbeck et al. (2017), and Murphy and Weinhardt (2016), I overcome this
challenge by using within-student variation in achievement across two similar courses,
where a team assignment is present only in one of them. More specifically, I consider a
statistics (s) course, where the final grade is a weighted average of individual and team
grade components, and a mathematics (m) course, where the final grade is determined






















2 + ξgi + ε
m
gi. (2.2)
The dependent variable yagi, a ∈ {s,m}, is the individual grade component of individual
i in team g, xgi denotes individual characteristics, whereas wgi is a vector of tutorial
group dummies (see Section 2.6 for details). Peer characteristics are summarized by zgi,
whereas εagi, a ∈ {s,m}, denotes a course-specific error term.
The student fixed effects ξgi that could potentially capture unobserved ability and
motivation determining both the statistics and mathematics grades are eliminated by
subtracting equation (2.2) from equation (2.1):
ysgi − ymgi = x′gi(βs1 − βm1 ) + w′gi(βs2 − βm2 ) + z′giβ3 + (εsgi − εmgi). (2.3)
This strategy allows me to identify β3 without having to rely on variation across students,
which can be confounded by such factors as overall ability, motivation, and family back-
ground. My identifying assumption is that the difference of course specific error terms
is uncorrelated with peer variables, i.e. E[zgi(εsgi − εmgi)|xgi, wgi] = 0. This assumption is
satisfied if students do not self-select into teams based on course-specific abilities cap-
tured by εsgi and ε
m
gi. If team formation is based on unobserved course-specific abilities,
the estimates obtained from equation (2.3) are inconsistent. It is important to emphasize
that this situation is unlikely in my setting because both the statistics and mathematics
courses require very similar skills.
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Unobserved abilities that might be correlated with peer variables not only have to
be present in both the statistics and mathematics equations, they have to have the same
influence on both grades. More formally, let vgi be a vector of unobserved characteris-



































The unobserved variables vgi are fully captured by ξgi if β
s
4 is equal to β
m
4 . This condition
is violated if unobserved abilities have different returns in the statistics and mathematics
courses, for example, because abstract thinking might be more important in the math-
ematics course than in the statistics course. Given that these concerns are less severe
if considered courses are similar, I allow β1 to be course-specific and test whether the
difference between the coefficients βs1 and β
m
1 is statistically significantly different from
zero. Moreover, a discrepancy between βs4 and β
m
4 might emerge if mappings of unob-
served abilities onto the statistics and mathematics grades are different, which might
arise, for example, due to a difference in skewness of the two distributions. To allay these
concerns, I perform a robustness check, where I express individual grades of the statistics
and mathematics courses in terms of percentiles of the respective distributions instead
of levels.
Furthermore, the identification strategy implies that zgi is present only in equation
(2.1). If zgi was present in both equations with the same coefficient, the effect of peer
characteristics would not be identified from equation (2.3). Although there are no team
assignments in the mathematics course, students might interact with their friends who
are also likely to be their teammates in the statistics course. The existence of achievement
peer effects among friends has been documented in the literature. For instance using the
AddHealth dataset, Lin (2010) shows that a student’s GPA is positively affected by the
mean GPA of her friends. As mechanisms of peer influence can be different in the statistics
and mathematics courses and as zgi is a noisy measure of friends characteristics (because
not all teammates are necessarily friends and not all friends are necessarily teammates),
I allow β3 to be course-specific and get the following alternative to equation (2.3):
ysgi − ymgi = x′gi(βs1 − βm1 ) + w′gi(βs2 − βm2 ) + z′gi(βs3 − βm3 ) + (εsgi − εmgi). (2.5)
Under the assumption that βs3 is equal to β
m
3 if there were no team assignments in the
statistics course, the estimate of β3 in equation (2.3) would capture the effect of peers
that arises because students have to solve the team assignment, i.e. eliminating peer
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effects arising due to friendships.7
The main aim of this paper is to investigate the effect of teammates’ abilities on a
student’s knowledge obtained from teamwork. Students’ abilities are approximated by
observed measures, and therefore, the estimates are subject to measurement error. As
noted by Angrist (2014) and further clarified by Feld and Zölitz (2017), measurement
error can lead to overestimation of peer effects instead of attenuation bias when peers are
not assigned randomly. Typically, peer characteristics are constructed as some functions
of background characteristics of all individuals in i’s group. Hence, measurement error
in xg−i, where xg−i is a matrix of background characteristics excluding student i, also
affects zgi. Since there are two variables with measurement error in one regression, the
sign of the bias might be reversed. My identifying assumption states that, conditional on
student fixed effects and observed characteristics, students’ peers are assigned as good as
randomly. Hence, if this assumption holds, measurement error leads only to attenuation
bias, at least if the linear-in-means model is considered.8
2.5.2. Sample selection bias
In my sample, at least one of the dependent variables ysgi and y
m
gi is missing for 20% of
the observations (see Section 2.6) because the students chose to skip at least one of the
exams. Sample selection bias arises if unobserved characteristics affecting the decisions to




gi in equations (2.1)
and (2.2), respectively. Given that the identification strategy discussed in the previous
subsection is based on a panel data framework, the sample selection problem is less of
a concern because most forms of unobserved heterogeneity are eliminated with student
fixed effects (Vella, 1998).
Besides observed characteristics, students’ decisions to attend the two exams are
likely to be mainly driven by their motivation and unobserved abilities. Since these
variables also determine the individual Statistics 2 grade, the estimates are subject to
sample selection bias. Fortunately, the inclusion of student fixed effects eliminates these
two components from the error term, and therefore, leaves us less exposed to sample
selection problems.
7This assumption might not be realistic if peer effects arising due to friendships are dependent on the
presence of team assignments.
8The results in Angrist (2014) and Feld and Zölitz (2017) are derived for the linear-in-means model. To
the best of my knowledge, the implications when peer effects are measured using other specifications,
for example, by the share of high ability teammates, have not been investigated yet.
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where d∗agi , a ∈ {s,m}, is a latent variable with the associated indicator function dagi =
1(d∗agi > 0) reflecting whether y
a
gi is observed or not and v
a
gi is a course-specific error
term. The latent variable d∗agi could, for example, represent the difference between the
grade student i expects to get and the smallest grade she would like to get if she goes
to the exam. My identifying assumption is that conditionally on observed characteristics
and unobserved characteristics determining both the statistics and mathematics grades,
a student’s decision to go to the exam is random, i.e. E[εagi|xgi, wgi, zgi, ξgi, dsgi = 1, dmgi =
1] = 0, a ∈ {s,m}.
Under this assumption, equation (2.3) produces consistent estimates for the popu-
lation of students including those who went to both exams and those who skipped at
least one of them. If, on the other hand, unobserved course-specific shocks determine a
student’s expected grade as well as her actual grade, the estimates of equation (2.3) are
informative only about the subpopulation of students who took both exams but not the
entire population of students.
2.6. Data
In the academic years 2013/2014, 2014/2015, and 2015/2016, a total of 1408 students
took part in the team assignment in the Statistics 2 course. The final sample used in this
study is obtained by several selection criteria. Table 2.1 gives detailed information about
the sample selection procedure. Firstly, as the first-year GPA is used to measure ability
composition of a team, the variable has to be observed for all teammates. Given that
the first-year GPA is not available for pre-Master and exchange students, teams with at
least one student from these groups are excluded from the analysis. I also exclude teams
with at least one student from Bachelor programs where Statistics 2 and Mathematics
2 are elective courses as well as students from the BSc Economics and Informatics and
Dual degree International Business Administration programs albeit the courses are com-
pulsory for this group. Out of 1408 students, there are only 3 Dual degree International
Business Administration and 12 BSc Economics and Informatics students. I thus con-
sider only students from the BSc Business Economics and BSc International Business
Administration programs. Out of the remaining students, 165 students belong to a team
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where at least one member took the Statistics 2 course in the fourth or later year of their
program. As the first-year GPA might not be informative about students’ knowledge and
motivation in the fourth or later year, these teams are excluded. Another solution to this
problem is to use the GPA from the previous year instead of the first-year GPA. The
former measure is preferred because for most students within each program, it is based
on the same set of courses. Teams with at least one student who took the Statistics 2
and/or Mathematics 2 courses in the first year are excluded as well. It is necessary to re-
move the entire team instead of the affected individuals only because the first-year GPA
of teammates might be correlated with the individual shocks εsgi and ε
m
gi in equations
(2.1) and (2.2), respectively. Furthermore, students who solved the assignment alone are
not considered either. Table 2.2 provides information about teams of the remaining 1027
individuals. Most of the teams have 4 members.9
The vector xgi includes the following set of variables: the first-year GPA,
10 the num-
ber of credit points the first-year GPA is based on, the dummies for female and Dutch,
the age at the start of the second year of a student’s program, the number of second
attempts, which measures how many times a student took an exam of the same course
twice, the number of second attempts that were not needed as a student already passed
the course in a previous attempt, and the number of credit points of courses a student was
exempted from. To account for subject specific abilities, I include same-subject lagged
test scores (i.e. the Statistics 1 and Mathematics 1 grades for the statistics and mathe-
matics equations, respectively) as well as cross-subject lagged test scores. Additionally,
wgi includes tutorial group dummies.
For the Statistics 1 and Mathematics 1 courses, the highest grades obtained before the
second year are used (see Figure 2.A.2 in Appendix 2.A).11 As some students were either
exempted from the Statistics 1 or Mathematics 1 courses or did not take the courses
before the second year, they are excluded from the analysis (see Table 2.1) as well as
students who were exempted from the Statistics 2 midterm. Furthermore, I eliminated
students who took the Statistics 2 course in their third year.
The final sample consists of 912 observations. In the Statistics 2 course, the final grade
is a weighted average of the team assignment, midterm, and exam components with the
weights 0.2, 0.3, and 0.5. To eliminate the team assignment component, ysgi is constructed
9Although the maximum size of a team is 4, there are two teams of size 5 because of the following
reason. Teams have to be formed of students from the same tutorial class. If, for example, there are 41
students in one tutorial class and 40 students formed 10 teams, the tutorial group teacher may allow
the remaining student to join one of the teams.
10If a student took two examinations of the same course in the first year, the first-year GPA is based
on the highest grade.
11In rare cases, students obtained the Statistics 1 and/or Mathematics 1 grades before entering the
considered programs.
17
Chapter 2: Achievement Peer Effects in Small Study Teams
Table 2.1: Sample construction.
Obs. including affected teammates
Initial sample 1408
Other program 191
Program year > 3 165
Program year = 1 24
Worked alone 1
Sample for peer characteristics 1027
Missing Statistics 1 grade 32
Missing Mathematics 1 grade 7
Exemption Statistics 2 midterm 3
Program year = 3 73
Final sample 912
Missing Statistics 2 grade 140
Missing Mathematics 2 grade 46
Reduced sample 726
Note. The inner rows refer to the number of students excluding already eliminated ones.
For example, out of 1408 students, there are 191 students with at least one member
from other programs. Out of the remaining 1217 students, there are 165 students with
at least one team member who took the Statistics 2 course in their fourth year or even
later.
as a weighted average of the midterm and exam components with the weights 0.3/0.8
and 0.5/0.8, respectively. The factor 0.8 was chosen to ensure that ysgi has its support
on the interval between 0 and 10. In the Mathematics 2 course, there is only one type
of examination. Thus, ymgi is equal to the exam grade. I start the analysis based on the
subsample of students who participated in both the Statistics 2 and Mathematics 2 exams
(see Reduced sample in Table 2.1).12 The Mathematics 2 grade is considered missing if
a student was either exempted from the course or did not participate in the regular
exam in the second year. (Students who participated in the Mathematics 2 resit only are
excluded because grades from the regular exam and the resit are not comparable.) The
reduced sample thus consists of students who took regular exams of the Statistics 2 and
Mathematics 2 courses in the second year.
Following a common approach in the literature, I measure peer quality using pre-
treatment ability. Hence, zgi can be measured in (at least) two ways: using the Statistics
1 and/or Mathematics 1 grades or using the first-year GPA. Although the Statistics 1 and
Mathematics 1 grades might better capture quantitative skills needed for the Statistics
2 course, I prefer to use the first-year GPA because a student might have a relatively
high Statistics 1 grade either because she is a good student in general, she has good
12There are no students who participated in the Statistics 2 exam but not in the midterm.
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Table 2.2: Team structure.





quantitative skills and could get a high grade even without studying hard, or she was
lucky. The Statistics 1 (as well as the Mathematics 1) grade thus might not predict well
how much effort a student is going to exert while solving the team assignment and how
much she values a high team assignment grade. On the other hand, a relatively high first-
year GPA indicates that a student performed persistently well in the first year. Hence,
it is more likely that she cares about her grades and exerts more effort while studying
indicating that she is likely to exert more effort while solving the team assignment as
well.
Table 2.3 reports summary statistics for the reduced sample. The average first-year
GPA is equal to 7.07 with a standard deviation of 0.71. Almost 40% of the students
are female and 94% of the students are Dutch. Less than one quarter of the students
skip at least one exam in the first year. The median number of second attempts is 1,
whereas less than 25% of the students take at least one unnecessary attempt to pass a
course. The grades of the Statistics 1 and Mathematics 1 courses are on average equal to
7.28 and 7.23, respectively. Less than one quarter of the students enter the second year
without passing these courses. In the beginning of the second year, the students are on
average 19.88 years old. Almost three quarters of the students follow the BSc Business
Economics program (BE).
The average Statistics 2 and Mathematics 2 grades are equal to 6.96 and 7.24, respec-
tively. The correlation of students’ Statistics 2 and Mathematics 2 grades is 0.61. Hence,
the scores are not perfectly correlated implying that there is enough variation to identify
peer effects. Lastly, the average team assignment grade of 8.23 is substantially higher
than any average grade discussed so far. On the one hand, students work on the team
assignment outside the classroom. Thus, they are allowed to use any useful material,
e.g., to check similar examples in the book or the slides. Furthermore, there is less time
pressure than in an exam. On the other hand, if students do not sort homogeneously
based on ability, high assignment grades might also indicate that students do not divide
the team assignment into equal parts and solve separately. This pattern is consistent
with the case where high ability students have more influence on the team assignment
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Table 2.3: Descriptive statistics: reduced sample.
Mean S.D. 1p 25p Median 75p 99p
Background characteristics
GPA 7.07 0.71 5.73 6.58 7.03 7.52 8.75
Female 0.39
Dutch 0.94
Credit points 59.62 2.30 48.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00
Exempted credit point 0.75 5.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 21.75
Second attempts 1.74 1.84 0.00 0.00 1.00 3.00 7.00
Unnecessary second attempts 0.13 0.51 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.00
Statistics 1 7.28 1.34 3.62 6.50 7.50 8.50 9.50
Mathematics 1 7.23 1.37 2.62 6.50 7.00 8.00 10.00
Age 19.88 1.17 18.36 19.23 19.59 20.03 24.10
Sample composition
Academic year 2013/2014 BE 0.25
Academic year 2014/2015 BE 0.25
Academic year 2015/2016 BE 0.24
Academic year 2013/2014 IBA 0.06
Academic year 2014/2015 IBA 0.11
Academic year 2015/2016 IBA 0.09
Outcomes
Statistics 2 6.96 1.92 1.50 6.00 7.50 8.50 10.00
Mathematics 2 7.24 1.90 1.62 6.50 7.50 8.50 10.00
Statistics 2 - Mathematics 2 -0.28 1.68 -4.50 -1.00 0.00 0.50 4.00
Team assignment grade 8.23 1.17 4.73 7.71 8.43 9.04 10.00
Note. Although grades at Tilburg University are rounded to multiples of 0.5 with the exception of grades
in the interval between 5.25 and 5.75 that are rounded to 6, my dataset contains a continuous measure of
the Statistics 2 grades because the grades are intermediate rather than final. To make the grades of the
Statistics 2 course to be comparable with the Mathematics 2 grades, I round them to multiples of 0.5 and




The first column of Table 2.4 shows that most background variables are relevant
predictors for the Statistics 2 grade. As expected, there is a strong relationship between
the first-year GPA and the Statistics 2 grade: if the first-year GPA increases by one,
the Statistics 2 grade increases by 0.627. Female students perform significantly (both
economically and statistically) better than their male counterparts, whereas the per-
formance of Dutch students is significantly worse than that of international students.
Students with a higher number of exempted first-year credit points as well as students
who took fewer second attempts to take an exam in the first year have higher grades.
Lastly, even conditionally on the first-year GPA and other background variables, the
Statistics 1 grade is a strong and statistically significant predictor of the Statistics 2
grade.
Teams
Similarly to Fafchamps and Lund (2003), Arcand and Fafchamps (2012), and Attanasio
et al. (2012), I use the following dyadic regression to summarize matching patterns of
teams:
dij = η0 +
K∑
k=1
|xki − xkj|ηk + oij, (2.6)
where dij is equal to one if students i and j are in one team and zero otherwise, xki
is the kth element of the vector xi, and oij is an error term. The dyadic regression is
estimated under two scenarios. In the first scenario, I assume that all students from
the same program and the same year could potentially form a team, whereas in the
second scenario only students from the same tutorial group are allowed to form a team.
Table 2.5 shows that there are negative partial associations between the probability that
two students are in the same team and the distance between their GPAs as well as the
indicator of them being of opposite genders. The partial effect of the indicator that one
student is Dutch while the other is not is positive under the program-year scenario and
negative under the tutorial group scenario.
Figure 2.1 represents team matching patterns in terms of the first-year GPA, the main
variable of interest. The figure indicates that teams are quite heterogeneous in terms of
ability implying that there is enough variation to identify peer effects. Similarly to Ahlin
(2016), the variance decomposition of the first-year GPA into between-team and within-
team components is used to measure homogeneity of matching. In the Sample used for
peer characteristics from Table 2.1, the between-team component accounts for 42.64%
of the total variance in the first-year GPA. Ideally, this number would be compared to
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Credit points 0.015 −0.024
(0.024) (0.050)
Exempted credit point 0.026∗∗∗ 0.011
(0.010) (0.016)
Second attempts −0.146∗∗∗ −0.054
(0.048) (0.145)
Unnecessary second attempts −0.006 −0.218
(0.112) (0.379)
Statistics 1 0.403∗∗∗ 0.433∗∗∗
(0.089) (0.165)




Tutorial group FE X X
F-test Background char. = 0 46.518∗∗∗ 8.854∗∗∗
F-test p-value 0.000 0.000
Observations 726 244
R2 0.468 0.526
Adjusted R2 0.434 0.424
Note. Column 1 refers to equation (2.1) (without z′giβ3), whereas in Col-
umn 2, the team assignment grade is regressed on average characteristics of
teammates. Standard errors are reported in the parentheses. In Column 1,
the standard errors are clustered at the assignment team level, whereas in
Column 2, robust standard errors are reported. ∗/∗∗/∗∗∗ denote statistical
significance at the 10/5/1% level.
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0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
GPA percentile
Ascending order
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
GPA percentile
Descending order
Rank 1 2 3 4 5
Note. The dots represent students’ abilities that are measured by percentiles of the first-year GPA
distribution. Each line connects the first-year GPAs of students from the same team. The colors indicate
a student’s ability rank in her team as well as distances between abilities of teammates. The graph is
based on the Sample for peer characteristics from Table 2.1.
Figure 2.1: Team compositions in terms of the first-year GPA.
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Statistics 1 0.016∗ −0.00000
(0.009) (0.013)
Mathematics 1 −0.004 −0.006
(0.007) (0.011)
Observations 95,949 14,110
Note. The labels program-year and tutorial group refer to
partitions of students within which students could poten-
tially form teams. Columns 1 and 2 refer to probit estimates
obtained using equation (2.6). ∗/∗∗/∗∗∗ denote statistical sig-
nificance at the 10/5/1% level.
the distribution of the between-team component obtained by using all possible partitions
of students given team sizes. This exercise, however, is computationally prohibitive in
my sample. For this reason, I calculate the between-team variance under the following
four matching scenarios: homogeneous matching, one half of randomly selected students
match homogeneously while the rest match randomly, one third of randomly selected
students match homogeneously while the rest match randomly, and random matching.
Two cases are considered: when students match homogeneously within a program-year
combination and within a tutorial group. A between-group variation of 42.64% is not
a likely draw from the distribution of between-group variation neither under random
assignment nor under perfect homogeneous matching though it is closer to the former.
However, a similar mean between-team variance component is obtained when one third
of randomly selected students match homogeneously while the rest match randomly.
Although the matching patterns observed in the data are not consistent with random
matching, homogeneous matching is not very prominent.
In the second column of Table 2.4, average background characteristics of teammates
are regressed on the team assignment grade. There are positive partial correlations be-
tween the team assignment grade and the average first-year GPA, the share of females,
the average Statistics 1 grade, and the average age.
24
Data
Table 2.6: Summary statistics of the between-team variance component under different matching
scenarios.
Mean Min 25p Median 75p Max
Program-year
Homogeneous matching 100% 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
Homogeneous matching 50% 0.61 0.52 0.59 0.61 0.63 0.68
Homogeneous matching 33.33% 0.49 0.40 0.47 0.49 0.51 0.56
Random matching 0.27 0.20 0.26 0.27 0.28 0.35
Turorial group
Homogeneous matching 100% 0.94 0.93 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.95
Homogeneous matching 50% 0.55 0.49 0.54 0.55 0.57 0.63
Homogeneous matching 33.33% 0.44 0.37 0.42 0.44 0.46 0.50
Random matching 0.30 0.24 0.29 0.30 0.31 0.36
Note. The labels program-year and tutorial group indicate partitions of students within which
students were matched. The four matching scenarios under the program-year partitions are dis-
cussed in detail, while the matching under the tutorial group partitions is done analogously. Ho-
mogeneous matching 100%: within each program-year combination, students are ordered based on
their first-year GPAs and divided into teams preserving the order. The team sizes are drawn from
the distribution of team sizes in the data without replacement. The procedure is repeated 1000
times. Random matching: within each program-year combination, students are partitioned ran-
domly into groups of the team sizes observed in the data. Homogeneous matching 50% (33.33%):
within each program year combination, students are divided randomly into two groups - homoge-
neous matching and random matching - where the sizes of the groups are determined by the share
of students who match homogeneously. Within each group, the respective procedure described
above is applied. The team sizes are partitioned into the two groups randomly. The procedure is
repeated 1000 times.
25
Chapter 2: Achievement Peer Effects in Small Study Teams
Table 2.3 shows that the average team assignment grade is surprisingly high. This
finding is consistent with the case where high ability students contribute more to the
team assignment than the rest of the students. Table 2.7 considers only teams that
obtained a high team assignment grade and investigates whether the grade is predicted
better by the average GPA or by the share of high ability team members. Although the
average GPA is a stronger predictor for the team assignment grades that are higher than
the median, the grades in the top 25% are predicted better by the share of students in
the top 15% and top 10% of the first-year GPA distribution. This finding is consistent
with the case where high ability students contribute more to the team assignment than
regular students.13
Table 2.7: Predictive power of different measures of ability compositions of homework assignment
teams.





Note. In Columns 1 and 2, only teams with team assignment
grades higher than the 50th and 75th percentile of the distri-
bution of team assignment grades, respectively, are consider1ed.
Each cell reports the determination coefficient of a different OLS
regression, where the team assignment grade is regressed on a
measure of team ability composition, which is indicated by the
respective row name. The label Xp stands for the share of stu-
dents whose first-year GPA is in the Xth or higher percentile of
the first-year GPA distribution.
13The share of students in the top 5% of the first-year GPA distribution, however, has a very low
predictive power. This finding does not contradict my explanation above because the number of
teams with students in the top 5% is very low. Consider the situation where the way students divide
the work depends on the presence of high ability team members. If there are no high ability students
in a team, all the students contribute to the team assignment proportionally to their ability. If, on
the other hand, high ability students are present, the rest of the students reduce their contribution
proportionally to the share of high ability teammates. Then, the average GPA of team members is
a stronger predictor for the former group of students, whereas the share of high ability students is a
stronger predictor for the latter group. If the number of teams with high ability students is low, the





To facilitate a comparison with Jain and Kapoor (2015), I start my analysis with the














where the dependent variable ysgi is the individual Statistics 2 grade, xgi is a vector of
background characteristics, wgi is a vector of tutorial group dummies
14, whereas GPAg−i
and SD(GPAg−i) are, respectively, the average and standard deviation of the first-year
GPA in team g excluding student i. There are several ways to specify the linear-in-means
model that differ from one another depending on how zgi in equation (2.1) is defined.






Feld and Zölitz (2017) and Booij et al. (2017), zgi is defined as the average (and standard
deviation) of peer GPA obtained in the previous period. Note that the latter specification
is not a reduced form of the former because the reduced form is a function of all the
average background characteristics, not only the GPA in the previous period. I choose to
follow the latter strand of literature and measure peer ability by the previous year GPA
instead of the individual Statistics 2 grade because of the following reasons. Firstly, the
Statistics 2 grade might be a less reliable measure of ability because it captures a student’s
performance in one course instead of her average performance in ten courses which is
captured by the previous year GPA. Secondly, although the recent literature on peer
effects in education has found that in many settings peer effects are heterogeneous, for
example, because high ability peers are affected differently by low ability peers and vice
versa (Sacerdote, 2014), to the best of my knowledge there is no estimation framework
that allows to estimate this type of model using contemporaneous achievement instead
of predetermined ability. Thirdly, peer effects in terms of the first-year GPA are more
interesting for policy makers because they can manipulate peer group composition in
14Although tutorial group switching is formally forbidden, informal switching sometimes takes place.
The dataset contains two types of tutorial group identifiers: administratively assigned and assigned by
the tutorial teacher of the Statistics 2 course (called Actual tutorial group in Table 2.C.10 in Appendix
2.C). In the first Statistics 2 tutorial lecture, names of students in each homework assignment team
are recorded by the tutorial teacher, hence the actual student’s tutorial group identifier is recorded
as well. Given that the administratively assigned tutorial group identifiers are missing for 4.5% of
the students, the actual tutorial group identifiers are used to construct the tutorial group fixed effects
employed in the estimation. Table 2.C.10 and Figure 2.C.11 in Appendix 2.C show that the estimation
results are robust if the tutorial group fixed effects based on the administratively assigned groups are
used.
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this dimension. Additionally, as pointed out by Manski (1993), linear-in-means models
with endogeneous effects suffer from the reflection problem.15
In my case, background characteristics include several measures of ability: first-year
GPA, Statistics 1 grade, and Mathematics 1 grade. I choose not to distinguish between
the different types of peer ability, and therefore, include only the average peer GPA
instead of the averages of all the background characteristics of peers.
Furthermore, I also include the standard deviation of the peer first-year GPA al-
though it is not present in the classical linear-in-means model. I do so because my
setting is closely related to Jain and Kapoor (2015)’s. Hence, I consider a specification
that closely follows theirs. There are more studies where the classical linear-in-means
model is extended with the standard deviation of prior achievement of peers, e.g., see
Booij et al. (2017), De Giorgi et al. (2012). The inclusion of the standard deviation can
be justified by the Focus model introduced by Hoxby and Weingarth (2005), which sug-
gests that a student benefits from peer homogeneity even though she does not belong to
the homogeneous subgroup. Although this model is interesting from a theoretical point
of view, it is difficult to imagine that a student would benefit from a homogeneous team
assignment group even though she is not a part of the homogeneous subgroup. The in-
clusion of the standard deviation can be also rationalized by a model where students
have rank concerns as in Tincani (2017).
The estimates of γ1 and γ2 are inconsistent and biased if there are unobservables
that are correlated with GPAg−i and SD(GPAg−i). To better understand the potential
sources of the bias, I regress GPAg−i and SD(GPAg−i) on various student background
characteristics (separate regressions). Column 1 of Table 2.8 shows that there are positive
and statistically significant correlations between the average first-year GPA of peers
and a student’s first-year GPA, Statistics 1, and Mathematics 1 grades. The number of
second attempts in the first-year and the average GPA of peers are negatively correlated.
Hence, there is a positive association between being a good student and the average
GPA of peers. If unobserved ability exhibits a similar correlation pattern to the observed
characteristics, the estimate of γ1 is biased upwards. It is also important to note that
the magnitudes of the estimates are not very large. Column 3 shows no evidence of
statistically significant associations between the standard deviation of peer GPA and
a student’s background characteristics. To account for differences in the grades across
years and programs, the same regressions are estimated with program-year fixed effects
(see columns 2 and 4 in Table 2.8). The estimates are very similar.
Table 2.9 shows the results from specifications obtained using different versions of
15In my case, the group size variation could in principle be used to tackle the reflection problem but
identification might be weak.
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Table 2.8: Balancing tests for the average and standard deviation of peer GPA.
Average of peer GPA Standard deviation of peer GPA
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GPA 0.178∗∗∗ 0.159∗∗∗ −0.017 −0.022
(0.027) (0.027) (0.037) (0.038)
Female 0.134∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ −0.016 −0.011
(0.039) (0.040) (0.029) (0.030)
Dutch −0.092 0.055 −0.011 −0.011
(0.072) (0.084) (0.046) (0.053)
Credit points 0.005 0.004 0.002 0.003
(0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005)
Exempted credit point −0.007 −0.008 0.010 0.009
(0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008)
Second attempts −0.068∗∗∗ −0.060∗∗∗ 0.003 0.004
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013)
Unnecessary second attempts 0.036 0.028 −0.011 −0.015
(0.054) (0.052) (0.034) (0.037)
Statistics 1 0.082∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗ −0.006 −0.004
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015)
Mathematics 1 0.057∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ −0.005 −0.008
(0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.018)
Age −0.001 −0.011 0.001 0.003
(0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Program-year FE X X
Observations 726 726 711 711
Note. Each row corresponds to results from a different OLS regression. The dependent variables in the first
two and the last two columns are the average first-year GPA and the standard deviation of the first-year GPA
of a student’s teammates, respectively, whereas the independent variables in each regression are the student’s
background characteristics. The number of observations is smaller in columns 3 and 4 because teams of size
2 are excluded as sample standard deviation is not defined for one observation. Robust standard errors are
reported in the parentheses. ∗/∗∗/∗∗∗ denote statistical significance at the 10/5/1% level.
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equation (2.7). In the first column, the classical linear-in-means model is considered,
where peer characteristics are summarized by the average first-year GPA of peers. In the
second column, the standard deviation of peer GPA is added. In the first column, the
estimate of the average GPA of teammates is negative and marginally significant. The
estimates in the second column are also negative but insignificant. As the estimates might
be confounded by unobserved factors that influence both the Statistics 2 grade and the
peer characteristics, columns 3 and 4 report results based on the difference specification
in equation (2.3). Column 3 indicates that if the mean GPA of a student’s peers increases
by 1, the student’s individual grade decreases by 0.211. The estimate is significant only
at the 10% level. Even though the estimates of peer effects in Column 4 are negative,
they are not statistically significantly different from zero.
Although there are no team assignments in the Mathematics 2 course, students might
interact in the same manner as in the Statistics 2 course. For example, anecdotal evi-
dence suggests that students form teams with their friends. Moreover, Lin (2010) and
Patacchini et al. (2017) find positive and significant achievement peer effects among
friends. Hence, consider a scenario where a student studies for the Mathematics 2 course
exclusively with her Statistics 2 teammates, for example, by solving problems which the
teacher recommends to solve at home. Then, the main difference between peer effects in
both courses is incentives. Namely, students receive a joint grade from the team assign-
ment in the Statistics 2 course, whereas in the Mathematics 2 course problems are not
graded. Hence, students might free-ride while solving the team assignment with their
teammates. If cooperation is as strong in the Statistics 2 course as in the Mathematics
2 course and there are no free-riding problems, GPAg−iγ1 and SD(GPAg−i)γ2 might be
present in both the statistics and mathematics equations and cancel out when taking
the difference.





1 +GPAg−iγ1 + SD(GPAg−i)γ2 + κg + u
s
gi, (2.8)
where κg is a team fixed effect. A number of studies document that friendship formation
processes exhibit homophily, a tendency of individuals to form friendships with others
who are similar to themselves (e.g., see Currarini et al. (2009) and references therein). In
equation (2.8), κg captures unobserved characteristics that are common for all members
in a team. The identification is based on group size variation similarly to Lee (2007). A
similar identification strategy is applied, for example, in Boucher et al. (2014). Column
5 of Table 2.9 shows that the estimate of γ1 is more negative compared to columns





Table 2.9: Estimates of the linear-in-means model.
Levels Differences Team FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Background characteristics
GPA 0.631∗∗∗ 0.620∗∗∗ 0.257 0.239 0.482 1.075∗
(0.191) (0.195) (0.205) (0.211) (0.611) (0.581)
Female 0.556∗∗∗ 0.588∗∗∗ 0.347∗∗∗ 0.374∗∗∗ 0.781∗∗∗ 0.771∗∗∗
(0.111) (0.109) (0.129) (0.130) (0.230) (0.230)
Dutch −0.502∗∗ −0.493∗∗ −0.304 −0.278 0.087 0.133
(0.241) (0.247) (0.325) (0.334) (0.335) (0.324)
Credit points 0.016 0.018 −0.016 −0.013 −0.003 −0.025
(0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.046) (0.049)
Exempted credit point 0.026∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.019 0.020 −0.002 −0.029
(0.010) (0.010) (0.015) (0.015) (0.035) (0.039)
Second attempts −0.153∗∗∗ −0.164∗∗∗ −0.016 −0.027 −0.118 −0.117
(0.048) (0.049) (0.061) (0.062) (0.072) (0.072)
Unnecessary second attempts 0.0001 0.011 0.006 0.016 −0.171 −0.165
(0.108) (0.110) (0.132) (0.133) (0.157) (0.156)
Statistics 1 0.408∗∗∗ 0.395∗∗∗ −0.019 −0.014 0.404∗∗∗ 0.385∗∗∗
(0.089) (0.089) (0.095) (0.096) (0.133) (0.131)
Mathematics 1 0.051 0.061 −0.236∗∗∗ −0.240∗∗∗ 0.100 0.126
(0.063) (0.063) (0.078) (0.080) (0.093) (0.091)
Age −0.085 −0.083 −0.083 −0.082 −0.072 −0.072
(0.052) (0.052) (0.066) (0.067) (0.070) (0.072)
Peer characteristics
Mean of peer GPA −0.220∗ −0.146 −0.211∗ −0.158 −0.521 1.026
(0.121) (0.110) (0.123) (0.121) (1.548) (1.428)
SD of peer GPA −0.073 −0.123 0.462
(0.137) (0.161) (0.431)
Tutorial group FE X X X X
F-test Peer char. = 0 1.021 1.313 0.876
F-test p-value 0.361 0.270 0.417
Observations 726 711 726 711 726 711
R2 0.471 0.475 0.110 0.106 0.647 0.648
Adjusted R2 0.437 0.439 0.053 0.046 0.448 0.452
Note. Columns 1, 2 and 3, 4 refer to equations (2.1) and (2.3), respectively, whereas columns 5 and 6 refer to equation (2.8).
The number of observations is smaller in columns 2, 4, and 6 because teams of size 2 are excluded as sample standard deviation
is not defined for one observation. Standard errors clustered at the assignment team level are reported in the parentheses.
∗/∗∗/∗∗∗ denote statistical significance at the 10/5/1% level.
31
Chapter 2: Achievement Peer Effects in Small Study Teams
estimates of γ1 and γ2 in column 6 are positive and of a much larger magnitude but
again remain statistically insignificant. On the one hand, the difference in the magnitudes
might indicate self-selection bias. On the other hand, κg also captures all other peer
characteristics that are common for all members in a team, for example, the maximum or
minimum GPA of teammates. Conditional on these characteristics, the influence of both
the mean and standard deviation of peer GPA might change. Nevertheless, the estimates
of both the mean and standard deviation of peer GPA in all the six specifications in Table
2.9 are not statistically significantly different from zero at the 5% level.
Although anecdotal evidence suggests that students tend to form teams with their
friends, my findings are different from those in Lin (2010) and Patacchini et al. (2017),
where achievement peer effects among friends are analyzed based on the linear-in-means
model. The difference might be driven by one of the following reasons. Firstly, when
friends are solving a team assignment together, they have different incentives compared
to cases when they are studying together voluntarily because in the former case they get
a joint team assignment grade. Secondly, Lin (2010) deals with potential threats to iden-
tification by including school-grade fixed effects, while Patacchini et al. (2017) include
network fixed effects and model the network formation process and the outcome equa-
tion jointly, whereas I use within-subject variation in students’ achievements. Thirdly,
in my model, peer effects are measured by prior achievement, whereas in their models a
measure of current achievement is used.
2.7.2. Effect of proportion of high ability peers
The linear-in-means model has two important implications. Firstly, a student is equally
affected by all of her teammates. Secondly, the effect on a student does not depend
on her (relative) position in the ability distribution. It may, however, be the case that
low ability students are harmed by high performers because of free-riding, whereas high
ability students may benefit from them because of mutual learning. Hence, I allow for
this type of heterogeneity and study the effect of the share of very high ability team-
mates on regular and very high ability students. I believe that students at the top of the
ability distribution can have a different influence than the rest of the students because
they might have higher grade concerns allowing them both to impose much higher social
norms as well as to have much lower costs of effort. They also might be able to explain
study material significantly better than regular students. Moreover, high ability students
may be influenced by other high ability students differently than regular students. For
example, for high ability students peers effect might be driven mainly by mutual learning
because the free-riding problem can be mitigated by their intrinsic motivation to learn,
whereas for regular students the free-riding problem might dominate. Ideally, the esti-
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mating equation allowing for heterogeneous effects of the share of high ability students
would be considered, where the effect depends on whether a student is regular or of high
ability. The number of high ability students in my sample is, however, small, hence the
effect might not (and is not as is shown below) precisely estimated. Therefore, I continue














where HAg−i is the share of high ability teammates in a student i’s team (excluding
student i).
Finally, high ability students need to be defined. A student is considered to be of
high ability if she belongs to the top X% of the first-year GPA distribution, where X
varies from 85 to 95; students below the Xth percentile are considered to be regular. My
sample, however, consists of students from two different programs and three different
years. Hence, there are (at least) four ways to define the first-year GPA distribution:
program-year specific, program-specific, year-specific, and pooled. The advantage of the
definition based on the program-year combination is that any differences between grading
systems in different programs and years are eliminated. But differences in absolute ability
might not be taken into account either. It may not be a problem if only relative ability
matters. If, however, absolute ability matters instead, peer effects might not be captured.
Another extreme is to pool the first-year GPAs from the three different years and the two
programs together. The implicit assumption is that the first-year GPAs are comparable
and represent absolute ability of students. On the one hand, the difficulty of courses
might be different between programs as well as the difficulty of exams between different
years. On the other hand, the differences might cancel out since the first-year GPA is a
weighted average of grades from 10 courses. Moreover, students from all programs at the
Tilburg School of Economics and Management fail a course if their grade is less than 6
and they graduate with honors or distinction if their GPA is at least 8 or 7.5, respectively.
Hence, this information gives more evidence that grades are comparable across years and
programs. Similarly, the definition based on program implies that the first-year GPAs
are comparable across different years but not programs, whereas the definition based on
year states the opposite. As all the definitions have their advantages an disadvantages, I
present my results based on all four of them.
Figure 2.2 provides evidence that there are differences between the 85–95th percentiles
of the program-year, program, year, and pooled first-year GPA distributions. Consider,
for example, the BSc Business Economic (BE) program in the academic year 2014/2015.
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BE 2015/2016 IBA 2015/2016
BE 2014/2015 IBA 2014/2015
BE 2013/2014 IBA 2013/2014




















Program−year Program Year Pooled
Note. The colors refer to the program-year, program, year, and pooled first-year GPA distributions. The
labels BE and IBA stand for the BSc Business Economics and BSc International Business Economics
programs, respectively. Each graph in the figure represents a program-year combination. Hence, the
percentiles of the pooled distribution are the same in all the graphs, whereas the percentiles of the
program and year distributions are the same across programs and years, respectively. The percentiles
of the program-year distribution are different in each graph.




The 85th percentile of the program-year, program, year, and pooled GPA distributions
are, respectively, 7.78, 7.56, 7.74, and 7.63. The 85th percentile of the program-year dis-
tribution corresponds to approximately the 86th, 89th, and 90th percentiles of the year,
pooled, and program distributions, respectively. The largest difference arises between
the percentiles of the program-year distribution and the rest. Especially the 91–95th
percentiles of the remaining three distributions are rather similar.
Additionally, it is important to investigate whether regular students form teams with
high ability students. If high ability students form teams exclusively with the same ability
students, there is no variation in HAg−i in equation (2.9) and γ1 is not identified or has a
large standard error if there are only very few teams with mixed ability students. Figure
2.3 shows the distributions of the shares of high ability teammates regular students have. I
will discuss the first graph in detail; the rest of the graphs follow a very similar pattern. In
the first graph, the classification of students into regular and high ability groups is based
on the program-year first-year GPA distribution. For the first bar, the 85th percentile
is used as a cutoff point: all students below the 85th percentile are considered regular
whereas the rest are defined to be of high ability. Out of the 726 students, there are
575 regular students: 360 with no high ability peers, 140 with 1/3 of high ability peers,
21 with 1/2, 48 with 2/3 and 6 students with all teammates of high ability. If the 95th
percentile is used as a cutoff point, all students below the 95th percentile are considered
to be regular, whereas the rest of the students are treated as high ability. Although the
number of regular students increases to 675, the number of regular students with at least
one high ability peer falls to 111 making it more difficult to estimate γ1 in equation (2.9)
precisely. For this reason the highest percentile I consider is the 95th.
Many studies on peer effects in education use limited variation in peer variables
(Booij et al., 2017). De Giorgi et al. (2012), for example, analyze the effect of classroom
size and class heterogeneity at Bocconi University. In their study, class size varies from
55 to 159 with the mean size of about 130. Due to random assignment of students into
classes and the law of large numbers, it is thus likely that both the mean and standard
deviation of peer ability, the two peer measures used in their study, have limited support.
Lavy et al. (2012) use a similar specification to equation (2.9) and analyze the effect of
the percentage of high ability pupils in English secondary schools. In their study, the
share of high ability peers varies from 0 to 0.20, although this variation mainly captures
differences in school quality (Lavy et al., 2012). In my case, however, the share of high
ability peers varies from 0 to 1, though the number of regular students with only high
ability teammates is quite low. Nevertheless, my results utilize variation in the share of
high ability students over a large support.
Next, the share of high ability members in a regular student’s team might not only
35













































Note. The titles of the graphs refer to the first-year GPA distributions used. The x-axis refers to the
cutoff point used to divide students into regular and high ability groups. For example, the label 85 in
the first graph indicates that students below the 85th percentile of the program-year GPA distribution
are considered to be regular, whereas the rest of the students are considered to be of high ability. Each
bar shows the distribution of HAg−i in equation (2.9) for regular students. The dashed line refers to
the number of students in the Reduced sample in Table 2.1.





Table 2.10: Balancing tests for the share of high ability students.
Program-year Program Year Pooled
85p 95p 85p 95p 85p 95p 85p 95p
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
GPA 0.054∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.043∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.041∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.040∗ 0.038∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.009) (0.023) (0.009) (0.023) (0.010) (0.022) (0.009)
Female 0.072∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗ 0.055∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗
(0.022) (0.013) (0.023) (0.013) (0.022) (0.013) (0.022) (0.013)
Dutch −0.038 0.043 −0.070 0.031 −0.067 0.032 −0.077 0.031
(0.049) (0.031) (0.054) (0.032) (0.055) (0.034) (0.058) (0.032)
Credit points 0.003 0.002 −0.0003 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002
(0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
Exempted credit point −0.004∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ 0.003∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001 −0.001∗∗ −0.001 −0.001∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.0004) (0.001) (0.0004) (0.002) (0.0005) (0.002) (0.0004)
Second attempts −0.011∗∗ −0.011∗∗∗ −0.010∗ −0.010∗∗∗ −0.010∗ −0.010∗∗∗ −0.012∗∗ −0.010∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
Unnecessary second attempts −0.015 0.005 −0.012 0.012 −0.023 0.010 −0.006 0.012
(0.023) (0.011) (0.023) (0.014) (0.022) (0.014) (0.027) (0.014)
Statistics 1 0.023∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.004)
Mathematics 1 0.022∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗ 0.013∗ 0.010∗∗ 0.010 0.010∗∗ 0.010 0.010∗∗
(0.007) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004)
Age −0.009 −0.006 0.007 −0.007∗ −0.003 −0.006 −0.00001 −0.007∗
(0.007) (0.004) (0.009) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004)
Program-year FE X X X X X X X X
Observations 575 675 573 676 575 676 579 676
Note. The labels program-year, program, year, and pooled refer to a first-year GPA distribution used to classify students as regular and high ability. The
labels 85p and 95p indicate which threshold is used to divide students into the two groups. That is, Xp means that students below the Xth percentile are
considered regular, whereas the rest of the students are considered of high ability. The estimates are based on the samples of regular students only. Each row
corresponds to results from a different OLS regression. The dependent variable is the share of high ability peers in a regular student’s team, whereas the
independent variables are the regular student’s characteristics. Robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses. ∗/∗∗/∗∗∗ denote statistical significance
at the 10/5/1% level.
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capture peer effects but also unobserved characteristics of the regular student. To better
understand potential sources of self-selection bias, I regress the shares of high ability
peers based on the 85th and 95th percentiles on a regular student’s background char-
acteristics. Table 2.10 reports positive and statistically significant partial16 correlations
between the share of high ability peers and the first-year GPA, female, and the Statis-
tics 1 and Mathematics 1 grades. The numbers of exempted credit points and first-year
second attempts are negatively and statistically significantly partially correlated with
the share of high ability peers. Hence, better students tend to have more high ability
peers. If unobserved ability follows the same pattern, a positive self-selection bias in the
levels equation might be present. Furthermore, the partial correlations based on the 95th
percentile are smaller in absolute value compared to those based on the 85th percentile.
The estimates of equation (2.9) are presented in Table 2.11. To simplify the analysis,
I also plot the estimated coefficients of γ1 in Figures 2.4 and 2.5. Figure 2.4 shows
that all the point estimates obtained using both the levels and differences equations are
negative. Most of the estimates of the levels equation based on the program, year, and
pooled first-year GPA distributions are larger than the corresponding estimates of the
difference equation indicating that the share of high ability peers in the levels equation
also captures a positive self-selection bias. Hence, I continue my analysis based solely on
the difference equation.
Figure 2.5 demonstrates that the estimates are slightly sensitive to the first-year
distribution used. For example, if the program-year distribution is employed, only the
estimates based on the 90–95th percentiles are statistically significantly different from
zero at the 10% significance level whereas it is the case for almost all the estimates
based on the remaining three distributions. Additionally, Table 2.B.2 and Figure 2.B.1
in Appendix 2.B show that almost all the estimates of γ1 based on the 75–84th percentiles
are not statistically significantly different from zero even at the 10% level.
The significant estimates vary approximately from -0.5 to -1.1 indicating that if all
teammates of a regular student are of high ability, her individual Statistics 2 grade is
lower by 0.5–1.1 points (0.26–0.57 standard deviation units of the Statistics 2 grade).
Although the number of regular students whose team members are all of high ability is
small (see Figure 2.3), there are many regular students in four-member teams with one
high ability student (share = 0.33 in Figure 2.3). Their individual Statistics 2 grade is
lower, on average, approximately by 0.17–0.37 points, a small but economically significant
effect.
16I call the estimates in Table 2.10 partial correlations instead of correlations although the estimates
are based on separate regression for each background variable because program-year fixed effects are































Note. The data points in this figure are taken from Table 2.11. The 90% confidence intervals are based
on the standard errors reported in the table. The dashed line corresponds to the effect of size zero.
Figure 2.4: The effect of the share of high ability students on regular students: comparison of estimates
based on the levels and differences equations.
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95% confidence interval 90% confidence interval
Note. The data points in this figure correspond to the estimates from Table 2.11 based on the difference
specification. The confidence intervals are based on the standard errors reported in the table. The dashed
line corresponds to the effect of size zero.






Table 2.11: Estimates of the effect of the share of high ability students on regular students: comparison of estimates based on the levels and differences equations.
Program-year Program Year Pooled
Levels Differences Levels Differences Levels Differences Levels Differences
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
85p −0.462 −0.441 −0.423 −0.614∗∗ −0.393 −0.517∗ −0.540∗ −0.837∗∗∗
(0.295) (0.313) (0.301) (0.283) (0.303) (0.288) (0.302) (0.286)
86p −0.372 −0.321 −0.547∗ −0.721∗∗ −0.462 −0.584∗∗ −0.463 −0.704∗∗
(0.295) (0.322) (0.305) (0.283) (0.312) (0.293) (0.320) (0.288)
87p −0.444 −0.458 −0.481 −0.632∗∗ −0.542∗ −0.648∗∗ −0.588∗ −0.833∗∗∗
(0.306) (0.325) (0.323) (0.301) (0.313) (0.288) (0.338) (0.298)
88p −0.489 −0.535∗ −0.582∗ −0.764∗∗ −0.515 −0.716∗∗ −0.637∗ −0.890∗∗∗
(0.314) (0.298) (0.335) (0.306) (0.328) (0.291) (0.341) (0.304)
89p −0.441 −0.479 −0.675∗∗ −0.882∗∗∗ −0.641∗ −0.987∗∗∗ −0.621∗ −0.820∗∗
(0.325) (0.312) (0.340) (0.304) (0.371) (0.312) (0.354) (0.319)
90p −0.595∗ −0.694∗∗ −0.834∗∗ −0.946∗∗∗ −0.768∗∗ −0.952∗∗∗ −0.622∗ −0.863∗∗∗
(0.309) (0.285) (0.353) (0.318) (0.380) (0.329) (0.367) (0.328)
91p −0.726∗∗ −0.747∗∗∗ −0.853∗∗ −1.089∗∗∗ −0.814∗∗ −0.929∗∗∗ −0.825∗∗ −1.041∗∗∗
(0.330) (0.287) (0.382) (0.334) (0.373) (0.335) (0.397) (0.347)
92p −0.776∗∗ −0.759∗∗ −0.832∗∗ −1.014∗∗∗ −0.869∗∗ −1.043∗∗∗ −0.749∗ −0.939∗∗∗
(0.341) (0.306) (0.402) (0.349) (0.393) (0.352) (0.383) (0.342)
93p −0.935∗∗ −0.967∗∗∗ −0.870∗∗ −1.022∗∗∗ −0.842∗∗ −1.044∗∗∗ −0.762∗ −0.965∗∗∗
(0.371) (0.344) (0.389) (0.341) (0.397) (0.350) (0.416) (0.359)
94p −0.751∗ −0.784∗∗ −0.933∗∗ −0.985∗∗∗ −1.014∗∗ −1.090∗∗∗ −0.930∗∗ −1.018∗∗∗
(0.413) (0.395) (0.416) (0.362) (0.435) (0.378) (0.420) (0.360)
95p −0.936∗∗ −0.940∗∗ −0.865∗ −0.773∗ −0.888∗ −0.810∗ −0.865∗ −0.773∗
(0.462) (0.411) (0.465) (0.446) (0.465) (0.441) (0.465) (0.446)
Background characteristics X X X X X X X X
Tutorial group FE X X X X X X X X
Note. The odd and even numbered columns refer to equations (2.1) and (2.3), respectively, where peer characteristics are measured by the share
of high ability peers. The labels program-year, program, year, and pooled refer to a first-year GPA distribution, whereas the row names refer to
percentiles of that distribution used to divide students into regular and high ability groups (see the note of Table 2.10). Each row corresponds to a
different OLS regression. The estimates are based on the samples of regular students only. The sample size varies between 573 and 676 as is depicted
in Figure 2.3. Standard errors clustered at the assignment team level are reported in the parentheses. ∗/∗∗/∗∗∗ denote statistical significance at the
10/5/1% level.
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If the share of her high ability teammates increases, a regular student might respond
in the following way. Firstly, if high ability peers have much lower costs of effort, she
might decrease her effort level, i.e. free-ride more. Secondly, she could increase her effort
if there are more high ability teammates who impose social norms of a high effort level.
Thirdly, she might be able to learn the material better as now there are more teammates
who could potentially give good explanations. My estimates indicate that the free-riding
effect dominates the remaining two effects.
Furthermore, so far only the effect on regular students has been analyzed. Hence,
Table 2.B.1 and Figure 2.B.2 in Appendix 2.B report the estimates of equation (2.3)
utilizing the entire sample of 726 students, where β3 depends on a student’s position in









2 +Rgi ·HAg−iγ1 + (1−Rgi) ·HAg−iγ2︸ ︷︷ ︸
z′giβ3
+Rgiβ4 + ξgi + ε
s
gi, (2.10)
where Rgi is a dummy variable indicating that a student is regular. The point esti-
mates for regular students are similar to those in Table 2.11 and Figure 2.5. Although
almost all the point estimates for high ability students are positive, most of them are
not statistically significantly different from zero even at the 10% level. The standard
errors obtained using the 85–90th percentiles are quite small, however, those based on
the higher percentiles are large due to a small number of high ability students.17
The potential mechanisms that rationalize my findings imply that regular students
should be affected more negatively by high ability peers defined on higher percentiles
than on lower. Ideally, the point estimates should be decreasing as well.18 The downwards
sloping trend in Figure 2.5 is not very prominent (perhaps except for the estimates
obtained using the program-year distribution). One of the explanations is that different
samples are used for different percentiles. For example, if the 90th percentile is utilized,
all students below the 90th percentile of the first-year GPA distribution are considered to
be regular, whereas if the 95th percentile is used, all students below the 95th percentile
are considered to be regular. Hence, if students between the 90th and 95th percentiles
benefit from students above the 95th percentile, the effect might be higher than that










gi ·HAg−iγ1 + (1−
R85gi ) ·HAg−iγ2 +R85giβ4 + ξgi + εsgi, where R85gi is equal to one if a student is below the 85th percentile
of the first-year GPA distribution and zero otherwise, whereas HAg−i is defined in the same way as
before. The estimates are presented in Table 2.B.3 and Figure 2.B.3. The standard errors of γ̂2 are
not smaller, however.
18In an ideal situation, point estimates could be used to test whether the population parameters are
decreasing. In my case, however, the estimates come from different regressions implying that the formal
testing is a very difficult task.
42
Results
based on the 90th percentile. To tackle this issue, I estimate the model based on the
sample of students below the 85th percentile (see Table 2.12 and Figure 2.6). The results
indicate that the estimates are more downward sloping than in Figure 2.5.19
I check the sensitivity of my results with respect to a number of specification choices
in Appendix 2.C.
Overall, my findings indicate that regular students are affected negatively by a larger
share of high ability peers. This result rejects the Shining Light model proposed by Hoxby
and Weingarth (2005), where several very high ability students inspire the others to exert
more effort. Also, contrary to Jain and Kapoor (2015), I find a causal effect of teammates’
ability on a student’s individual achievement. On the one hand, this discrepancy might
emerge because I analyze self-selected teams, whereas Jain and Kapoor (2015) consider
randomly-assigned teams. Moreover, I employ a different functional form of peer effects.
On the other hand, the results might be dependent on the institutional setting.
My results also differ from those in Lavy et al. (2012) who study the effect of high
ability students on regular students in English secondary schools. They find little evi-
dence that regular students are affected by high ability peers.20 There are two potential
explanations. First, due to data limitations, Lavy et al. (2012) measure peer effects at
a grade level with the average grade size being 135 students. Their argument is that
this measure is likely to be correlated with the peer measures within classes. If peer
effects of high ability students operate only within small groups of friends, they might
not be captured when peer characteristics are measured at the classroom level. The sec-
ond and perhaps more convincing explanation is that students in the two settings have
different incentives. Namely, as students are evaluated based solely on their individual
performance in Lavy et al. (2012)’s setting, they do not have any incentives to free-ride.
My results also differ from the empirical team production literature, where it is typ-
ically found that the negative free-riding effect is offset by other mechanisms generating
positive peer effects in terms of productivity (see Mas and Moretti, 2009, and Chan et al.,
2014). One of the explanations is that my paper studies a task that has to be performed
only once. Hence, for high ability students it might be less costly to perform the task
themselves instead of teaching their low ability teammates how to perform the task and
monitoring them. This situation is less likely to occur among supermarket cashers stud-
ied in Mas and Moretti (2009) or salespeople in a department store analyzed by Chan
et al. (2014). Furthermore, there is less scope for task diversification in their papers than
19Table 2.B.4 and Figure 2.B.4 in Appendix 2.B provide similar results based on the sample of students
below the 90th percentile.
20Although they find that these results are heterogeneous: girls significantly benefit from high ability
ability peers, whereas boys are marginally negatively affected.
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Table 2.12: Estimates of the effect of the share of high ability students on students below the 85th
percentile of the first-year GPA distribution.
Program-year Program Year Pooled
(1) (2) (3) (4)
85p −0.441 −0.614∗∗ −0.517∗ −0.837∗∗∗
(0.313) (0.283) (0.288) (0.286)
86p −0.355 −0.741∗∗ −0.601∗∗ −0.709∗∗
(0.329) (0.288) (0.302) (0.292)
87p −0.495 −0.658∗∗ −0.685∗∗ −0.857∗∗∗
(0.330) (0.310) (0.302) (0.307)
88p −0.580∗ −0.762∗∗ −0.735∗∗ −0.892∗∗∗
(0.309) (0.322) (0.311) (0.317)
89p −0.619∗ −0.879∗∗∗ −1.018∗∗∗ −0.878∗∗
(0.334) (0.327) (0.334) (0.341)
90p −0.825∗∗∗ −0.952∗∗∗ −0.965∗∗∗ −0.960∗∗∗
(0.316) (0.355) (0.357) (0.346)
91p −0.837∗∗ −1.152∗∗∗ −1.022∗∗∗ −1.133∗∗∗
(0.329) (0.373) (0.364) (0.368)
92p −0.862∗∗ −1.123∗∗∗ −1.222∗∗∗ −1.039∗∗∗
(0.354) (0.396) (0.390) (0.383)
93p −1.137∗∗∗ −1.163∗∗∗ −1.191∗∗∗ −1.138∗∗∗
(0.379) (0.411) (0.423) (0.420)
94p −1.218∗∗∗ −1.190∗∗∗ −1.210∗∗ −1.267∗∗∗
(0.420) (0.438) (0.468) (0.426)
95p −1.358∗∗∗ −1.196∗∗ −1.212∗∗ −1.228∗∗
(0.479) (0.500) (0.505) (0.479)
Background characteristics X X X X
Tutorial group FE X X X X
Observations 575 573 575 579
Note. The estimates are based on the difference equation (2.3), where peer characteristics are measured by
the share of high ability peers. Compared to Table 2.11, this table is based on the sample of students below
the 85th percentile, whereas in Table 2.11 the sample of students varies with a percentile used to define
high ability peers. Standard errors clustered at the assignment team level are reported in the parentheses.






























95% confidence interval 90% confidence interval
Note. The data points in this figure correspond to the estimates from Table 2.12. The confidence intervals
are based on the standard errors reported in the table. The dashed line corresponds to the effect of size
zero.
Figure 2.6: The effect of the share of high ability students on students below the 85th percentile of
the first-year GPA distribution.
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in my study. If a team consists of three high ability students and one regular student,
the high ability students might be responsible for solving the exercises, while the regular
student might take care of the layout of the final document.
2.8. Threats to Identification
As discussed in Subsection 2.5.1, my identification strategy requires that students do
not form teams based on course-specific unobserved abilities. Moreover, to be eliminated
with student fixed effects, course-specific unobserved abilities have to map to both the
Statistics 2 and Mathematics 2 grades in the same way. I investigate whether there is
any evidence to believe that this assumption is plausible in the following ways.
First, I consider a placebo test where the Statistics 2 grade is replaced with the
Mathematics 1 grade in equation (2.3). Since there are no team assignments in the
Mathematics 1 course, the share of high ability students should not have any effect
if unobserved characteristics are fully eliminated with student fixed effects. Table 2.13
shows that none of the resulting estimates is statistically significantly different from zero.
Second, I consider a specification where ysgi and y
m
gi are percentiles of the distributions
of Statistics 2 and Mathematics 2 grades instead of the grades themselves. Similarly to
the definition of the share of high ability peers, I use the program-year, program, year,
and pooled distributions of the Statistics 2 and Mathematics 2 grades to define the per-
centiles. Tables 2.B.5, 2.B.6, 2.B.7, and 2.B.8 and Figures 2.B.5, 2.B.6, 2.B.7, and 2.B.8
in Appendix 2.B show that the estimates employing both definitions are qualitatively
similar.
Third, if observed variables enter both the statistics and mathematics equations with
the same coefficients, i.e. the coefficients in the difference equation are not statistically
significantly different from zero, there is more evidence that the same might be true for
unobserved characteristics. Table 2.14 reports the estimates of the background character-
istics obtained using both the level and difference specifications with the 90th percentile
being used to classify students as either high ability or regular. Even though the first-year
GPA, the numbers of the first-year second attempts to take an exam and credit points
a student was exempted from, the indicator for being Dutch, and the Statistics 1 grade
have a strong influence on the Statistics 2 grade as is reported in the odd-numbered
columns, the estimates become insignificant when the difference equation is considered.
In the difference equation, the coefficient of female is, however, statistically significantly
different from zero and positive. Hence, female students outperform males more in the
Statistics 2 course than in the Mathematics 2 course. One of the reasons might be that,
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Table 2.13: Placebo tests.
Program-year Program Year Pooled
(1) (2) (3) (4)
85p 0.171 −0.163 −0.116 −0.309
(0.301) (0.284) (0.291) (0.299)
86p 0.128 −0.191 −0.149 −0.255
(0.296) (0.292) (0.303) (0.307)
87p 0.112 −0.224 −0.216 −0.307
(0.304) (0.314) (0.307) (0.318)
88p 0.002 −0.292 −0.311 −0.363
(0.292) (0.324) (0.314) (0.337)
89p −0.091 −0.332 −0.420 −0.353
(0.302) (0.331) (0.346) (0.333)
90p −0.137 −0.229 −0.356 −0.452
(0.296) (0.354) (0.369) (0.336)
91p −0.044 −0.405 −0.278 −0.439
(0.311) (0.357) (0.351) (0.372)
92p 0.003 −0.319 −0.341 −0.354
(0.334) (0.374) (0.381) (0.367)
93p 0.008 −0.328 −0.348 −0.352
(0.382) (0.372) (0.391) (0.401)
94p −0.186 −0.162 −0.188 −0.146
(0.431) (0.400) (0.416) (0.401)
95p −0.215 −0.026 −0.041 −0.026
(0.478) (0.475) (0.487) (0.475)
Background characteristics X X
Tutorial group FE X X X X
Note. The regressions are based on equation (2.3) where peer characteristics are measured by
the share of high ability peers and the Statistics 2 grade is replaced with the Mathematics 1
grade. The rest of the table is defined in the same way as in Table 2.11. The estimates are
based on samples of regular students only. Standard errors clustered at the assignment team
level are reported in parentheses. ∗/∗∗/∗∗∗ denote statistical significance at the 10/5/1% level.
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in the Statistics 2 course, the stakes of examinations are lower (30% midterm and 50%
final exam) than in the Mathematics 2 course (100% final exam). Azmat et al. (2016)
show that females outperform males at a relatively larger degree when the stakes are low
compared to situations when they are high. Another explanation is the well documented
fact that gender gaps in achievement are subject specific (e.g., see Fryer and Levitt,
2010). This explanation is perhaps less relevant in my setting as both the Statistics 2
and Mathematics 2 courses require similar sets of skills. Moreover, the coefficient of the
Mathematics 1 grade is statistically significantly different from zero as well and nega-
tive meaning that the Mathematics 1 grade has more influence on the Mathematics 2
performance than on the performance of the Statistics 2 course.
In the ideal scenario, all of the coefficients of the background characteristics would
be statistically indistinguishable from zero. It is perhaps too optimistic to expect that
there are no gender differences between the courses or that the Mathematics 1 and
Statistics 1 grades have the same effect on both courses. For example, in their preferred
specification, Lavy et al. (2012), who use a similar identification strategy to mine to
analyze peer effects in a classroom setting, allow only the coefficients of gender and
same-course lagged test scores as well as cross-course lagged test scores to be subject-
specific. They assume that the rest of the background variables cancel out when taking
the differences. Hence, my results are consistent with the preferred specification in Lavy
et al. (2012). Furthermore, the determination coefficients in the difference equation are
lower than 0.043 meaning that little variation in the difference equation is explained
by the background characteristics.21 Also, I estimate the difference equation under the
assumption that background variables enter both equations with the same coefficients,
i.e. βs1 − βm1 = 0, implying that xgi is not present in equation (2.3). The results in Table
2.B.9 and Figure 2.B.9 in Appendix 2.B indicate that the estimates are quite similar to
the ones obtained under the assumption that the coefficients in the two equations are
different.
2.9. Mechanisms
The main finding of the paper that the share of high ability students has a negative effect
on regular students whereas the effect on high ability students themselves is not statisti-
21The main aim of this exercise is to investigate whether it is reasonable to believe that unobserved char-
acteristics that influence team formation are eliminated with student fixed effects. The determination
coefficient of the difference regression without student fixed effects is, therefore, considered because
fixed effects mainly capture impacts stemming from a tutorial group teacher and from peer effects
that operate at the tutorial group level. Therefore, student fixed effects are unlikely to be informative







Table 2.14: The effect of background characteristics on the difference between the Statistics 2 and Mathematics 2 grades.
Program-year Program Year Pooled
Levels Differences Levels Differences Levels Differences Levels Differences
GPA 0.670∗∗∗ 0.069 0.775∗∗∗ 0.171 0.691∗∗∗ 0.136 0.730∗∗∗ 0.132
(0.249) (0.251) (0.251) (0.254) (0.251) (0.255) (0.254) (0.253)
Female 0.550∗∗∗ 0.274∗ 0.585∗∗∗ 0.330∗∗ 0.584∗∗∗ 0.314∗∗ 0.549∗∗∗ 0.293∗∗
(0.131) (0.148) (0.128) (0.148) (0.127) (0.144) (0.127) (0.145)
Dutch −0.478∗ −0.480 −0.454 −0.431 −0.506∗ −0.590 −0.538∗ −0.526
(0.281) (0.379) (0.295) (0.403) (0.303) (0.433) (0.305) (0.411)
Credit points 0.027 −0.013 0.013 −0.017 0.015 −0.016 0.013 −0.018
(0.023) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.026) (0.027) (0.026) (0.027)
Exempted credit point 0.029∗∗∗ 0.020 0.029∗∗∗ 0.022 0.031∗∗∗ 0.025 0.030∗∗∗ 0.023
(0.010) (0.016) (0.010) (0.017) (0.011) (0.016) (0.010) (0.016)
Second attempts −0.128∗∗ −0.021 −0.124∗∗ −0.018 −0.129∗∗ −0.020 −0.125∗∗ −0.018
(0.052) (0.061) (0.053) (0.061) (0.053) (0.061) (0.053) (0.061)
Unnecessary second attempts 0.038 −0.019 −0.092 −0.048 −0.076 −0.006 −0.068 −0.014
(0.108) (0.142) (0.130) (0.136) (0.136) (0.137) (0.135) (0.138)
Statistics 1 0.408∗∗∗ 0.015 0.401∗∗∗ −0.009 0.410∗∗∗ −0.005 0.403∗∗∗ 0.004
(0.094) (0.101) (0.093) (0.100) (0.095) (0.101) (0.095) (0.100)
Mathematics 1 0.082 −0.200∗∗ 0.067 −0.206∗∗ 0.061 −0.209∗∗∗ 0.067 −0.212∗∗∗
(0.070) (0.083) (0.069) (0.081) (0.069) (0.081) (0.069) (0.082)
Age −0.114∗ −0.126∗ −0.115∗ −0.128∗ −0.136∗∗ −0.169∗∗ −0.129∗∗ −0.135∗
(0.061) (0.073) (0.062) (0.076) (0.068) (0.079) (0.065) (0.080)
90p −0.595∗ −0.694∗∗ −0.834∗∗ −0.946∗∗∗ −0.768∗∗ −0.952∗∗∗ −0.622∗ −0.863∗∗∗
(0.309) (0.285) (0.353) (0.318) (0.380) (0.329) (0.367) (0.328)
Tutorial group FE X X X X X X X X
F-test Background char. = 0 26.900∗∗∗ 1.458 29.271∗∗∗ 1.748∗ 27.089∗∗∗ 1.953∗∗ 28.735∗∗∗ 1.731∗
F-test p-value 0.000 0.151 0.000 0.067 0.000 0.036 0.000 0.071
R2 without FE 0.035 0.041 0.042 0.040
Observations 625 625 625 625 625 625 625 625
R2 0.413 0.122 0.410 0.124 0.409 0.128 0.408 0.121
Adjusted R2 0.368 0.055 0.366 0.058 0.364 0.062 0.363 0.054
Note. The odd and even numbered columns refer to equations (2.1) and (2.3), respectively, where peer characteristics are measured by the share of high
ability peers defined using the 90th percentile. The labels program-year, program, year, and pooled refer to a first-year GPA distribution. The estimates
are based on the samples of regular students only. Standard errors clustered at the assignment team level are reported in the parentheses. ∗/∗∗/∗∗∗ denote
statistical significance at the 10/5/1% level.
49
Chapter 2: Achievement Peer Effects in Small Study Teams
cally significantly different from zero is consistent with two broad classes of mechanisms.
On the one hand, the negative effect on regular students may be generated by a decrease
in the effort level while solving the team assignment. This decrease could stem either
from free-riding or from high ability students volunteering to solve the assignment due to
grade concerns. On the other hand, the negative effect could be driven by a decrease in
the effort level while preparing for the exam and the midterm. If a student has a higher
share of high ability teammates, she might expect to get a higher team assignment grade,
and therefore, study less for the midterm and the final exam, especially if her main goal
is to pass the course. If this effect dominates, the inclusion of the team assignment grade
in equation (2.3) would capture the effect generating statistically insignificant estimates
of γ1. Table 2.15 and Figure 2.7, however, show that the estimates of γ1 become even
smaller. This result is consistent with the first class of mechanisms: if there are high
ability students in a regular student’s team, in order to get the same team assignment
grade, she has to exert less effort compared to the case when there are no high ability
students in her team. Although I cannot pin down the exact mechanism that generates
my findings, below I present a model that rationalizes them, but other models are also
possible.
Let a team consist of two students, student i and her teammate j, who interact in a
two-stage game. In the first stage, student i exerts ei ≥ 0 units of effort that translate
into the team assignment grade via a team assignment production function f(ei + ej)
with f ′ > 0 and f ′′ < 0. Additionally, student i produces h(ei) units of human capital for
the second stage. Students, however, have student-specific cost functions θie
2
i /2, where θi
denotes the inverse of student i’s ability. Thus, a high ability student has lower marginal
costs of effort than a low ability student. In the second stage, students’ human capital
from the first stage translates into the individual exam grade via an individual exam
production function v(h(ei)) = g(ei) with g
′ > 0 and g′′ < 0.
Student i maximizes the following utility function with respect to the effort level ei:
ui(ei, ej) = f(ei + ej) + αg(ei)− θie2i /2,
where α > 0 determines the relative importance of the team assignment and final exam
grades.
The Nash equilibrium effort levels (e∗i , e
∗
j) solve the following first order conditions:
22
f ′(ei + ej) + αg
′(ei) = θiei
f ′(ei + ej) + αg
′(ej) = θjej.






























With team assignment grade Without team assignment grade
Note. The data points in this figure correspond to the estimates from Table 2.15. The 90% confidence
intervals are based on the standard errors reported in the table. The dashed line corresponds to the
effect of size zero.
Figure 2.7: Estimates of the effect of the share of high ability students on regular students: comparison




























Table 2.15: Estimates of the effect of the share of high ability students on regular students: comparison of estimates based on regressions with and without
team assignment grade.
Program-year Program Year Pooled
Without With Without With Without With Without With
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
85p −0.441 −0.529 −0.614∗∗ −0.757∗∗ −0.517∗ −0.650∗∗ −0.837∗∗∗ −1.010∗∗∗
(0.313) (0.341) (0.283) (0.304) (0.288) (0.315) (0.286) (0.312)
86p −0.321 −0.374 −0.721∗∗ −0.870∗∗∗ −0.584∗∗ −0.741∗∗ −0.704∗∗ −0.854∗∗∗
(0.322) (0.343) (0.283) (0.303) (0.293) (0.317) (0.288) (0.314)
87p −0.458 −0.531 −0.632∗∗ −0.770∗∗ −0.648∗∗ −0.779∗∗ −0.833∗∗∗ −0.991∗∗∗
(0.325) (0.347) (0.301) (0.324) (0.288) (0.313) (0.298) (0.324)
88p −0.535∗ −0.585∗ −0.764∗∗ −0.892∗∗∗ −0.716∗∗ −0.853∗∗∗ −0.890∗∗∗ −1.057∗∗∗
(0.298) (0.318) (0.306) (0.329) (0.291) (0.321) (0.304) (0.333)
89p −0.479 −0.537 −0.882∗∗∗ −1.022∗∗∗ −0.987∗∗∗ −1.150∗∗∗ −0.820∗∗ −0.966∗∗∗
(0.312) (0.329) (0.304) (0.327) (0.312) (0.342) (0.319) (0.342)
90p −0.694∗∗ −0.766∗∗ −0.946∗∗∗ −1.093∗∗∗ −0.952∗∗∗ −1.074∗∗∗ −0.863∗∗∗ −0.999∗∗∗
(0.285) (0.302) (0.318) (0.345) (0.329) (0.365) (0.328) (0.352)
91p −0.747∗∗∗ −0.815∗∗∗ −1.089∗∗∗ −1.255∗∗∗ −0.929∗∗∗ −1.026∗∗∗ −1.041∗∗∗ −1.184∗∗∗
(0.287) (0.304) (0.334) (0.358) (0.335) (0.359) (0.347) (0.377)
92p −0.759∗∗ −0.826∗∗ −1.014∗∗∗ −1.119∗∗∗ −1.043∗∗∗ −1.152∗∗∗ −0.939∗∗∗ −1.022∗∗∗
(0.306) (0.325) (0.349) (0.369) (0.352) (0.379) (0.342) (0.357)
93p −0.967∗∗∗ −1.037∗∗∗ −1.022∗∗∗ −1.108∗∗∗ −1.044∗∗∗ −1.134∗∗∗ −0.965∗∗∗ −1.051∗∗∗
(0.344) (0.362) (0.341) (0.354) (0.350) (0.366) (0.359) (0.376)
94p −0.784∗∗ −0.843∗∗ −0.985∗∗∗ −1.063∗∗∗ −1.090∗∗∗ −1.154∗∗∗ −1.018∗∗∗ −1.085∗∗∗
(0.395) (0.420) (0.362) (0.375) (0.378) (0.389) (0.360) (0.369)
95p −0.940∗∗ −0.992∗∗ −0.773∗ −0.807∗ −0.810∗ −0.844∗ −0.773∗ −0.807∗
(0.411) (0.429) (0.446) (0.458) (0.441) (0.454) (0.446) (0.458)
Background characteristics X X X X X X X X
Tutorial group FE X X X X X X X X
Note. The estimates are based on equation (2.3), where peer characteristics are measured by the share of high ability peers. The even numbered columns
include the team assignment grade as a regressor, whereas the odd numbered columns do not. The rest of the table is defined in the same way as in Table
2.11. Standard errors clustered at the assignment team level are reported in the parentheses. ∗/∗∗/∗∗∗ denote statistical significance at the 10/5/1% level.
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Mechanisms
It can easily be shown that de∗i /dθj is positive. This implies that, if student i’s teammate
is a high ability student instead of a low ability student, then i exerts less effort, i.e. free-
rides more, and as a result will also get a lower final exam grade (because the final exam
production function is increasing in ei).
Due to the concavity of the team assignment production function and the additivity
of efforts, the efforts of students i and j are strategic substitutes. Therefore, their reaction
curves are downward sloping (see Figure 2.8), i.e if j increases effort, it is optimal for i to
decrease her effort. Increasing j’s ability (i.e. decreasing θj), shifts j’s reaction function
to the right (see Figure 2.8), while i’s reaction function stays the same. This leads to
a new equilibrium in which j’s optimal level of effort is higher and i’s optimal level of















Figure 2.8: Reaction curves and equilibria from the game without peer pressure.
The analysis above depends on the fact that there are no mechanisms that generate
an offsetting positive effect of j’s ability on either the effort or the final exam grade of
student i. However, when students are jointly working on a team assignment, there may
be many opportunities for mutual learning. High ability students with enough knowledge
might give explanations to their teammates or show them how to solve the assignment.
While mutual learning does not necessarily have a direct effect on efforts, it may have
a positive effect on the final exam grade. For example, if the final grade production
function is g(ei, θj) = h(ei) + ω/θj with h
′ > 0, h′′ < 0, and ω > 0, the total effect on
a student’s final grade when a low ability teammate is substituted with a high ability
teammate can be positive.
Moreover, Kandel and Lazear (1992) argue that a negative free-riding effect can
be mitigated by peer pressure arising due to social norms, for example through being
shamed for not having contributed enough or through feeling guilt for having let down
53
Chapter 2: Achievement Peer Effects in Small Study Teams
teammates. For a model similar to mine, Mas and Moretti (2009) claim that peer pressure
may not only offset the negative free-riding effect but even change the sign of de∗i /dθj.
My results are consistent with a model where the three mechanisms discussed above
have different intensity for regular and high ability students. For the former group, the
negative free-riding effect dominates, whereas for the latter group it is offset by positive
effects stemming from peer pressure and mutual learning.
2.10. Policy Implications
One of the goals of team assignments is to facilitate students’ learning.23 Hence, in this
section I will propose a policy that maximizes students’ academic knowledge obtained
from teamwork, which is measured in the present study by the individual Statistics 2
grade. As is suggested in Bhattacharya (2009), it is possible to exploit heterogeneity of
peer effects to optimally divide students into peer groups in order to maximize average
performance. Given that in my study regular students are hurt by high ability students,
whereas high ability students are not hurt by and might actually benefit from each
other, the average individual performance would increase if students formed homogeneous
ability groups, i.e. if regular students were separated from very high ability students. On
the one hand, team homogeneity can be achieved if a tutorial teacher assigns students into
teams in such a way that regular students are separated from high ability students. The
estimates, however, might not be informative about settings where students are assigned
into teams without taking into account social ties. On the other hand, given that a
student has to form a team with other students from the same tutorial group, it is also
possible to allocate students into different tutorial groups depending on whether they are
of high ability or regular. This allocation mechanism allows to form homogeneous teams
based on social ties. Students are, however, typically supposed to stay in the same tutorial
group for the entire academic year. Hence, tutorial groups would also be the same for
courses without any team assignments. There is, however, convincing empirical evidence
that students benefit from tutorial group homogeneity even in cases when there is no
free-riding incentives. For example, using random assignment of undergraduate students
from the bachelor program in economics and business at the University of Amsterdam,
an institutional setting very similar to the one considered in my paper, Booij et al. (2017)
show that the academic performance of students increases by switching from mixed to
23Team assignments may also have other objectives, such as to improve students’ collaborative skills.
Even if this is the main objective, policy makers may prefer if this objective is also complimented with
an increase in students’ knowledge obtained from teamwork.
54
Policy Implications
homogeneous ability tutorial groups.24 25
Table 2.16: Estimated changes in average performance under homogeneous homework assignment
teams compared to team compositions observed in the dataset.
Program-year Program Year Pooled
(1) (2) (3) (4)
85p 0.058 0.077∗∗ 0.067∗ 0.104∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.036) (0.037) (0.035)
86p 0.038 0.086∗∗ 0.071∗∗ 0.084∗∗
(0.038) (0.034) (0.036) (0.034)
87p 0.053 0.073∗∗ 0.073∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.035) (0.033) (0.034)
88p 0.058∗ 0.082∗∗ 0.076∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.033) (0.031) (0.033)
89p 0.049 0.092∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗
(0.032) (0.032) (0.030) (0.032)
90p 0.064∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
91p 0.063∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.028) (0.026) (0.028)
92p 0.058∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.026) (0.025) (0.024)
93p 0.067∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024)
94p 0.050∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.023) (0.022) (0.021)
95p 0.054∗∗ 0.040∗ 0.044∗ 0.040∗
(0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.023)
Note. The estimates are based on the first term in equation (2.11), where the esti-
mates of γ1 are obtained from the difference specification in Table 2.11. Standard
errors obtained by using the delta rule are reported in the parentheses. ∗/∗∗/∗∗∗
denote statistical significance at the 10/5/1% level.
To evaluate aggregate effects of such a policy, the following thought experiment is
performed. Let ysgi and y
s new
g′i correspond, respectively, to a student i’s Statistics 2 grade
under the current team formation mechanism and the mechanism where students are
grouped together into tutorial classes depending on whether they are regular or high
24They found that students benefit the most from the three-way tracking: students are grouped together
depending on whether their high school GPA is in the bottom, middle, or top tertile. The grouping
considered in my study, however, has not been analyzed in their paper. Moreover, their grouping is
based on the high school GPA, while the first-year GPA is used in my study.
25There are two more studies based on random assignment into teaching units which show that students
benefit from group homogeneity. Duflo et al. (2011) divide primary school students in Kenya into high
and low ability groups depending on their position in a school prior achievement distribution and show
that students’ performance increases compared to students in mixed ability groups. Carrell et al. (2013)
form squadrons at the US Air Force Academy consisting of middle ability students and conclude that
their performance increases relative to middle ability students in mixed ability squadrons.
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95% confidence interval 90% confidence interval
Note. The data points in this figure correspond to the estimates from Table 2.16. The confidence intervals
are based on the standard errors reported in the table. The dashed line corresponds to the effect of size
zero.
Figure 2.9: Estimated changes in average performance under homogeneous homework assignment
teams compared to team compositions observed in the dataset.
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ability. Under the new mechanism, assignment teams have to consist of students from
the same tutorial class. Then, the difference in the aggregate performance is measured
by
























where g′ and w′g′iβ
s
2 are correspondingly student i’s team and tutorial fixed effects under
the new allocation, whereas n denotes the total number of students. The first and second
terms capture the change in the average performance that arises from regular and high
ability students having teammates of the same ability level under the new allocation
scheme, whereas the last term captures the difference in the tutorial group fixed effects.
There are two issues with evaluating the expression in equation (2.11). Firstly, although
γ2 obtained from equation (2.10) is positive, it is not precisely estimated. Secondly, even
though the results in Booij et al. (2017) imply that the difference in the last term in
equation (2.11) is positive, the estimates obtained in the present paper are not infor-
mative about it. Therefore, I take a conservative approach and calculate the difference
in the average performance based only on the first term in equation (2.11). The results
in Table 2.16 and Figure 2.9 suggest that the average performance would increase by
0.043–0.101 points.
It is also, however, important to note that under the new allocation interactions
between students might differ. For example, Carrell et al. (2013) investigate whether
heterogeneous peer effects obtained using observational data can be used to construct
optimal group allocations. In particular, they used historical pre-treatment estimates to
sort half of entering freshmen at the US Air Force Academy into squadrons to maximize
the academic performance of low ability students whereas the remaining half of the
students was sorted randomly as used to be done before the treatment. The optimal
squadrons consisted either of 50% of low ability students and 50% of high ability students
or of 100% of middle ability students. Carrell et al. (2013) find that the performance of
low ability students actually fell rather than increased. They rationalize this finding by
endogenous sorting of students into homogeneous subgroups in squadrons composed of
50% of low ability students and 50% of high ability students. This issue is less likely to
occur in my setting because I propose to sort students into homogeneous ability groups.
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2.11. Conclusions
The main contribution of this paper is to provide empirical evidence on the effect of abil-
ity composition of a student’s homework assignment team on her academic knowledge
obtained from teamwork. Since in my setting students self-select into teams, I overcome
this problem by exploiting within-student variation in performance across two similar
courses, where a team assignment is present only in one of them. After classifying stu-
dents as high ability and regular, I find that there is strong evidence of the negative
impact of very high ability students on the rest of the students. More precisely, a stu-
dent whose teammates are all of high ability gets a 0.26–0.57 standard deviation units
lower individual grade compared to her counterpart who does not have any high ability
teammates. The effect of the share of high ability teammates on high ability students is
positive but not statistically significant.
The results suggest that encouraging students to form homogeneous homework as-
signment teams would increase the average individual performance. On the one hand,
this separation could be achieved by grouping students into homogeneous ability teams.
As in the present study students are allowed to form teams themselves, the estimates
might not be informative about situations where students are divided into teams by the
teacher. To preserve both the ability to self-select teammates and team homogeneity, I
suggest to form homogeneous ability tutorial groups and to allow students to form teams
within tutorial groups. This policy recommendation is similar to the one proposed by
Booij et al. (2017) and Duflo et al. (2011) who experimentally manipulate the ability
composition of teaching units in settings without free-riding incentives.
On the other hand, teams considered in this paper might be heterogeneous because
the incentives are not very strong: the team assignment grade determines only 20% of the
final grade. The findings in Bandiera et al. (2013) indicate that strengthening incentives
makes individuals form teams with others of similar abilities instead of individuals they
are socially connected to. Also, students in the Netherlands, including top performers,
are not highly motivated OECD (2016). Hence, they do not have high grade concerns,
and therefore, form teams with their friends rather than high ability students. If more
motivated students are considered, they might form homogeneous teams by themselves.
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Appendix 2.A Additional Tables and Figures for Section 2.6
Table 2.A.1: Weights of grade components of the Statistics 2 course.
Grade component
Regular students Repeaters
Exam Resit Exam Resit




a The grade has to be at least 5; if this grade is less than 5, the final grade
can be at most 5, i.e. a student does not pass the course.
Figure 2.A.1: Time-line of the Statistics 2 course (time intervals are not representative).
Figure 2.A.2: Time-line representing the relationship between different courses.
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Accounting 1: Financial Accounting 1 1 1 6
Organization Theory: Introduction 1 6
Organization and Strategy 1 1 6
Microeconomics for Business Administration 1 1 1 6
Writing Skills 1 1 1
Science for Practice 1 1 5
Science for Policy 1 3
Introduction Research Methods for Business Economics 1 3
Mathematics 1 (Dutch) 1 1 1 6
Finance 1 (Dutch) 2 2 2 6
Macroeconomics for Business Administration 2 2 2 6
Marketing 1 2 2 2 6
Oral Skills 2 2 2 1
Statistics 1 2 2 2 6
Entrepreneurial Business Planninga 2 2 2 5
Tax Economicsa 2 2 2 5
BSc International Business Administration
Accounting 1 for IBA 1 1 1 6
International Management for IBA 1 1 1 6
Mathematics 1 for IBA 1 1 1 6
Microeconomics for IBA 1 1 1 6
Organizational Behavior for IBA 1 1 1 6
Finance 1 for IBA 2 2 2 6
Macroeconomics for IBA 2 2 2 6
Marketing Management for IBA 2 2 2 6
Project IBA 2 2 2 6
Statistics 1 for IBA 2 2 2 6
a Only one of the courses has to be chosen.
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Financial Processes 1 1 1 6
Management and Information Systems 1 1 1 6
Operations Management for BE 1 1 1 6
Social Philosophy and Philosophy of Science (Dutch) 1 1 1 6
Mathematics 2 1 1 2 6
Accounting 2: Management Accounting 2 2 2 6
Finance 2 (Dutch) 2 2 2 6
Marketing 2: Consumer Behavior 2 2 2 6
Research in Business Administration 2 2 2 6
Statistics 2 (Dutch) 2 2 1 6
English for Business Economics 2 2 2 6
BSc International Business Administration
Cross Cultural Psychology for IBA 1 6
Comparative & Cross-Cultural Management for IBA 1 1 6
Finance 2 for IBA 1 1 1 6
Mathematics 2 for IBA 1 1 2 6
Philosophy of Science for IBA 1 1 1 6
Information Management for IBA 1 1 1 6
Operations Management for IBA 1 1 1 6
Accounting 2 for IBA 2 2 2 6
Business Research for IBA 2 2 2 6
Decision Making in Marketing for IBA 2 2 2 6
Statistics 2 for IBA 2 2 1 6
Strategic Management for IBA 2 2 2 6
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95% confidence interval 90% confidence interval
Note. The data points in this figure correspond to the estimates from Table 2.B.2 based on the difference
specification. The 90% confidence intervals are based on the standard errors reported in the table. The
dashed line corresponds to the effect of size zero.
Figure 2.B.1: The effect of the share of high ability students on regular students based on the difference
equation, where students are classified to be either regular or high ability using the 75–84th percentiles
of the first-year GPA distributions.
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Table 2.B.1: Estimates of the effect of the share of high ability students on regular and high ability
students.
Program-year Program Year Pooled
(1) (2) (3) (4)
85p regular −0.455 −0.625∗∗ −0.451 −0.780∗∗∗
(0.310) (0.275) (0.283) (0.281)
high 0.379 0.305 0.227 0.016
(0.427) (0.382) (0.408) (0.371)
F-test Regular = high 2.433 3.996∗∗ 1.918 2.692
[0.119] [0.046] [0.167] [0.101]
86p regular −0.285 −0.696∗∗ −0.528∗ −0.708∗∗
(0.319) (0.274) (0.286) (0.280)
high 0.180 −0.004 0.130 0.109
(0.423) (0.376) (0.446) (0.399)
F-test Regular = high 0.762 2.096 1.594 2.708
[0.383] [0.148] [0.207] [0.100]
87p regular −0.441 −0.616∗∗ −0.607∗∗ −0.816∗∗∗
(0.321) (0.292) (0.279) (0.291)
high 0.521 −0.017 −0.019 0.114
(0.440) (0.387) (0.477) (0.439)
F-test Regular = high 3.153∗ 1.438 1.119 3.090∗
[0.076] [0.231] [0.290] [0.079]
88p regular −0.510∗ −0.778∗∗∗ −0.693∗∗ −0.879∗∗∗
(0.290) (0.295) (0.285) (0.296)
high 0.505 0.029 0.126 0.236
(0.505) (0.400) (0.488) (0.476)
F-test Regular = high 3.144∗ 2.458 2.115 4.078∗∗
[0.077] [0.117] [0.146] [0.044]
89p regular −0.448 −0.892∗∗∗ −0.996∗∗∗ −0.819∗∗∗
(0.302) (0.294) (0.301) (0.308)
high 0.231 0.237 0.275 0.258
(0.515) (0.477) (0.513) (0.501)
F-test Regular = high 1.375 4.101∗∗ 4.874∗∗ 3.556∗
[0.241] [0.043] [0.028] [0.060]
90p regular −0.693∗∗ −0.989∗∗∗ −0.931∗∗∗ −0.874∗∗∗
(0.284) (0.301) (0.316) (0.315)
high 0.592 0.562 0.392 0.273
(0.658) (0.561) (0.542) (0.514)
F-test Regular = high 3.324∗ 6.554∗∗ 5.019∗∗ 3.628∗
[0.069] [0.011] [0.025] [0.057]
91p regular −0.771∗∗∗ −1.099∗∗∗ −0.924∗∗∗ −1.042∗∗∗
(0.282) (0.325) (0.329) (0.332)
high 0.507 0.891 0.261 0.360
(0.749) (0.734) (0.509) (0.560)
F-test Regular = high 2.619 6.724∗∗∗ 4.199∗∗ 5.059∗∗
[0.106] [0.010] [0.041] [0.025]
92p regular −0.763∗∗ −1.009∗∗∗ −1.080∗∗∗ −0.959∗∗∗
(0.301) (0.336) (0.340) (0.337)
high 0.650 0.638 0.094 0.816
(0.784) (0.757) (0.498) (0.751)
F-test Regular = high 3.046∗ 4.498∗∗ 4.032∗∗ 5.216∗∗
[0.081] [0.034] [0.045] [0.023]
93p regular −0.938∗∗∗ −1.037∗∗∗ −1.058∗∗∗ −0.981∗∗∗
(0.346) (0.340) (0.348) (0.358)
high 0.385 1.406 1.350 1.331
(0.845) (0.859) (0.916) (0.962)
F-test Regular = high 2.196 7.678∗∗∗ 6.683∗∗∗ 5.553∗∗
[0.139] [0.006] [0.010] [0.019]
94p regular −0.782∗∗ −1.010∗∗∗ −1.071∗∗∗ −1.026∗∗∗
(0.396) (0.361) (0.380) (0.361)
high −0.161 1.242 1.855∗∗ 1.602∗
(0.871) (0.973) (0.916) (0.942)
F-test Regular = high 0.445 5.078∗∗ 10.000∗∗∗ 7.779∗∗∗
[0.505] [0.025] [0.002] [0.005]
95p regular −0.937∗∗ −0.765∗ −0.808∗ −0.765∗
(0.412) (0.450) (0.444) (0.450)
high −0.258 0.458 0.153 0.458
(1.039) (0.864) (0.860) (0.864)
F-test Regular = high 0.378 1.623 0.972 1.623
[0.539] [0.203] [0.324] [0.203]
Background characteristics X X X X
Tutorial group FE X X X X
Note. The estimates are based on equation (2.3), where peer characteristics are
defined in the same way as in equation (2.10). The rest of the table is defined in
the same way as in Table 2.11. Standard errors clustered at the assignment team
level are reported in the parentheses. P-values of the F-tests are reported in the
brackets. ∗/∗∗/∗∗∗ denote statistical significance at the 10/5/1% level.
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High ability students Regular students
Note. The data points in this figure correspond to the estimates from Table 2.B.1. The 90% confidence
intervals are based on the standard errors reported in the table. The dashed line corresponds to the
effect of size zero.























Table 2.B.2: Estimates of the effect of the share of high ability students on regular students based on the difference equation, where students are classified to
be either regular or high ability using the 75–84th percentiles of the first-year GPA distributions.
Program-year Program Year Pooled
Levels Differences Levels Differences Levels Differences Levels Differences
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
75p −0.138 −0.198 −0.401 −0.441 −0.277 −0.340 −0.647∗∗ −0.403
(0.296) (0.316) (0.287) (0.334) (0.297) (0.345) (0.299) (0.340)
76p −0.066 −0.093 −0.375 −0.369 −0.241 −0.309 −0.680∗∗ −0.417
(0.294) (0.315) (0.289) (0.327) (0.292) (0.323) (0.298) (0.348)
77p −0.084 −0.132 −0.490∗ −0.460 −0.375 −0.294 −0.537∗ −0.500
(0.298) (0.318) (0.289) (0.323) (0.295) (0.327) (0.294) (0.333)
78p −0.037 −0.279 −0.520∗ −0.470 −0.369 −0.293 −0.502∗ −0.443
(0.290) (0.315) (0.289) (0.330) (0.296) (0.325) (0.283) (0.322)
79p −0.132 −0.397 −0.523∗ −0.535∗ −0.404 −0.431 −0.383 −0.266
(0.296) (0.314) (0.285) (0.317) (0.303) (0.335) (0.284) (0.324)
80p −0.166 −0.421 −0.503∗ −0.423 −0.315 −0.405 −0.370 −0.296
(0.293) (0.310) (0.285) (0.320) (0.297) (0.325) (0.284) (0.326)
81p −0.227 −0.526∗ −0.413 −0.411 −0.306 −0.389 −0.316 −0.303
(0.294) (0.309) (0.290) (0.326) (0.286) (0.308) (0.282) (0.306)
82p −0.240 −0.423 −0.426 −0.379 −0.335 −0.325 −0.391 −0.540∗
(0.288) (0.302) (0.287) (0.300) (0.285) (0.311) (0.296) (0.284)
83p −0.298 −0.450 −0.443 −0.342 −0.313 −0.278 −0.392 −0.639∗∗
(0.286) (0.298) (0.289) (0.301) (0.295) (0.315) (0.300) (0.294)
84p −0.378 −0.495∗ −0.379 −0.478∗ −0.315 −0.334 −0.508∗ −0.890∗∗∗
(0.283) (0.300) (0.301) (0.284) (0.297) (0.309) (0.304) (0.286)
Background characteristics X X X X X X X X
Tutorial group FE X X X X X X X X
Note. The table is defined in the same way as Table 2.11 except that the 75–84th percentiles are used to classify students to be either regular or high ability
instead of the 85–95th percentiles. Standard errors clustered at the assignment team level are reported in the parentheses. ∗/∗∗/∗∗∗ denote statistical significance
at the 10/5/1% level.
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Table 2.B.3: Estimates of the effect of the share of high ability students on students below the 85th
and above or equal to the 85th percentile of the first-year GPA distribution.
Program-year Program Year Pooled
(1) (2) (3) (4)
85p below 85p −0.455 −0.625∗∗ −0.451 −0.780∗∗∗
(0.310) (0.275) (0.283) (0.281)
above 85p 0.379 0.305 0.227 0.016
(0.427) (0.382) (0.408) (0.371)
F-test below 85p = above 85p 2.433 3.996∗∗ 1.918 2.692
[0.119] [0.046] [0.167] [0.101]
86p below 85p −0.285 −0.733∗∗∗ −0.538∗ −0.687∗∗
(0.319) (0.281) (0.295) (0.284)
above 85p 0.180 0.031 0.113 −0.015
(0.423) (0.358) (0.425) (0.381)
F-test below 85p = above 85p 0.762 2.633 1.590 1.947
[0.383] [0.105] [0.208] [0.163]
87p below 85p −0.441 −0.669∗∗ −0.626∗∗ −0.824∗∗∗
(0.321) (0.302) (0.294) (0.298)
above 85p 0.521 0.021 −0.078 −0.043
(0.440) (0.356) (0.416) (0.401)
F-test below 85p = above 85p 3.153∗ 2.054 1.114 2.388
[0.076] [0.152] [0.292] [0.123]
88p below 85p −0.510∗ −0.811∗∗∗ −0.686∗∗ −0.884∗∗∗
(0.290) (0.307) (0.303) (0.307)
above 85p 0.505 −0.028 −0.078 −0.025
(0.505) (0.350) (0.413) (0.408)
F-test below 85p = above 85p 3.144∗ 2.674 1.386 2.820∗
[0.077] [0.102] [0.240] [0.094]
89p below 85p −0.448 −0.940∗∗∗ −0.984∗∗∗ −0.854∗∗∗
(0.302) (0.311) (0.323) (0.327)
above 85p 0.231 0.046 −0.061 0.042
(0.515) (0.379) (0.418) (0.431)
F-test below 85p = above 85p 1.375 3.961∗∗ 3.136∗ 2.745∗
[0.241] [0.047] [0.077] [0.098]
90p below 85p −0.693∗∗ −0.994∗∗∗ −0.963∗∗∗ −0.973∗∗∗
(0.284) (0.334) (0.341) (0.332)
above 85p 0.592 0.034 0.076 0.199
(0.658) (0.404) (0.417) (0.427)
F-test below 85p = above 85p 3.324∗ 3.902∗∗ 4.056∗∗ 4.629∗∗
[0.069] [0.049] [0.044] [0.032]
91p below 85p −0.771∗∗∗ −1.173∗∗∗ −0.997∗∗∗ −1.138∗∗∗
(0.282) (0.358) (0.356) (0.351)
above 85p 0.507 0.118 0.128 0.219
(0.749) (0.531) (0.429) (0.473)
F-test below 85p = above 85p 2.619 4.339∗∗ 4.330∗∗ 5.580∗∗
[0.106] [0.038] [0.038] [0.018]
92p below 85p −0.763∗∗ −1.118∗∗∗ −1.252∗∗∗ −1.047∗∗∗
(0.301) (0.378) (0.379) (0.376)
above 85p 0.650 0.086 0.153 0.239
(0.784) (0.530) (0.418) (0.562)
F-test below 85p = above 85p 3.046∗ 3.851∗ 6.375∗∗ 3.920∗∗
[0.081] [0.050] [0.012] [0.048]
93p below 85p −0.938∗∗∗ −1.173∗∗∗ −1.169∗∗∗ −1.142∗∗∗
(0.346) (0.402) (0.417) (0.415)
above 85p 0.385 0.206 0.071 0.296
(0.845) (0.549) (0.556) (0.602)
F-test below 85p = above 85p 2.196 4.388∗∗ 3.433∗ 4.182∗∗
[0.139] [0.037] [0.064] [0.041]
94p below 85p −0.782∗∗ −1.191∗∗∗ −1.156∗∗ −1.240∗∗∗
(0.396) (0.431) (0.459) (0.424)
above 85p −0.161 0.201 0.074 0.429
(0.871) (0.576) (0.593) (0.625)
F-test below 85p = above 85p 0.445 3.989∗∗ 2.999∗ 5.361∗∗
[0.505] [0.046] [0.084] [0.021]
95p below 85p −0.937∗∗ −1.186∗∗ −1.173∗∗ −1.187∗∗
(0.412) (0.499) (0.495) (0.488)
above 85p −0.258 0.428 0.131 0.515
(1.039) (0.704) (0.685) (0.747)
F-test below 85p = above 85p 0.378 3.709∗ 2.471 3.867∗∗
[0.539] [0.055] [0.116] [0.050]
Background characteristics X X X X
Tutorial group FE X X X X
Note. The table is constructed in the same way as Table 2.B.1.
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High ability students Regular students
Note. The data points in this figure correspond to the estimates from Table 2.B.3. The 90% confidence
intervals are based on the standard errors reported in the table. The dashed line corresponds to the
effect of size zero.
Figure 2.B.3: The effect of the share of high ability students on students below the 85th and above or
equal to the 85th percentile of the first-year GPA distribution.
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Table 2.B.4: Estimates of the effect of the share of high ability students on students below the 90th
percentile of the first-year GPA distribution.
Program-year Program Year Pooled
(1) (2) (3) (4)
90p −0.694∗∗ −0.946∗∗∗ −0.952∗∗∗ −0.863∗∗∗
(0.285) (0.318) (0.329) (0.328)
91p −0.738∗∗ −1.124∗∗∗ −0.998∗∗∗ −1.060∗∗∗
(0.294) (0.343) (0.337) (0.355)
92p −0.747∗∗ −1.080∗∗∗ −1.172∗∗∗ −0.943∗∗
(0.316) (0.362) (0.356) (0.372)
93p −1.009∗∗∗ −1.106∗∗∗ −1.179∗∗∗ −1.021∗∗
(0.337) (0.371) (0.386) (0.407)
94p −1.101∗∗∗ −1.144∗∗∗ −1.231∗∗∗ −1.095∗∗∗
(0.379) (0.396) (0.425) (0.416)
95p −1.266∗∗∗ −1.133∗∗ −1.237∗∗∗ −1.011∗∗
(0.417) (0.452) (0.454) (0.469)
Background characteristics X X X X
Tutorial group FE X X X X
Observations 625 625 625 625
Note. This table is similar to Table 2.12 with the main difference being that the sample consists of students
below the 90th percentile of each distribution instead of the 85th percentile. Standard errors clustered at
the assignment team level are reported in the parentheses. ∗/∗∗/∗∗∗ denote statistical significance at the
10/5/1% level.
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95% confidence interval 90% confidence interval
Note. The data points in this figure correspond to the estimates from Table 2.B.4. The confidence
intervals are based on the standard errors reported in the table. The dashed line corresponds to the
effect of size zero.
Figure 2.B.4: The effect of the share of high ability students on students below the 90th percentile of
the first-year GPA distribution.
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ates of percentile differences
Differences Perc. differences
Note. The data points in this figure correspond to the estimates from Table 2.B.5. The 90% confidence
intervals are based on the standard errors reported in the table. The dashed line corresponds to the
effect of size zero.
Figure 2.B.5: The effect of the share of high ability students on regular students using regressions
where ysgi and y
m























Table 2.B.5: Estimates of the effect of the share of high ability students on regular students: comparison of estimates based on regressions with ysgi and y
m
gi
being defined as grades and as percentiles obtained by using program-year distributions of the respective grades.
Program-year Program Year Pooled
Differences Perc. differences Differences Perc. differences Differences Perc. differences Differences Perc. differences
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
85p −0.441 −0.060 −0.614∗∗ −0.066 −0.517∗ −0.052 −0.837∗∗∗ −0.095∗∗
(0.313) (0.044) (0.283) (0.043) (0.288) (0.042) (0.286) (0.045)
86p −0.321 −0.041 −0.721∗∗ −0.087∗∗ −0.584∗∗ −0.059 −0.704∗∗ −0.066
(0.322) (0.044) (0.283) (0.042) (0.293) (0.042) (0.288) (0.044)
87p −0.458 −0.053 −0.632∗∗ −0.058 −0.648∗∗ −0.067 −0.833∗∗∗ −0.090∗∗
(0.325) (0.045) (0.301) (0.044) (0.288) (0.043) (0.298) (0.043)
88p −0.535∗ −0.062 −0.764∗∗ −0.080∗ −0.716∗∗ −0.067 −0.890∗∗∗ −0.103∗∗
(0.298) (0.044) (0.306) (0.046) (0.291) (0.044) (0.304) (0.043)
89p −0.479 −0.046 −0.882∗∗∗ −0.104∗∗ −0.987∗∗∗ −0.114∗∗ −0.820∗∗ −0.094∗∗
(0.312) (0.046) (0.304) (0.044) (0.312) (0.044) (0.319) (0.045)
90p −0.694∗∗ −0.077∗ −0.946∗∗∗ −0.121∗∗∗ −0.952∗∗∗ −0.110∗∗ −0.863∗∗∗ −0.097∗∗
(0.285) (0.043) (0.318) (0.043) (0.329) (0.045) (0.328) (0.048)
91p −0.747∗∗∗ −0.081∗ −1.089∗∗∗ −0.142∗∗∗ −0.929∗∗∗ −0.094∗∗ −1.041∗∗∗ −0.122∗∗
(0.287) (0.043) (0.334) (0.047) (0.335) (0.047) (0.347) (0.048)
92p −0.759∗∗ −0.080∗ −1.014∗∗∗ −0.132∗∗∗ −1.043∗∗∗ −0.116∗∗ −0.939∗∗∗ −0.121∗∗
(0.306) (0.046) (0.349) (0.049) (0.352) (0.050) (0.342) (0.049)
93p −0.967∗∗∗ −0.130∗∗∗ −1.022∗∗∗ −0.132∗∗∗ −1.044∗∗∗ −0.133∗∗∗ −0.965∗∗∗ −0.111∗∗
(0.344) (0.050) (0.341) (0.048) (0.350) (0.050) (0.359) (0.051)
94p −0.784∗∗ −0.104∗ −0.985∗∗∗ −0.116∗∗ −1.090∗∗∗ −0.133∗∗ −1.018∗∗∗ −0.125∗∗
(0.395) (0.056) (0.362) (0.051) (0.378) (0.053) (0.360) (0.050)
95p −0.940∗∗ −0.133∗∗ −0.773∗ −0.086 −0.810∗ −0.100 −0.773∗ −0.086
(0.411) (0.056) (0.446) (0.063) (0.441) (0.062) (0.446) (0.063)
Background characteristics X X X X X X X X
Tutorial group FE X X X X X X X X
Note. The estimates are based on equation (2.3), where peer characteristics are measured by the share of high ability peers. In the odd numbered columns, ysgi
and ymgi are defined as grades, whereas in the even numbered columns they are defined as percentiles. The rest of the table is defined in the same way as in Table
2.11. Standard errors clustered at the assignment team level are reported in the parentheses. ∗/∗∗/∗∗∗ denote statistical significance at the 10/5/1% level.
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ates of percentile differences
Differences Perc. differences
Note. The data points in this figure correspond to the estimates from Table 2.B.6. The 90% confidence
intervals are based on the standard errors reported in the table. The dashed line corresponds to the
effect of size zero.
Figure 2.B.6: The effect of the share of high ability students on regular students using regressions
where ysgi and y
m























Table 2.B.6: Estimates of the effect of the share of high ability students on regular students: comparison of estimates based on regressions with ysgi and y
m
gi
being defined as grades and as percentiles obtained by using program distributions of the respective grades.
Program-year Program Year Pooled
Differences Perc. differences Differences Perc. differences Differences Perc. differences Differences Perc. differences
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
85p −0.441 −0.056 −0.614∗∗ −0.060 −0.517∗ −0.051 −0.837∗∗∗ −0.089∗∗
(0.313) (0.042) (0.283) (0.041) (0.288) (0.041) (0.286) (0.044)
86p −0.321 −0.032 −0.721∗∗ −0.077∗ −0.584∗∗ −0.055 −0.704∗∗ −0.059
(0.322) (0.042) (0.283) (0.041) (0.293) (0.041) (0.288) (0.043)
87p −0.458 −0.045 −0.632∗∗ −0.051 −0.648∗∗ −0.059 −0.833∗∗∗ −0.080∗
(0.325) (0.044) (0.301) (0.043) (0.288) (0.041) (0.298) (0.042)
88p −0.535∗ −0.053 −0.764∗∗ −0.073∗ −0.716∗∗ −0.061 −0.890∗∗∗ −0.090∗∗
(0.298) (0.042) (0.306) (0.044) (0.291) (0.042) (0.304) (0.042)
89p −0.479 −0.038 −0.882∗∗∗ −0.095∗∗ −0.987∗∗∗ −0.103∗∗ −0.820∗∗ −0.079∗
(0.312) (0.044) (0.304) (0.043) (0.312) (0.042) (0.319) (0.044)
90p −0.694∗∗ −0.070 −0.946∗∗∗ −0.110∗∗∗ −0.952∗∗∗ −0.097∗∗ −0.863∗∗∗ −0.083∗
(0.285) (0.043) (0.318) (0.042) (0.329) (0.043) (0.328) (0.046)
91p −0.747∗∗∗ −0.076∗ −1.089∗∗∗ −0.132∗∗∗ −0.929∗∗∗ −0.079∗ −1.041∗∗∗ −0.108∗∗
(0.287) (0.043) (0.334) (0.046) (0.335) (0.045) (0.347) (0.046)
92p −0.759∗∗ −0.074 −1.014∗∗∗ −0.122∗∗ −1.043∗∗∗ −0.099∗∗ −0.939∗∗∗ −0.111∗∗
(0.306) (0.046) (0.349) (0.049) (0.352) (0.048) (0.342) (0.048)
93p −0.967∗∗∗ −0.123∗∗ −1.022∗∗∗ −0.125∗∗ −1.044∗∗∗ −0.126∗∗ −0.965∗∗∗ −0.102∗∗
(0.344) (0.050) (0.341) (0.048) (0.350) (0.050) (0.359) (0.051)
94p −0.784∗∗ −0.092 −0.985∗∗∗ −0.109∗∗ −1.090∗∗∗ −0.127∗∗ −1.018∗∗∗ −0.121∗∗
(0.395) (0.058) (0.362) (0.051) (0.378) (0.053) (0.360) (0.050)
95p −0.940∗∗ −0.129∗∗ −0.773∗ −0.082 −0.810∗ −0.092 −0.773∗ −0.082
(0.411) (0.057) (0.446) (0.064) (0.441) (0.063) (0.446) (0.064)
Background characteristics X X X X X X X X
Tutorial group FE X X X X X X X X
Note. The estimates are based on equation (2.3), where peer characteristics are measured by the share of high ability peers. In the odd numbered columns, ysgi
and ymgi are defined as grades, whereas in the even numbered columns they are defined as percentiles. The rest of the table is defined in the same way as in Table
2.11. Standard errors clustered at the assignment team level are reported in the parentheses. ∗/∗∗/∗∗∗ denote statistical significance at the 10/5/1% level.
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ates of percentile differences
Differences Perc. differences
Note. The data points in this figure correspond to the estimates from Table 2.B.7. The 90% confidence
intervals are based on the standard errors reported in the table. The dashed line corresponds to the
effect of size zero.
Figure 2.B.7: The effect of the share of high ability students on regular students using regressions
where ysgi and y
m























Table 2.B.7: Estimates of the effect of the share of high ability students on regular students: comparison of estimates based on regressions with ysgi and y
m
gi
being defined as grades and as percentiles obtained by using year distributions of the respective grades.
Program-year Program Year Pooled
Differences Perc. differences Differences Perc. differences Differences Perc. differences Differences Perc. differences
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
85p −0.441 −0.058 −0.614∗∗ −0.062 −0.517∗ −0.053 −0.837∗∗∗ −0.092∗∗
(0.313) (0.043) (0.283) (0.042) (0.288) (0.041) (0.286) (0.045)
86p −0.321 −0.037 −0.721∗∗ −0.080∗ −0.584∗∗ −0.059 −0.704∗∗ −0.061
(0.322) (0.043) (0.283) (0.042) (0.293) (0.041) (0.288) (0.043)
87p −0.458 −0.049 −0.632∗∗ −0.053 −0.648∗∗ −0.064 −0.833∗∗∗ −0.083∗
(0.325) (0.044) (0.301) (0.044) (0.288) (0.042) (0.298) (0.042)
88p −0.535∗ −0.058 −0.764∗∗ −0.077∗ −0.716∗∗ −0.065 −0.890∗∗∗ −0.095∗∗
(0.298) (0.043) (0.306) (0.045) (0.291) (0.043) (0.304) (0.043)
89p −0.479 −0.042 −0.882∗∗∗ −0.100∗∗ −0.987∗∗∗ −0.112∗∗∗ −0.820∗∗ −0.086∗
(0.312) (0.045) (0.304) (0.043) (0.312) (0.043) (0.319) (0.044)
90p −0.694∗∗ −0.073∗ −0.946∗∗∗ −0.122∗∗∗ −0.952∗∗∗ −0.105∗∗ −0.863∗∗∗ −0.092∗
(0.285) (0.043) (0.318) (0.042) (0.329) (0.044) (0.328) (0.047)
91p −0.747∗∗∗ −0.079∗ −1.089∗∗∗ −0.142∗∗∗ −0.929∗∗∗ −0.089∗ −1.041∗∗∗ −0.123∗∗∗
(0.287) (0.043) (0.334) (0.046) (0.335) (0.045) (0.347) (0.046)
92p −0.759∗∗ −0.078∗ −1.014∗∗∗ −0.132∗∗∗ −1.043∗∗∗ −0.111∗∗ −0.939∗∗∗ −0.120∗∗
(0.306) (0.046) (0.349) (0.048) (0.352) (0.048) (0.342) (0.047)
93p −0.967∗∗∗ −0.128∗∗∗ −1.022∗∗∗ −0.135∗∗∗ −1.044∗∗∗ −0.134∗∗∗ −0.965∗∗∗ −0.112∗∗
(0.344) (0.049) (0.341) (0.047) (0.350) (0.049) (0.359) (0.050)
94p −0.784∗∗ −0.103∗ −0.985∗∗∗ −0.119∗∗ −1.090∗∗∗ −0.137∗∗∗ −1.018∗∗∗ −0.129∗∗∗
(0.395) (0.055) (0.362) (0.050) (0.378) (0.052) (0.360) (0.049)
95p −0.940∗∗ −0.135∗∗ −0.773∗ −0.089 −0.810∗ −0.103∗ −0.773∗ −0.089
(0.411) (0.054) (0.446) (0.062) (0.441) (0.061) (0.446) (0.062)
Background characteristics X X X X X X X X
Tutorial group FE X X X X X X X X
Note. The estimates are based on equation (2.3), where peer characteristics are measured by the share of high ability peers. In the odd numbered columns, ysgi
and ymgi are defined as grades, whereas in the even numbered columns they are defined as percentiles. The rest of the table is defined in the same way as in Table
2.11. Standard errors clustered at the assignment team level are reported in the parentheses. ∗/∗∗/∗∗∗ denote statistical significance at the 10/5/1% level.
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ates of percentile differences
Differences Perc. differences
Note. The data points in this figure correspond to the estimates from Table 2.B.8. The 90% confidence
intervals are based on the standard errors reported in the table. The dashed line corresponds to the
effect of size zero.
Figure 2.B.8: The effect of the share of high ability students on regular students using regressions
where ysgi and y
m























Table 2.B.8: Estimates of the effect of the share of high ability students on regular students: comparison of estimates based on regressions with ysgi and y
m
gi
being defined as grades and as percentiles obtained by using pooled distributions of the respective grades.
Program-year Program Year Pooled
Differences Perc. differences Differences Perc. differences Differences Perc. differences Differences Perc. differences
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
85p −0.441 −0.055 −0.614∗∗ −0.058 −0.517∗ −0.050 −0.837∗∗∗ −0.086∗∗
(0.313) (0.042) (0.283) (0.041) (0.288) (0.040) (0.286) (0.043)
86p −0.321 −0.033 −0.721∗∗ −0.075∗ −0.584∗∗ −0.055 −0.704∗∗ −0.056
(0.322) (0.042) (0.283) (0.041) (0.293) (0.040) (0.288) (0.042)
87p −0.458 −0.044 −0.632∗∗ −0.049 −0.648∗∗ −0.058 −0.833∗∗∗ −0.077∗
(0.325) (0.043) (0.301) (0.042) (0.288) (0.041) (0.298) (0.041)
88p −0.535∗ −0.053 −0.764∗∗ −0.070 −0.716∗∗ −0.059 −0.890∗∗∗ −0.087∗∗
(0.298) (0.042) (0.306) (0.043) (0.291) (0.041) (0.304) (0.042)
89p −0.479 −0.038 −0.882∗∗∗ −0.091∗∗ −0.987∗∗∗ −0.101∗∗ −0.820∗∗ −0.077∗
(0.312) (0.044) (0.304) (0.042) (0.312) (0.042) (0.319) (0.043)
90p −0.694∗∗ −0.068 −0.946∗∗∗ −0.109∗∗∗ −0.952∗∗∗ −0.093∗∗ −0.863∗∗∗ −0.080∗
(0.285) (0.042) (0.318) (0.042) (0.329) (0.043) (0.328) (0.046)
91p −0.747∗∗∗ −0.073∗ −1.089∗∗∗ −0.128∗∗∗ −0.929∗∗∗ −0.076∗ −1.041∗∗∗ −0.106∗∗
(0.287) (0.042) (0.334) (0.046) (0.335) (0.045) (0.347) (0.046)
92p −0.759∗∗ −0.071 −1.014∗∗∗ −0.120∗∗ −1.043∗∗∗ −0.097∗∗ −0.939∗∗∗ −0.107∗∗
(0.306) (0.045) (0.349) (0.048) (0.352) (0.048) (0.342) (0.047)
93p −0.967∗∗∗ −0.117∗∗ −1.022∗∗∗ −0.123∗∗ −1.044∗∗∗ −0.123∗∗ −0.965∗∗∗ −0.099∗∗
(0.344) (0.049) (0.341) (0.048) (0.350) (0.049) (0.359) (0.050)
94p −0.784∗∗ −0.085 −0.985∗∗∗ −0.106∗∗ −1.090∗∗∗ −0.124∗∗ −1.018∗∗∗ −0.118∗∗
(0.395) (0.056) (0.362) (0.050) (0.378) (0.052) (0.360) (0.049)
95p −0.940∗∗ −0.123∗∗ −0.773∗ −0.075 −0.810∗ −0.086 −0.773∗ −0.075
(0.411) (0.056) (0.446) (0.063) (0.441) (0.062) (0.446) (0.063)
Background characteristics X X X X X X X X
Tutorial group FE X X X X X X X X
Note. The estimates are based on equation (2.3), where peer characteristics are measured by the share of high ability peers. In the odd numbered columns, ysgi
and ymgi are defined as grades, whereas in the even numbered columns they are defined as percentiles. The rest of the table is defined in the same way as in Table
2.11. Standard errors clustered at the assignment team level are reported in the parentheses. ∗/∗∗/∗∗∗ denote statistical significance at the 10/5/1% level.
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Heterogeneous coefficients Homogeneous coefficients
Note. The data points in this figure correspond to the estimates from Table 2.B.9. The 90% confidence
intervals are based on the standard errors reported in the table. The dashed line corresponds to the
effect of size zero.
Figure 2.B.9: Estimates of the effect of the share of high ability students on regular students: com-
























Table 2.B.9: Estimates of the effect of the share of high ability students on regular students: comparison of estimates based on regressions with course-specific
and common coefficients of background variables.
Program-year Program Year Pooled
Heterogeneous Homogeneous Heterogeneous Homogeneous Heterogeneous Homogeneous Heterogeneous Homogeneous
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
85p −0.441 −0.386 −0.614∗∗ −0.517∗ −0.517∗ −0.408 −0.837∗∗∗ −0.723∗∗
(0.313) (0.303) (0.283) (0.276) (0.288) (0.287) (0.286) (0.282)
86p −0.321 −0.267 −0.721∗∗ −0.647∗∗ −0.584∗∗ −0.486∗ −0.704∗∗ −0.621∗∗
(0.322) (0.312) (0.283) (0.283) (0.293) (0.289) (0.288) (0.284)
87p −0.458 −0.389 −0.632∗∗ −0.550∗ −0.648∗∗ −0.531∗ −0.833∗∗∗ −0.737∗∗
(0.325) (0.317) (0.301) (0.300) (0.288) (0.285) (0.298) (0.295)
88p −0.535∗ −0.438 −0.764∗∗ −0.671∗∗ −0.716∗∗ −0.615∗∗ −0.890∗∗∗ −0.778∗∗∗
(0.298) (0.295) (0.306) (0.303) (0.291) (0.293) (0.304) (0.301)
89p −0.479 −0.372 −0.882∗∗∗ −0.779∗∗ −0.987∗∗∗ −0.913∗∗∗ −0.820∗∗ −0.713∗∗
(0.312) (0.307) (0.304) (0.305) (0.312) (0.306) (0.319) (0.312)
90p −0.694∗∗ −0.574∗∗ −0.946∗∗∗ −0.844∗∗∗ −0.952∗∗∗ −0.853∗∗∗ −0.863∗∗∗ −0.756∗∗
(0.285) (0.282) (0.318) (0.305) (0.329) (0.324) (0.328) (0.326)
91p −0.747∗∗∗ −0.640∗∗ −1.089∗∗∗ −0.982∗∗∗ −0.929∗∗∗ −0.798∗∗ −1.041∗∗∗ −0.918∗∗∗
(0.287) (0.290) (0.334) (0.326) (0.335) (0.333) (0.347) (0.339)
92p −0.759∗∗ −0.656∗∗ −1.014∗∗∗ −0.908∗∗∗ −1.043∗∗∗ −0.928∗∗∗ −0.939∗∗∗ −0.797∗∗
(0.306) (0.310) (0.349) (0.337) (0.352) (0.345) (0.342) (0.334)
93p −0.967∗∗∗ −0.898∗∗∗ −1.022∗∗∗ −0.899∗∗∗ −1.044∗∗∗ −0.925∗∗∗ −0.965∗∗∗ −0.839∗∗
(0.344) (0.345) (0.341) (0.331) (0.350) (0.337) (0.359) (0.346)
94p −0.784∗∗ −0.642 −0.985∗∗∗ −0.888∗∗ −1.090∗∗∗ −0.976∗∗∗ −1.018∗∗∗ −0.933∗∗∗
(0.395) (0.398) (0.362) (0.349) (0.378) (0.366) (0.360) (0.349)
95p −0.940∗∗ −0.826∗∗ −0.773∗ −0.660 −0.810∗ −0.692 −0.773∗ −0.660
(0.411) (0.410) (0.446) (0.439) (0.441) (0.437) (0.446) (0.439)
Background characteristics X X X X
Tutorial group FE X X X X X X X X
Note. The estimates are based on equation (2.3), where peer characteristics are measured by the share of high ability peers. In the odd numbered columns,
the coefficients of background characteristics are allowed to be different for the statistics and mathematics equations, whereas in the even numbered columns
they are imposed to be the same. The rest of the table is defined in the same way as in Table 2.11. Standard errors clustered at the assignment team level
are reported in the parentheses. ∗/∗∗/∗∗∗ denote statistical significance at the 10/5/1% level.
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Appendix 2.C Additional Sensitivity Checks
In this section, I check sensitivity of my results with respect to different issues.
First, in Section 2.7, I concluded that the difference between the estimates of the
level and difference equations in Table 2.11 and Figure 2.4 stems from a positive self-
selection bias. Another explanation is that in the Mathematics 2 course students are
positively affected by the share of high ability peers. To allay these concerns, I regress
the Mathematics 2 grade on the share of high ability peers. Table 2.C.1 and Figure 2.C.1
show that the estimates are not statistically significantly different from zero. Hence, it
is likely that the difference indeed stems from a positive self-selection bias.
Second, as there is an association between the share of high ability peers and the
team size, Table 2.C.2 and Figure 2.C.2 report results based only on teams of size four.
The identifying assumption is that students do not choose the team size based on course
specific abilities. The point estimates are quite similar to those obtained when the teams
of all the sizes are considered.
Third, Table 2.C.3 and Figure 2.C.3 report results where the shares of females and
Dutch teammates as well as the average age of teammates are included as additional
regressors. The negative peer effect reported in Figure 2.5 might be due to these char-
acteristics instead of the first-year GPA per se.26 The results are robust to the inclusion
of the additional peer characteristics.
Fourth, in Section 2.7, ability composition of the peer group is measured by the
share of high ability peers. It might be the case, however, that the results are driven by
the presence of at least one high ability teammate instead of the share of high ability
teammates. For example, consider a scenario where high ability peers care about their
grades and, if they are in a team with regular students, they volunteer to solve the entire
assignment themselves. If a regular student is in a team with 3 high ability students or in a
team with 2 regular and 1 high ability students, she experiences the same effect. Hence,
Table 2.C.4 and Figure 2.C.4 report results where peer characteristics are measured
by the presence of at least one high ability student in a regular student’s team. As
expected the estimates are smaller in magnitude but have a similar pattern of significance
compared to those based on the share specification. Moreover, Figure 2.C.5 reports the
determination coefficients of the two sets of regressions. In almost all the cases, the
determination coefficient of the share equation based on the 90–95th percentiles is larger
than the one based on of the presence equation. As most of the significant estimates
26Given that the aim of this study is to check whether academic ability of peers matters rather than to
disentangle the effect of different measures of academic ability, the averages of other peer characteristics
measuring students’ abilities are not included in the regression.
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are based on these percentiles, I can conclude that the share of high ability peers better
captures peer effects than the presence of at least one high ability peer.
Furthermore, as there are different team sizes in my sample, it might be the case that
the number of high ability peers matters instead of the share. The difference between
the two specifications is that the share specification takes into account the number of
regular students, whereas the number specification neglects it. For instance, if there
are two high ability students in 3- and 4-student teams, the share specification implies
that the regular students in the former team are affected more whereas the number
specification postulates that the regular students in both teams are affected equally. The
estimates are provided in Table 2.C.5 and Figure 2.C.6. Although the estimates based
on the number specification are, as anticipated, of a smaller magnitude, they exhibit a
similar pattern of statistical significance. Moreover, Figure 2.C.7 shows that in almost
all the cases the determination coefficient of the share equation is higher than the one of
the number equation implying that the former specification has more predictive power.
Fifth, I use the first-year GPA to measure students’ ability. The Statistics 2 course
considered in this paper, however, is one of the most quantitative courses in the curricu-
lum. Therefore, Table 2.C.6 presents the results where students’ ability is measured by
the Statistics 1 and the Mathematics 1 grades. The grades of the two courses are multi-
ples of 0.5, therefore, instead of using percentiles to classify students as either regular or
high ability, I use the grades themselves. Consistent with the results obtained by using
the first-year GPA, the estimates in Table 2.C.6 are negative, though not all of them
are statistically significant. The discrepancy could arise because the first-year GPA is
being able to better capture students’ abilities required for the team assignment. Even
though a high Statistics 1 or Mathematics 1 grade indicates that a student has good
quantitative skills, it also could arise just because a student was lucky. A high first-year
GPA, on the other hand, shows that a student performed systematically well in the first
year, implying that she works hard systematically and has grade concerns.
Tables 2.C.7, 2.C.8, and 2.C.9 and Figures 2.C.8, 2.C.9, and 2.C.10 report results
which are based on two years instead of three to check whether the estimates are driven
by one year only. Although the academic year 2015/2016 has the strongest influence, the
estimates without this year remain negative although of a smaller magnitude.
Moreover, Table 2.C.10 and Figure 2.C.11 show robustness of the estimates depending
on whether tutorial group fixed effects are based on the actual tutorial groups or the
administratively assigned tutorial groups (see footnote 14).
Table 2.C.11 and Figure 2.C.12 compare estimates based on different definitions of
the dependent variable in the statistics equation, ysgi: individual grade, where y
s
gi =
(0.3 · ymidgi + 0.5 · yexamgi )/0.8, and final grade, where ysgi = 0.3 · ymidgi + 0.2 · ytagi + 0.5 · yexamgi
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with ymidgi , y
exam
gi , and y
ta
gi being the grades of the midterm, exam, and team assignment
of the Statistics 2 course, respectively. Although the estimates based on the individual
grade are negative, their magnitude are much lower compared to the estimates based
on the final grade. Hence, it is important to disentangle the individual and team grade
components.
Lastly, ability composition of a team might not only influence a student’s Statistics 2
grade but also her decision to go to the exam. On the one hand, in the previous sections
of this paper, it has been established that students who have a higher share of high
ability teammates are likely to get a lower individual Statistics 2 grade. Hence, a student
might decide to skip the exam because her expected grade is low. On the other hand,
if a regular student has a high share of high ability teammates, she is likely to get a
higher team assignment grade which implies that her opportunity costs of not going to
the exam are higher. Which effect dominates is thus an empirical question. To tackle the
potential endogeneity problem, I employ the decision to go to the Mathematics 2 exam
and use student fixed effects to eliminate unobserved characteristics that determine both




















2 + ψgi + ε
m
gi, (2.C.2)
where qsgi and q
m
gi are binary variables that are equal to one if student i from team
g attended the Statistics 2 and Mathematics 2 exams, respectively. My identifying as-
sumption is that students self-select into teams based on observed characteristics and un-
observed characteristics which determine both decisions, i.e. E[HAg−iεsgi|xgi, wgi, ψgi] = 0
and E[HAg−iεmgi|xgi, wgi, ψgi] = 0. Table 2.3.12 and Figure 2.C.13 demonstrate that the
share of high ability peers does not have a statistically significant influence on a student’s
decision to go to the Statistics 2 exam.
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Table 2.C.1: Estimates of the effect of the share of high ability students on the Mathematics 2 grade
of regular students.
Program-year Program Year Pooled
(1) (2) (3) (4)
85p −0.022 0.191 0.124 0.297
(0.255) (0.252) (0.253) (0.270)
86p −0.051 0.173 0.121 0.241
(0.256) (0.257) (0.269) (0.275)
87p 0.014 0.150 0.106 0.245
(0.259) (0.277) (0.278) (0.284)
88p 0.046 0.182 0.201 0.253
(0.255) (0.284) (0.277) (0.294)
89p 0.038 0.207 0.346 0.199
(0.267) (0.292) (0.303) (0.306)
90p 0.098 0.112 0.184 0.242
(0.264) (0.315) (0.316) (0.304)
91p 0.021 0.237 0.115 0.215
(0.272) (0.320) (0.316) (0.335)
92p −0.016 0.182 0.174 0.190
(0.288) (0.328) (0.335) (0.325)
93p 0.031 0.151 0.202 0.203
(0.331) (0.318) (0.332) (0.336)
94p 0.033 0.052 0.076 0.088
(0.383) (0.334) (0.349) (0.337)
95p 0.004 −0.091 −0.077 −0.091
(0.419) (0.407) (0.422) (0.407)
Background characteristics X X X X
Tutorial group FE X X X X
Note. This table is constructed in a similar way as Table 2.11. The main difference is that in
this table the dependent variable is the Mathematics 2 grade and equation (2.2) is employed.
Standard errors clustered at the assignment team level are reported in the parentheses. ∗/∗∗/∗∗∗
denote statistical significance at the 10/5/1% level.
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95% confidence interval 90% confidence interval
Note. The data points in this figure correspond to the estimates from Table 2.C.1. The confidence
intervals are based on the standard errors reported in the table. The dashed line corresponds to the
effect of size zero.































All teams Team size = 4
Note. The data points in this figure correspond to the estimates from Table 2.C.2. The 90% confidence
intervals are based on the standard errors reported in the table. The dashed line corresponds to the
effect of size zero.





























Table 2.C.2: Estimates of the effect of the share of high ability students on regular students in teams of different sizes.
Program-year Program Year Pooled
All teams Team size = 4 All teams Team size = 4 All teams Team size = 4 All teams Team size = 4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
85p −0.441 −0.386 −0.614∗∗ −0.409 −0.517∗ −0.546∗ −0.837∗∗∗ −0.548∗
(0.313) (0.335) (0.283) (0.307) (0.288) (0.318) (0.286) (0.319)
86p −0.321 −0.360 −0.721∗∗ −0.534∗ −0.584∗∗ −0.505 −0.704∗∗ −0.505
(0.322) (0.331) (0.283) (0.321) (0.293) (0.319) (0.288) (0.324)
87p −0.458 −0.481 −0.632∗∗ −0.444 −0.648∗∗ −0.571∗ −0.833∗∗∗ −0.681∗∗
(0.325) (0.332) (0.301) (0.338) (0.288) (0.326) (0.298) (0.332)
88p −0.535∗ −0.521 −0.764∗∗ −0.644∗ −0.716∗∗ −0.758∗∗ −0.890∗∗∗ −0.758∗∗
(0.298) (0.319) (0.306) (0.340) (0.291) (0.315) (0.304) (0.337)
89p −0.479 −0.374 −0.882∗∗∗ −0.774∗∗ −0.987∗∗∗ −0.957∗∗∗ −0.820∗∗ −0.751∗∗
(0.312) (0.342) (0.304) (0.337) (0.312) (0.329) (0.319) (0.339)
90p −0.694∗∗ −0.581∗ −0.946∗∗∗ −0.757∗∗ −0.952∗∗∗ −0.867∗∗ −0.863∗∗∗ −0.875∗∗
(0.285) (0.326) (0.318) (0.338) (0.329) (0.342) (0.328) (0.344)
91p −0.747∗∗∗ −0.750∗∗ −1.089∗∗∗ −0.968∗∗∗ −0.929∗∗∗ −0.833∗∗ −1.041∗∗∗ −0.931∗∗∗
(0.287) (0.318) (0.334) (0.352) (0.335) (0.343) (0.347) (0.360)
92p −0.759∗∗ −0.757∗∗ −1.014∗∗∗ −0.886∗∗ −1.043∗∗∗ −0.957∗∗∗ −0.939∗∗∗ −0.814∗∗
(0.306) (0.335) (0.349) (0.376) (0.352) (0.360) (0.342) (0.356)
93p −0.967∗∗∗ −0.772∗∗ −1.022∗∗∗ −0.947∗∗ −1.044∗∗∗ −0.939∗∗ −0.965∗∗∗ −0.811∗∗
(0.344) (0.372) (0.341) (0.376) (0.350) (0.373) (0.359) (0.387)
94p −0.784∗∗ −0.512 −0.985∗∗∗ −0.874∗∗ −1.090∗∗∗ −0.893∗∗ −1.018∗∗∗ −0.913∗∗
(0.395) (0.426) (0.362) (0.407) (0.378) (0.403) (0.360) (0.396)
95p −0.940∗∗ −0.716∗ −0.773∗ −0.424 −0.810∗ −0.491 −0.773∗ −0.424
(0.411) (0.434) (0.446) (0.476) (0.441) (0.469) (0.446) (0.476)
Background characteristics X X X X X X X X
Tutorial group FE X X X X X X X X
Note. The estimates are based on equation (2.3), where peer characteristics are measured by the share of high ability peers. In the odd numbered columns,
teams of all sizes are included in the estimation, whereas the even numbered columns are based on teams of size 4 only. The rest of the table is defined in the
same way as in Table 2.11. Standard errors clustered at the assignment team level are reported in the parentheses. ∗/∗∗/∗∗∗ denote statistical significance






























Only HA HA with other characteristics
Note. The data points in this figure correspond to the estimates from Table 2.C.3. The 90% confidence
intervals are based on the standard errors reported in the table. The dashed line corresponds to the
effect of size zero.
Figure 2.C.3: The effect of the share of high ability students on regular ability students including the




























Table 2.C.3: The effect of the share of high ability students on regular ability students including the shares of female and Dutch teammates as well as the
average age of teammates as additional regressors.
Program-year Program Year Pooled
Only HA HA + other char. Only HA HA + other char. Only HA HA + other char. Only HA HA + other char.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
85p −0.441 −0.531 −0.614∗∗ −0.694∗∗ −0.517∗ −0.587∗∗ −0.837∗∗∗ −0.943∗∗∗
(0.313) (0.323) (0.283) (0.292) (0.288) (0.294) (0.286) (0.294)
86p −0.321 −0.379 −0.721∗∗ −0.817∗∗∗ −0.584∗∗ −0.657∗∗ −0.704∗∗ −0.800∗∗∗
(0.322) (0.328) (0.283) (0.292) (0.293) (0.302) (0.288) (0.295)
87p −0.458 −0.530 −0.632∗∗ −0.720∗∗ −0.648∗∗ −0.717∗∗ −0.833∗∗∗ −0.918∗∗∗
(0.325) (0.333) (0.301) (0.309) (0.288) (0.294) (0.298) (0.306)
88p −0.535∗ −0.634∗∗ −0.764∗∗ −0.850∗∗∗ −0.716∗∗ −0.774∗∗∗ −0.890∗∗∗ −0.968∗∗∗
(0.298) (0.307) (0.306) (0.317) (0.291) (0.298) (0.304) (0.314)
89p −0.479 −0.576∗ −0.882∗∗∗ −0.960∗∗∗ −0.987∗∗∗ −1.063∗∗∗ −0.820∗∗ −0.890∗∗∗
(0.312) (0.322) (0.304) (0.316) (0.312) (0.318) (0.319) (0.327)
90p −0.694∗∗ −0.787∗∗∗ −0.946∗∗∗ −1.045∗∗∗ −0.952∗∗∗ −1.020∗∗∗ −0.863∗∗∗ −0.918∗∗∗
(0.285) (0.295) (0.318) (0.331) (0.329) (0.338) (0.328) (0.339)
91p −0.747∗∗∗ −0.837∗∗∗ −1.089∗∗∗ −1.144∗∗∗ −0.929∗∗∗ −1.020∗∗∗ −1.041∗∗∗ −1.110∗∗∗
(0.287) (0.298) (0.334) (0.344) (0.335) (0.346) (0.347) (0.358)
92p −0.759∗∗ −0.833∗∗∗ −1.014∗∗∗ −1.072∗∗∗ −1.043∗∗∗ −1.131∗∗∗ −0.939∗∗∗ −1.014∗∗∗
(0.306) (0.318) (0.349) (0.360) (0.352) (0.365) (0.342) (0.352)
93p −0.967∗∗∗ −1.052∗∗∗ −1.022∗∗∗ −1.093∗∗∗ −1.044∗∗∗ −1.130∗∗∗ −0.965∗∗∗ −1.033∗∗∗
(0.344) (0.351) (0.341) (0.348) (0.350) (0.360) (0.359) (0.370)
94p −0.784∗∗ −0.875∗∗ −0.985∗∗∗ −1.061∗∗∗ −1.090∗∗∗ −1.194∗∗∗ −1.018∗∗∗ −1.108∗∗∗
(0.395) (0.399) (0.362) (0.370) (0.378) (0.386) (0.360) (0.368)
95p −0.940∗∗ −1.009∗∗ −0.773∗ −0.916∗∗ −0.810∗ −0.935∗∗ −0.773∗ −0.916∗∗
(0.411) (0.417) (0.446) (0.446) (0.441) (0.438) (0.446) (0.446)
Background characteristics X X X X X X X X
Tutorial group FE X X X X X X X X
Note. The estimates are based on equation (2.3), where peer characteristics are measured by the shares of high ability peers. The even numbered
columns include the shares of females and Dutch as well as the average age of teammates as additional regressors, whereas the odd numbered columns
do not. The rest of the table is defined in the same way as in Table 2.11. Standard errors clustered at the assignment team level are reported in the




























































Note. The data points in this figure correspond to the estimates from Table 2.C.4. The 90% confidence
intervals are based on the standard errors reported in the table. The dashed line corresponds to the
effect of size zero.
Figure 2.C.4: The effect of the share and presence of high ability students on regular students.
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Note. The data points in this figure correspond to the determination coefficients of the regressions in
Table 2.C.4.
Figure 2.C.5: Determination coefficients of regressions where peer composition is measured by the















Table 2.C.4: Estimates of the effect of the share and presence of high ability students on regular students.
Program-year Program Year Pooled
Share Presence Share Presence Share Presence Share Presence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
85p −0.441 −0.214 −0.614∗∗ −0.331∗∗ −0.517∗ −0.224 −0.837∗∗∗ −0.414∗∗∗
(0.313) (0.157) (0.283) (0.155) (0.288) (0.159) (0.286) (0.146)
86p −0.321 −0.146 −0.721∗∗ −0.409∗∗∗ −0.584∗∗ −0.286∗ −0.704∗∗ −0.403∗∗∗
(0.322) (0.158) (0.283) (0.145) (0.293) (0.158) (0.288) (0.143)
87p −0.458 −0.225 −0.632∗∗ −0.363∗∗ −0.648∗∗ −0.322∗∗ −0.833∗∗∗ −0.431∗∗∗
(0.325) (0.160) (0.301) (0.145) (0.288) (0.152) (0.298) (0.145)
88p −0.535∗ −0.205 −0.764∗∗ −0.427∗∗∗ −0.716∗∗ −0.363∗∗ −0.890∗∗∗ −0.440∗∗∗
(0.298) (0.159) (0.306) (0.147) (0.291) (0.146) (0.304) (0.144)
89p −0.479 −0.181 −0.882∗∗∗ −0.441∗∗∗ −0.987∗∗∗ −0.462∗∗∗ −0.820∗∗ −0.380∗∗
(0.312) (0.159) (0.304) (0.146) (0.312) (0.149) (0.319) (0.151)
90p −0.694∗∗ −0.299∗∗ −0.946∗∗∗ −0.413∗∗∗ −0.952∗∗∗ −0.404∗∗∗ −0.863∗∗∗ −0.432∗∗∗
(0.285) (0.143) (0.318) (0.149) (0.329) (0.152) (0.328) (0.154)
91p −0.747∗∗∗ −0.328∗∗ −1.089∗∗∗ −0.451∗∗∗ −0.929∗∗∗ −0.363∗∗ −1.041∗∗∗ −0.426∗∗∗
(0.287) (0.141) (0.334) (0.153) (0.335) (0.152) (0.347) (0.155)
92p −0.759∗∗ −0.324∗∗ −1.014∗∗∗ −0.416∗∗∗ −1.043∗∗∗ −0.453∗∗∗ −0.939∗∗∗ −0.379∗∗
(0.306) (0.147) (0.349) (0.160) (0.352) (0.153) (0.342) (0.157)
93p −0.967∗∗∗ −0.447∗∗∗ −1.022∗∗∗ −0.469∗∗∗ −1.044∗∗∗ −0.484∗∗∗ −0.965∗∗∗ −0.398∗∗
(0.344) (0.151) (0.341) (0.161) (0.350) (0.157) (0.359) (0.155)
94p −0.784∗∗ −0.277∗ −0.985∗∗∗ −0.427∗∗∗ −1.090∗∗∗ −0.463∗∗∗ −1.018∗∗∗ −0.426∗∗∗
(0.395) (0.158) (0.362) (0.162) (0.378) (0.168) (0.360) (0.160)
95p −0.940∗∗ −0.302∗ −0.773∗ −0.322∗ −0.810∗ −0.291∗ −0.773∗ −0.322∗
(0.411) (0.164) (0.446) (0.187) (0.441) (0.175) (0.446) (0.187)
Background characteristics X X X X X X X X
Tutorial group FE X X X X X X X X
Note. The estimates are based on equation (2.3). In the odd and even numbered columns, peer characteristics are measured by the share and presence of
high ability peers, respectively. (Presence = 1 if there is at least one high ability member in a regular student’s team.) The rest of the table is defined in the
same way as in Table 2.11. Standard errors clustered at the assignment team level are reported in the parentheses. ∗/∗∗/∗∗∗ denote statistical significance
at the 10/5/1% level.
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Note. The data points in this figure correspond to the estimates from Table 2.C.5. The 90% confidence
intervals are based on the standard errors reported in the table. The dashed line corresponds to the
effect of size zero.




































Note. The data points in this figure correspond to the determination coefficients of the regressions in
Table 2.C.5.
Figure 2.C.7: Determination coefficients of regressions where peer composition is measured by the




























Table 2.C.5: Estimates of the effect of the share and number of high ability students on regular students.
Program-year Program Year Pooled
Share Number Share Number Share Number Share Number
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
85p −0.441 −0.112 −0.614∗∗ −0.181∗ −0.517∗ −0.149 −0.837∗∗∗ −0.253∗∗
(0.313) (0.109) (0.283) (0.097) (0.288) (0.098) (0.286) (0.099)
86p −0.321 −0.075 −0.721∗∗ −0.224∗∗ −0.584∗∗ −0.177∗ −0.704∗∗ −0.223∗∗
(0.322) (0.111) (0.283) (0.098) (0.293) (0.100) (0.288) (0.097)
87p −0.458 −0.118 −0.632∗∗ −0.197∗ −0.648∗∗ −0.203∗∗ −0.833∗∗∗ −0.274∗∗∗
(0.325) (0.112) (0.301) (0.102) (0.288) (0.098) (0.298) (0.100)
88p −0.535∗ −0.146 −0.764∗∗ −0.252∗∗ −0.716∗∗ −0.240∗∗ −0.890∗∗∗ −0.297∗∗∗
(0.298) (0.101) (0.306) (0.103) (0.291) (0.097) (0.304) (0.102)
89p −0.479 −0.133 −0.882∗∗∗ −0.297∗∗∗ −0.987∗∗∗ −0.321∗∗∗ −0.820∗∗ −0.273∗∗∗
(0.312) (0.107) (0.304) (0.102) (0.312) (0.102) (0.319) (0.105)
90p −0.694∗∗ −0.216∗∗ −0.946∗∗∗ −0.296∗∗∗ −0.952∗∗∗ −0.297∗∗∗ −0.863∗∗∗ −0.294∗∗∗
(0.285) (0.099) (0.318) (0.104) (0.329) (0.106) (0.328) (0.108)
91p −0.747∗∗∗ −0.247∗∗ −1.089∗∗∗ −0.341∗∗∗ −0.929∗∗∗ −0.283∗∗∗ −1.041∗∗∗ −0.323∗∗∗
(0.287) (0.096) (0.334) (0.110) (0.335) (0.107) (0.347) (0.112)
92p −0.759∗∗ −0.250∗∗ −1.014∗∗∗ −0.312∗∗∗ −1.043∗∗∗ −0.323∗∗∗ −0.939∗∗∗ −0.282∗∗
(0.306) (0.101) (0.349) (0.115) (0.352) (0.113) (0.342) (0.111)
93p −0.967∗∗∗ −0.307∗∗∗ −1.022∗∗∗ −0.319∗∗∗ −1.044∗∗∗ −0.322∗∗∗ −0.965∗∗∗ −0.290∗∗
(0.344) (0.116) (0.341) (0.114) (0.350) (0.115) (0.359) (0.118)
94p −0.784∗∗ −0.233∗ −0.985∗∗∗ −0.302∗∗ −1.090∗∗∗ −0.348∗∗∗ −1.018∗∗∗ −0.314∗∗∗
(0.395) (0.133) (0.362) (0.121) (0.378) (0.126) (0.360) (0.119)
95p −0.940∗∗ −0.292∗∗ −0.773∗ −0.221 −0.810∗ −0.235 −0.773∗ −0.221
(0.411) (0.138) (0.446) (0.150) (0.441) (0.148) (0.446) (0.150)
Background characteristics X X X X X X X X
Tutorial group FE X X X X X X X X
Note. The estimates are based on equation (2.3). In the odd and even numbered columns, peer characteristics are measured by the share and number of
high ability peers, respectively. The rest of the table is defined in the same way as in Table 2.11. Standard errors clustered at the assignment team level
are reported in the parentheses. ∗/∗∗/∗∗∗ denote statistical significance at the 10/5/1% level.
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Table 2.C.6: Estimates of the effect of the share of high ability students on regular students, where
high ability students are defined using Statistics 1 and Mathematics 1 grades.
Statistics 1 Mathematics 1
(1) (2)
grade at least 8 −0.413 −0.578∗
(0.311) (0.305)
grade at least 8.5 −0.505∗ −0.233
(0.295) (0.307)
grade at least 9 −0.307 −0.636∗∗
(0.374) (0.319)
grade at least 9.5 −0.652 −0.281
(0.483) (0.446)
Background characteristics X X
Tutorial group FE X X
Note. The estimates are based on equation (2.3),
where peer characteristics are measured by the share
of high ability peers. The rows indicate which students
are classified as high ability. Standard errors clustered
at the assignment team level are reported in the paren-
theses. ∗/∗∗/∗∗∗ denote statistical significance at the
10/5/1% level.
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All years Without 2013/14
Note. The data points in this figure correspond to the estimates from Table 2.C.7. The 90% confidence
intervals are based on the standard errors reported in the table. The dashed line corresponds to the
effect of size zero.
Figure 2.C.8: The effects of the share of high ability students on regular students using different















Table 2.C.7: Estimates of the share of high ability students on regular students using different samples: based on all academic years and excluding the academic
year 2013/2014.
Program-year Program Year Pooled
All years Without 2013/14 All years Without 2013/14 All years Without 2013/14 All years Without 2013/14
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
85p −0.441 −0.534 −0.614∗∗ −0.651∗ −0.517∗ −0.562 −0.837∗∗∗ −1.010∗∗∗
(0.313) (0.390) (0.283) (0.360) (0.288) (0.352) (0.286) (0.344)
86p −0.321 −0.388 −0.721∗∗ −0.823∗∗ −0.584∗∗ −0.652∗ −0.704∗∗ −0.844∗∗
(0.322) (0.406) (0.283) (0.361) (0.293) (0.368) (0.288) (0.357)
87p −0.458 −0.546 −0.632∗∗ −0.754∗∗ −0.648∗∗ −0.799∗∗ −0.833∗∗∗ −0.955∗∗
(0.325) (0.405) (0.301) (0.375) (0.288) (0.351) (0.298) (0.372)
88p −0.535∗ −0.602 −0.764∗∗ −0.845∗∗ −0.716∗∗ −0.845∗∗ −0.890∗∗∗ −0.979∗∗∗
(0.298) (0.376) (0.306) (0.387) (0.291) (0.363) (0.304) (0.377)
89p −0.479 −0.609 −0.882∗∗∗ −0.959∗∗ −0.987∗∗∗ −1.159∗∗∗ −0.820∗∗ −0.895∗∗
(0.312) (0.389) (0.304) (0.378) (0.312) (0.401) (0.319) (0.403)
90p −0.694∗∗ −0.734∗∗ −0.946∗∗∗ −1.066∗∗∗ −0.952∗∗∗ −1.054∗∗ −0.863∗∗∗ −0.930∗∗
(0.285) (0.353) (0.318) (0.402) (0.329) (0.424) (0.328) (0.415)
91p −0.747∗∗∗ −0.770∗∗ −1.089∗∗∗ −1.132∗∗∗ −0.929∗∗∗ −1.036∗∗ −1.041∗∗∗ −1.134∗∗
(0.287) (0.365) (0.334) (0.436) (0.335) (0.422) (0.347) (0.443)
92p −0.759∗∗ −0.704∗ −1.014∗∗∗ −1.061∗∗ −1.043∗∗∗ −1.178∗∗∗ −0.939∗∗∗ −0.966∗∗
(0.306) (0.386) (0.349) (0.457) (0.352) (0.438) (0.342) (0.434)
93p −0.967∗∗∗ −0.980∗∗ −1.022∗∗∗ −1.037∗∗ −1.044∗∗∗ −1.122∗∗ −0.965∗∗∗ −1.001∗∗
(0.344) (0.439) (0.341) (0.450) (0.350) (0.469) (0.359) (0.481)
94p −0.784∗∗ −0.899∗ −0.985∗∗∗ −1.006∗∗ −1.090∗∗∗ −1.174∗∗ −1.018∗∗∗ −1.035∗∗
(0.395) (0.538) (0.362) (0.487) (0.378) (0.524) (0.360) (0.493)
95p −0.940∗∗ −1.172∗∗ −0.773∗ −0.932 −0.810∗ −1.031 −0.773∗ −0.932
(0.411) (0.592) (0.446) (0.621) (0.441) (0.631) (0.446) (0.621)
Background characteristics X X X X X X X X
Tutorial group FE X X X X X X X X
Note. The estimates are based on equation (2.3). In the odd numbered columns, all academic years are included for the estimation, whereas the academic year
2013/2014 is excluded from the sample in the even numbered columns. The rest of the table is defined in the same way as in Table 2.11. Standard errors clustered
at the assignment team level are reported in the parentheses. ∗/∗∗/∗∗∗ denote statistical significance at the 10/5/1% level.
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All years Without 2014/15
Note. The data points in this figure correspond to the estimates from Table 2.C.8. The 90% confidence
intervals are based on the standard errors reported in the table. The dashed line corresponds to the
effect of size zero.
Figure 2.C.9: The effect of the share of high ability students on regular students using different samples:















Table 2.C.8: Estimates of the share of high ability students on regular students using different samples: based on all academic years and excluding the academic
year 2014/2015.
Program-year Program Year Pooled
All years Without 2014/15 All years Without 2014/15 All years Without 2014/15 All years Without 2014/15
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
85p −0.441 −0.351 −0.614∗∗ −0.738∗∗ −0.517∗ −0.566 −0.837∗∗∗ −0.856∗∗
(0.313) (0.420) (0.283) (0.357) (0.288) (0.374) (0.286) (0.367)
86p −0.321 −0.346 −0.721∗∗ −0.920∗∗ −0.584∗∗ −0.640∗ −0.704∗∗ −0.869∗∗
(0.322) (0.420) (0.283) (0.356) (0.293) (0.375) (0.288) (0.376)
87p −0.458 −0.381 −0.632∗∗ −0.826∗∗ −0.648∗∗ −0.837∗∗ −0.833∗∗∗ −1.140∗∗∗
(0.325) (0.433) (0.301) (0.398) (0.288) (0.360) (0.298) (0.389)
88p −0.535∗ −0.593 −0.764∗∗ −1.158∗∗∗ −0.716∗∗ −0.912∗∗ −0.890∗∗∗ −1.211∗∗∗
(0.298) (0.387) (0.306) (0.393) (0.291) (0.369) (0.304) (0.405)
89p −0.479 −0.566 −0.882∗∗∗ −1.250∗∗∗ −0.987∗∗∗ −1.100∗∗∗ −0.820∗∗ −1.185∗∗∗
(0.312) (0.396) (0.304) (0.399) (0.312) (0.379) (0.319) (0.417)
90p −0.694∗∗ −0.877∗∗ −0.946∗∗∗ −1.163∗∗∗ −0.952∗∗∗ −1.236∗∗∗ −0.863∗∗∗ −1.232∗∗∗
(0.285) (0.358) (0.318) (0.404) (0.329) (0.410) (0.328) (0.442)
91p −0.747∗∗∗ −0.998∗∗∗ −1.089∗∗∗ −1.219∗∗∗ −0.929∗∗∗ −1.213∗∗∗ −1.041∗∗∗ −1.263∗∗∗
(0.287) (0.362) (0.334) (0.417) (0.335) (0.439) (0.347) (0.443)
92p −0.759∗∗ −1.111∗∗∗ −1.014∗∗∗ −1.201∗∗∗ −1.043∗∗∗ −1.279∗∗∗ −0.939∗∗∗ −1.218∗∗∗
(0.306) (0.383) (0.349) (0.443) (0.352) (0.481) (0.342) (0.456)
93p −0.967∗∗∗ −1.092∗∗ −1.022∗∗∗ −1.170∗∗ −1.044∗∗∗ −1.148∗∗ −0.965∗∗∗ −1.126∗∗
(0.344) (0.445) (0.341) (0.457) (0.350) (0.459) (0.359) (0.482)
94p −0.784∗∗ −0.832∗ −0.985∗∗∗ −1.099∗∗ −1.090∗∗∗ −1.099∗∗ −1.018∗∗∗ −1.142∗∗
(0.395) (0.496) (0.362) (0.483) (0.378) (0.483) (0.360) (0.479)
95p −0.940∗∗ −0.941∗ −0.773∗ −0.746 −0.810∗ −0.674 −0.773∗ −0.746
(0.411) (0.497) (0.446) (0.593) (0.441) (0.550) (0.446) (0.593)
Background characteristics X X X X X X X X
Tutorial group FE X X X X X X X X
Note. The estimates are based on equation (2.3). In the odd numbered columns, all academic years are included for the estimation, whereas the academic year
2014/2015 is excluded from the sample in the even numbered columns. The rest of the table is defined in the same way as in Table 2.11. Standard errors clustered
at the assignment team level are reported in the parentheses. ∗/∗∗/∗∗∗ denote statistical significance at the 10/5/1% level.
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All years Without 2015/16
Note. The data points in this figure correspond to the estimates from Table 2.C.9. The 90% confidence
intervals are based on the standard errors reported in the table. The dashed line corresponds to the
effect of size zero.
Figure 2.C.10: The effect of the share of high ability students on regular students using different















Table 2.C.9: Estimates of the share of high ability students on regular students using different samples: based on all academic years and excluding the academic
year 2015/2016.
Program-year Program Year Pooled
All years Without 2015/16 All years Without 2015/16 All years Without 2015/16 All years Without 2015/16
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
85p −0.441 −0.442 −0.614∗∗ −0.442 −0.517∗ −0.414 −0.837∗∗∗ −0.581∗
(0.313) (0.320) (0.283) (0.310) (0.288) (0.314) (0.286) (0.341)
86p −0.321 −0.242 −0.721∗∗ −0.375 −0.584∗∗ −0.432 −0.704∗∗ −0.391
(0.322) (0.316) (0.283) (0.308) (0.293) (0.315) (0.288) (0.321)
87p −0.458 −0.468 −0.632∗∗ −0.289 −0.648∗∗ −0.251 −0.833∗∗∗ −0.426
(0.325) (0.319) (0.301) (0.325) (0.288) (0.328) (0.298) (0.319)
88p −0.535∗ −0.403 −0.764∗∗ −0.323 −0.716∗∗ −0.365 −0.890∗∗∗ −0.489
(0.298) (0.316) (0.306) (0.327) (0.291) (0.327) (0.304) (0.320)
89p −0.479 −0.193 −0.882∗∗∗ −0.461 −0.987∗∗∗ −0.667∗ −0.820∗∗ −0.416
(0.312) (0.343) (0.304) (0.327) (0.312) (0.351) (0.319) (0.334)
90p −0.694∗∗ −0.398 −0.946∗∗∗ −0.578∗ −0.952∗∗∗ −0.510 −0.863∗∗∗ −0.471
(0.285) (0.333) (0.318) (0.350) (0.329) (0.360) (0.328) (0.339)
91p −0.747∗∗∗ −0.419 −1.089∗∗∗ −0.824∗∗ −0.929∗∗∗ −0.526 −1.041∗∗∗ −0.669∗
(0.287) (0.324) (0.334) (0.374) (0.335) (0.362) (0.347) (0.384)
92p −0.759∗∗ −0.392 −1.014∗∗∗ −0.706∗ −1.043∗∗∗ −0.653∗ −0.939∗∗∗ −0.580
(0.306) (0.346) (0.349) (0.373) (0.352) (0.364) (0.342) (0.370)
93p −0.967∗∗∗ −0.766∗∗ −1.022∗∗∗ −0.810∗∗ −1.044∗∗∗ −0.780∗∗ −0.965∗∗∗ −0.724∗∗
(0.344) (0.362) (0.341) (0.353) (0.350) (0.360) (0.359) (0.361)
94p −0.784∗∗ −0.548 −0.985∗∗∗ −0.785∗∗ −1.090∗∗∗ −0.912∗∗ −1.018∗∗∗ −0.790∗∗
(0.395) (0.401) (0.362) (0.367) (0.378) (0.386) (0.360) (0.351)
95p −0.940∗∗ −0.593 −0.773∗ −0.569 −0.810∗ −0.646 −0.773∗ −0.569
(0.411) (0.410) (0.446) (0.412) (0.441) (0.421) (0.446) (0.412)
Background characteristics X X X X X X X X
Tutorial group FE X X X X X X X X
Note. The estimates are based on equation (2.3). In the odd numbered columns, all academic years are included for the estimation, whereas the academic year
2015/2016 is excluded from the sample in the even numbered columns. The rest of the table is defined in the same way as in Table 2.11. Standard errors clustered
at the assignment team level are reported in the parentheses. ∗/∗∗/∗∗∗ denote statistical significance at the 10/5/1% level.
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Actual tutorial group Administrative tutorial group
Note. The data points in this figure correspond to the estimates from Table 2.C.10. The 90% confidence
intervals are based on the standard errors reported in the table. The dashed line corresponds to the
effect of size zero.
Figure 2.C.11: The effect of the share of high ability students on regular students obtained from
















Table 2.C.10: Estimates of the effect of the share of high ability students on regular students obtained from regressions with tutorial group fixed effects based
on the actual and administrative tutorial group definitions.
Program-year Program Year Pooled
Actual group Admin. group Actual group Admin. group Actual group Admin. group Actual group Admin. group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
85p −0.441 −0.444 −0.614∗∗ −0.616∗∗ −0.517∗ −0.519∗ −0.837∗∗∗ −0.838∗∗∗
(0.313) (0.314) (0.283) (0.283) (0.288) (0.289) (0.286) (0.287)
86p −0.321 −0.323 −0.721∗∗ −0.722∗∗ −0.584∗∗ −0.585∗∗ −0.704∗∗ −0.706∗∗
(0.322) (0.323) (0.283) (0.283) (0.293) (0.294) (0.288) (0.288)
87p −0.458 −0.460 −0.632∗∗ −0.633∗∗ −0.648∗∗ −0.649∗∗ −0.833∗∗∗ −0.835∗∗∗
(0.325) (0.325) (0.301) (0.302) (0.288) (0.288) (0.298) (0.298)
88p −0.535∗ −0.537∗ −0.764∗∗ −0.765∗∗ −0.716∗∗ −0.718∗∗ −0.890∗∗∗ −0.892∗∗∗
(0.298) (0.299) (0.306) (0.307) (0.291) (0.292) (0.304) (0.304)
89p −0.479 −0.481 −0.882∗∗∗ −0.883∗∗∗ −0.987∗∗∗ −0.988∗∗∗ −0.820∗∗ −0.821∗∗
(0.312) (0.313) (0.304) (0.305) (0.312) (0.312) (0.319) (0.319)
90p −0.694∗∗ −0.696∗∗ −0.946∗∗∗ −0.947∗∗∗ −0.952∗∗∗ −0.953∗∗∗ −0.863∗∗∗ −0.864∗∗∗
(0.285) (0.286) (0.318) (0.318) (0.329) (0.329) (0.328) (0.328)
91p −0.747∗∗∗ −0.749∗∗∗ −1.089∗∗∗ −1.090∗∗∗ −0.929∗∗∗ −0.930∗∗∗ −1.041∗∗∗ −1.042∗∗∗
(0.287) (0.288) (0.334) (0.334) (0.335) (0.335) (0.347) (0.347)
92p −0.759∗∗ −0.761∗∗ −1.014∗∗∗ −1.015∗∗∗ −1.043∗∗∗ −1.044∗∗∗ −0.939∗∗∗ −0.940∗∗∗
(0.306) (0.306) (0.349) (0.349) (0.352) (0.353) (0.342) (0.342)
93p −0.967∗∗∗ −0.968∗∗∗ −1.022∗∗∗ −1.020∗∗∗ −1.044∗∗∗ −1.042∗∗∗ −0.965∗∗∗ −0.963∗∗∗
(0.344) (0.344) (0.341) (0.341) (0.350) (0.350) (0.359) (0.360)
94p −0.784∗∗ −0.782∗∗ −0.985∗∗∗ −0.983∗∗∗ −1.090∗∗∗ −1.089∗∗∗ −1.018∗∗∗ −1.017∗∗∗
(0.395) (0.396) (0.362) (0.363) (0.378) (0.378) (0.360) (0.361)
95p −0.940∗∗ −0.938∗∗ −0.773∗ −0.772∗ −0.810∗ −0.809∗ −0.773∗ −0.772∗
(0.411) (0.412) (0.446) (0.447) (0.441) (0.442) (0.446) (0.447)
Background characteristics X X X X X X X X
Tutorial group FE X X X X X X X X
Note. The estimates are based on equation (2.3). In the odd and even numbered columns, actual and administrative, respectively, tutorial group definitions
are used (see footnote 14). As the administrative tutorial group identifiers are missing for 4.5% of the observations, actual tutorial group identifiers were
imputed for them. The rest of the table is defined in the same way as in Table 2.11. Standard errors clustered at the assignment team level are reported
in the parentheses. ∗/∗∗/∗∗∗ denote statistical significance at the 10/5/1% level.
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Individual grade Final grade
Note. The data points in this figure correspond to the estimates from Table 2.C.11. The 90% confidence
intervals are based on the standard errors reported in the table. The dashed line corresponds to the
effect of size zero.
Figure 2.C.12: The effect of the share of high ability students on regular students using regressions,
















Table 2.C.11: Estimates of the effect of the share of high ability students on regular students using regressions, where the Statistics 2 grade is defined solely
on the individual component and on both the individual and team components.
Program-year Program Year Pooled
Individual grade Final grade Individual grade Final grade Individual grade Final grade Individual grade Final grade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
85p −0.441 0.004 −0.614∗∗ −0.176 −0.517∗ −0.073 −0.837∗∗∗ −0.395
(0.313) (0.286) (0.283) (0.256) (0.288) (0.260) (0.286) (0.269)
86p −0.321 0.066 −0.721∗∗ −0.269 −0.584∗∗ −0.110 −0.704∗∗ −0.278
(0.322) (0.290) (0.283) (0.260) (0.293) (0.266) (0.288) (0.262)
87p −0.458 −0.036 −0.632∗∗ −0.201 −0.648∗∗ −0.200 −0.833∗∗∗ −0.369
(0.325) (0.288) (0.301) (0.273) (0.288) (0.261) (0.298) (0.271)
88p −0.535∗ −0.155 −0.764∗∗ −0.339 −0.716∗∗ −0.286 −0.890∗∗∗ −0.439
(0.298) (0.264) (0.306) (0.277) (0.291) (0.259) (0.304) (0.275)
89p −0.479 −0.139 −0.882∗∗∗ −0.457∗ −0.987∗∗∗ −0.563∗∗ −0.820∗∗ −0.325
(0.312) (0.275) (0.304) (0.274) (0.312) (0.271) (0.319) (0.286)
90p −0.694∗∗ −0.379 −0.946∗∗∗ −0.512∗ −0.952∗∗∗ −0.533∗ −0.863∗∗∗ −0.412
(0.285) (0.259) (0.318) (0.285) (0.329) (0.287) (0.328) (0.287)
91p −0.747∗∗∗ −0.488∗ −1.089∗∗∗ −0.637∗∗ −0.929∗∗∗ −0.547∗ −1.041∗∗∗ −0.593∗∗
(0.287) (0.261) (0.334) (0.290) (0.335) (0.296) (0.347) (0.301)
92p −0.759∗∗ −0.506∗ −1.014∗∗∗ −0.638∗∗ −1.043∗∗∗ −0.689∗∗ −0.939∗∗∗ −0.638∗∗
(0.306) (0.278) (0.349) (0.300) (0.352) (0.311) (0.342) (0.301)
93p −0.967∗∗∗ −0.720∗∗ −1.022∗∗∗ −0.725∗∗ −1.044∗∗∗ −0.748∗∗ −0.965∗∗∗ −0.685∗∗
(0.344) (0.314) (0.341) (0.290) (0.350) (0.298) (0.359) (0.307)
94p −0.784∗∗ −0.487 −0.985∗∗∗ −0.729∗∗ −1.090∗∗∗ −0.854∗∗∗ −1.018∗∗∗ −0.808∗∗∗
(0.395) (0.361) (0.362) (0.309) (0.378) (0.318) (0.360) (0.302)
95p −0.940∗∗ −0.662∗ −0.773∗ −0.548 −0.810∗ −0.600 −0.773∗ −0.548
(0.411) (0.352) (0.446) (0.383) (0.441) (0.382) (0.446) (0.383)
Background characteristics X X X X X X X X
Tutorial group FE X X X X X X X X
Note. The estimates are based on equation (2.3). In the odd and even numbered columns, the Statistics 2 grade is defined based on the individual component
and on both the individual and team components, respectively. The rest of the table is defined in the same way as in Table 2.11. Standard errors clustered
at the assignment team level are reported in the parentheses. ∗/∗∗/∗∗∗ denote statistical significance at the 10/5/1% level.
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Note. The data points in this figure correspond to the estimates from Table 2.3.12. The 90% confidence
intervals are based on the standard errors reported in the table. The dashed line corresponds to the
effect of size zero.
Figure 2.C.13: The effect of the share of high ability students on the decision of regular students to















Table 2.3.12: Estimates of the effect of the share of high ability students on the decision of regular students to attend the Statistics 2 exam.
Program-year Program Year Pooled
Levels Differences Levels Differences Levels Differences Levels Differences
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
85p 0.096∗ 0.042 0.111∗∗ 0.042 0.148∗∗∗ 0.083 0.121∗∗ 0.055
(0.057) (0.062) (0.055) (0.060) (0.057) (0.063) (0.057) (0.062)
86p 0.093 0.060 0.107∗ 0.052 0.108∗ 0.055 0.121∗∗ 0.058
(0.057) (0.062) (0.058) (0.063) (0.056) (0.062) (0.057) (0.062)
87p 0.115∗∗ 0.046 0.123∗∗ 0.066 0.085 0.038 0.111∗ 0.051
(0.056) (0.064) (0.059) (0.063) (0.056) (0.062) (0.062) (0.065)
88p 0.104∗ 0.060 0.125∗∗ 0.094 0.080 0.043 0.098 0.037
(0.058) (0.062) (0.061) (0.063) (0.058) (0.064) (0.064) (0.067)
89p 0.111∗ 0.073 0.124∗ 0.096 0.075 0.032 0.073 0.032
(0.057) (0.065) (0.064) (0.065) (0.064) (0.069) (0.063) (0.070)
90p 0.071 0.050 0.096 0.075 0.071 0.032 0.089 0.081
(0.056) (0.063) (0.063) (0.070) (0.067) (0.075) (0.065) (0.069)
91p 0.065 0.057 0.081 0.064 0.070 0.048 0.084 0.075
(0.057) (0.065) (0.069) (0.076) (0.068) (0.076) (0.070) (0.078)
92p 0.057 0.041 0.057 0.070 0.061 0.078 0.044 0.059
(0.061) (0.068) (0.068) (0.080) (0.072) (0.077) (0.067) (0.078)
93p 0.052 0.041 0.020 0.038 0.015 0.030 0.013 0.042
(0.064) (0.067) (0.066) (0.075) (0.069) (0.077) (0.070) (0.081)
94p 0.063 0.059 −0.002 0.039 0.015 0.065 0.035 0.041
(0.068) (0.073) (0.069) (0.081) (0.070) (0.079) (0.066) (0.083)
95p 0.022 0.047 0.013 0.010 0.009 0.020 0.013 0.010
(0.071) (0.076) (0.066) (0.083) (0.068) (0.083) (0.066) (0.083)
Background characteristics X X X X X X X X
Tutorial group FE X X X X X X X X
Note. In the odd numbered columns, equation (2.C.1) is utilizes, whereas the even numbered columns are based on the difference between
equations (2.C.1) and (2.C.2). The rest of the table is defined in the same way as in Table 2.11. Standard errors clustered at the assignment






This chapter is based on the identically entitled working paper, which is co-authored
with Jaap H. Abbring.
3.1. Introduction
In many countries, students’ placements into schools, tracks, majors, and universities are
based on standardized test scores that are complemented with teachers’ assessments. Yet,
it is not clear whether this addition of subjective teachers’ assessments produces higher
quality matches between schools and students.1 On the one hand, teachers may be able to
assess important dimensions of a student’s human capital not captured by standardized
tests, such as work ethic and other non-cognitive skills. On the other hand, teachers may
have discriminatory views about students of a particular gender or socio-economic class.
Therefore, teacher discretion might foster inequality of opportunity, increase gender wage
gaps, and reduce intergenerational mobility. Providing empirical evidence on the added
value of subjective teachers’ assessments is challenging because they are usually given
in the form of recommendation letters, and therefore hard to quantify, and rarely come
with information on standardized test scores. In this paper, we contribute to this debate
by exploiting a unique feature of the Dutch educational system that ensures that we
observe the teachers’ secondary school track recommendation and a standardized test
score that maps in such a recommendation for each student.
The Netherlands has an early educational tracking system, like, for example, Austria,
Germany, and Hungary. After finishing primary school at about the age of 12, pupils enter
one of several secondary education tracks, which vary both in terms of required abilities
and curricula. Pupils’ educational tracks are primarily determined by a recommendation
of their primary school teacher and a standardized test. In the period considered in this
1We consider the matches between schools and students to be of high quality if the most and least
talented students are placed into the highest and lowest tracks, respectively, and the rest of the students
are placed in the same vein.
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paper, teachers give their recommendations after learning the results of the standard-
ized test. These recommendations may deviate from the tracks suggested by the test
results. Using rich administrative data from Statistics Netherlands (CBS), we document
who benefits from teachers’ ability to deviate from the recommendation for a secondary
school track implied by the standardized test. We show that, for a given test score,
teachers recommend higher tracks to pupils with more educated parents. The relations
between teachers’ recommendations and immigration status as well as mother’s income
are weaker, whereas the relations with gender and father’s income are unsubstantial.
This relation between tracking recommendations and parental education could stem
from teachers’ biases or mistaken beliefs. For example, if teachers have a taste for dis-
crimination against pupils who have less educated parents, or mistakenly think that this
group of pupils will perform worse in secondary school, they will issue lower recommenda-
tions to these pupils. Alternatively, teachers may incorporate into their recommendations
knowledge of pupils’ abilities that are not captured by the standardized test or, relat-
edly, statistically discriminate. Under this form of teacher discretion, pupils who have
less educated parents could get lower recommendations if, for example, their teachers
observe they have lower motivation or rationally foresee that their parents will be less
able to assist them with their homework, in particular in the higher tracks.
It is important to disentangle these two forms of teacher discretion, because they
have different policy implications. If teacher discretion stems from their biases or mis-
taken beliefs, educational institutions may want to minimize the reliance on teachers’
assessments. On the other hand, if teachers take into account abilities not captured by
the standardized test, educational institutions may prefer to give more weight to their
assessments. If teachers correctly foresee that pupils with lower educated parents are
at a disadvantage in the higher educational tracks, it may moreover be useful to offer
homework and other guidance that can substitute for those pupils’ parental inputs.
Inspired by Hoffman et al.’s (2018) analysis of discretion in hiring, we propose to
distinguish between the two forms of discretion by exploiting the association between
a teacher’s propensity to adjust recommendations implied by the standardized test and
secondary school performance of pupils whose teachers recommend that they pursue the
highest (or lowest) track. Assume that teachers make exceptions only if they have ad-
ditional correct information about pupils and consider two otherwise identical teachers
who differ in their willingness to exert discretion. Then, if they have to assess the same
pool of pupils, the average performance in secondary education of pupils who are given
the highest track recommendation by the more willing teacher is higher than the one of
the less willing teacher. Therefore, there is a positive association between pupils’ perfor-
mance and teachers’ propensity to adjust recommendations given by the standardized
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test. If, on the other hand, teacher discretion is driven by biases or mistaken beliefs, the
sign of this association is reversed. Hence, a positive association informs us that teachers
rationally incorporate additional correct information, while a negative association sug-
gests that they are biased or act on mistaken beliefs.2,3 To implement this approach,
we can select a subsample of pupils who are granted the highest (or lowest) track rec-
ommendation by their teachers and regress secondary school outcomes – such as track
switching, grade retention, performance on the final secondary education exams – on the
share of pupils for whom their teachers made exceptions.
The theoretical predictions that underly our empirical approach assumed that both
teachers assess the same pool of pupils. Given that in our setting a teacher typically
teaches only one group of pupils and she has to give recommendations only for this
group, we have to rely on the variation in the willingness to exert discretion between
teachers who assess different sets of pupils. The resulting selection effects may confound
the proposed test. To limit these selection effects, we suggest to exploit schools with
multiple groups in the final year of primary education and to rely on the variation in
teachers’ willingness to exert discretion between teachers of pupils from different groups
in the same school. As it is very likely that primary education pupils are not subject to
strong ability tracking within schools, pupils from different groups in the same school
should be comparable.
Our paper contributes to the prior work on educational tracking and elite school
attendance. Duflo et al. (2011) and Hanushek and Wößmann (2006) study the effect of
educational tracking on short term outcomes, whereas Dustmann et al. (2017) consider
long term educational and labor market outcomes and Pekkarinen et al. (2009) analyze
the effect of tracking on intergenerational income mobility. Several papers study the ef-
fects of attending a school with high achieving peers in settings where pupils apply to
secondary schools of their choice but admissions are dependent on their grades (Abdulka-
diroğlu et al., 2014; Jackson, 2010; Pop-Eleches and Urquiola, 2013). Similarly to this
literature, our paper considers an educational system with early tracking, where pupils
attending the highest track are surrounded by high achieving peers. However, instead of
analyzing the effects of tracking, we study whether teachers have and act on information
that increases the match quality between a school and a pupil.
2The signs are reversed if we instead consider pupils with the lowest track recommendation.
3Our paper does not aim at identifying the exact channel of teacher discretion. For example, if we find
a negative association between pupils’ performance in secondary education and teachers’ propensity
to adjust recommendations given by the standardized test, we cannot conclude whether teachers are
biased or have mistaken beliefs. We do not see this feature as a strong drawback as nevertheless we
are able to inform policy makers whether the reliance on teacher discretion produces higher quality
matches between schools and pupils.
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The present paper is also related to the recent literature on teacher discretion and
its consequences. Several studies document negative effects of teacher discretion. Lavy
(2008) finds that teachers in Israel grade girls more favorably than boys, while Hanna
and Linden (2012) show that lower caste pupils are graded less favorably than their high
caste counterparts in India. Burgess and Greaves (2013) establish systematic differences
between standardized test scores and teachers’ assessments for ethnic minority and white
pupils and claim that the result is consistent with a model where past performance of eth-
nic minority pupils on the standardized test in a teacher’s school impacts her assessment.
Dee et al. (2016) and Diamond and Persson (2016) show that teachers inflate grades just
below important cutoffs in high school exit exams in New York and nationwide math
tests in Sweden, respectively. Furthermore, Calsamiglia and Loviglio (2017) document
that teachers are not aware of the national ability distribution and grade pupils based on
their local relative performance. Therefore, having high ability peers is harmful. Rather
than documenting distortions that arise under teachers’ assessments, our paper aims at
investigating whether potential negative effects of teacher discretion are offset by their
ability to add additional information about pupils’ human capital that is not captured
by standardized test scores.
The most closely related studies are two reports by the Dutch Inspectorate of Edu-
cation (Inspectorate of Education, 2016, 2017). These reports consider a similar sample
and a similar set of observed characteristics. They establish that, conditional on test
scores, the main factor influencing teachers’ recommendations is parental education.
Our empirical analyses confirm this finding and show it to be robust across a range of
specifications. The reports of the Dutch Inspectorate of Education neither investigate
the nature of teacher discretion nor propose a method to do so. In contrast, we propose
a feasible method to study whether primary school teachers use their discretion to ratio-
nally incorporate additional information about pupils or to unleash the negative effects
of their biases and mistaken beliefs. Implementing this method is left for future work.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 presents the insti-
tutional background. Section 3.3 describes the data. Section 3.4 presents the empirical
analysis of the relation between teachers’ recommendations and pupils’ characteristics
and test scores. Section 3.5 discusses the proposed method to assess the nature of teacher
discretion. Section 3.6 concludes. The appendix provides supplementary results that are




3.2.1. Overview of the Dutch education system
In the Netherlands, primary education consists of two kindergarten classes followed by
grades 1 through 6 (see Figure 3.A.1 in Appendix 3.A for an overview of the Dutch
education system). Although children are not required to attend school before their fifth
birthday, almost all of them start primary school at the age of four in the first kinder-
garten class. Reading, writing, and mathematics lessons start from grade 1. In primary
education, pupils are taught almost all subjects in a given grade by the same teacher
with some exceptions for physical education, religion, and ethics. Teachers, however,
usually do not teach the same group of pupils for all eight years. Pupils transition to
secondary school when they are about twelve years old, where they are allocated into
different educational tracks.
There are seven educational tracks, which differ by their curricula and length. The
two highest tracks prepare pupils for tertiary education: the six-year pre-university track
(VWO) offers access to post-secondary education in a university and the five-year senior
general education track (HAVO) prepares pupils for a university of applied sciences.
Next, there are four four-year pre-vocational tracks (VMBO): a basic profession-
oriented track, a middle management-oriented track, a mixed track, and a theory-oriented
track. These four tracks mainly prepare pupils for higher vocational education and of-
fer varying mixes of theoretical education and vocational training. For example, the
theory-oriented track is mostly theoretical and allows pupils after graduation not only
to continue with higher vocational training but also to pursue the senior secondary ed-
ucation track. In the basic profession-oriented track, on the other hand, pupils not only
get theoretical education but also work experience.
After getting a pre-vocational secondary education diploma, pupils can continue in
one of four types of upper secondary vocational education depending on their track in
pre-vocational training. For instance, the middle management training program takes
about four years and prepares for white collar work. Its graduates can also enroll in a
university of applied sciences. The two- to three-year basic education program, on the
other hand, focuses on simpler tasks that require less independence and responsibility.
To graduate from one of these six secondary school tracks and obtain a track-specific
diploma, a pupil has to pass a final school or national exam, or a combination of both.
A small group of secondary school pupils follows the seventh, practical education
track. This track mainly consists of on-the-job experience and is designed for pupils who
otherwise would not be able to graduate from one of the four pre-vocational tracks.
Pupils who graduate from this track receive a practical training certificate.
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The system offers opportunities for track switching. After graduating in one secondary
school track, a pupil can pursue studies in a track that is one level higher. For example,
a pupil who has obtained a diploma in the senior secondary education track can enrol
in the last two years of the pre-university track and participate in the final exam of
this track. In addition, pupils may switch tracks before graduating from their tracks. In
particular, a pupil who cannot cope with a track’s study load may be down-tracked and
a pupil who performs exceptionally may be promoted to a higher track. In practice, it
is hard for pupils to switch to a higher track, because curricula differ and a system to
remedy the knowledge gaps after switching is lacking.
Finally, some schools offer combined instead of homogeneous tracks in the first one or
two years of secondary education, allowing pupils to postpone their tracking decisions.
For instance, a combined pre-university education and senior secondary education track
is suited for pupils who are between the two tracks.
3.2.2. Selection into secondary school tracks
At the end of their primary education, the great majority of pupils take the Cito test,
which is a standardized test designed to recommend a secondary school track. The test
consists of multiple choice questions about mathematics, language, and study skills.
Pupils not only receive a standard test score, ranging from 501 to 550, but also an
associated recommendation (for the link between Cito scores and the associated recom-
mendations, see Table 3.A.1 in Appendix 3.A). In the academic years considered in this
paper, 2010/11–2013/14, the test was not mandatory, but administrated to the great
majority of pupils. Moreover, primary school teachers had to issue their recommenda-
tions for secondary school tracks after learning the test results; Figure 3.1 shows the
order of events in the last year of primary education.
Pupils take Cito test
Teachers learn Cito scores and recommendations
Teachers give recommendations
Secondary school admissions
Figure 3.1: Order of events in the last year of primary education.
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Teachers were not obliged to take into consideration track recommendations based
on the test and the degree by which they do so varies greatly. Therefore, pupils with the
same score on the standardized test may get different track recommendations from their
teachers. As neither schools nor teachers are evaluated by teachers’ recommendations
for secondary school tracks, teachers do not have any personal incentives to provide
pupils with higher recommendations. They may, however, be lobbied by parents to give
particular (usually, higher) recommendations.
In addition, in the study period, secondary schools were not legally obliged to follow
recommendations issued by primary school teachers. Some elite schools admitted only
pupils with very high scores of the standardized test, whereas other secondary schools
were more lenient and allowed pupils to enter a track of their choice without paying
much attention to a recommendation from the teacher. Nevertheless, teachers’ recom-
mendations played (and still play) a significant role in secondary school track placements
(Feron et al., 2016).
3.3. Data
In this study, we use administrative data collected by Statistics Netherlands (CBS). Our
initial dataset is obtained by linking the population of pupils who are in the last year
of primary public education with information on primary school identifiers, Cito scores,
teachers’ recommendations for secondary school tracks, gender, immigration status, and
income and education of the pupils’ legal parents. The rest of this section describes
some of the variables used in this study in detail, defines the final sample, discusses the
main reasons why Cito scores are missing for some pupils, and presents some summary
statistics.
3.3.1. Variable definitions
In this subsection, we present the variables used in our analysis that have nontrivial
definitions.
Teacher’s recommendation. Table 3.3 lists the possible teacher’s recommenda-
tions from the lowest (practical training) to the highest (pre-university education) level.
We merged the pre-vocational education: theoretical learning path and pre-vocational ed-
ucation: mixed learning path tracks due to their similarity and the anecdotal evidence
that the mixed learning path recommendation was not issued in some regions in our
study period.4 Although about 70% of the pupils are recommended a specific track, the
4The two tracks are merged in recommendations provided by the Cito test as well, see Table 3.A.1. To
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rest of the pupils receive combined track recommendations. As the number of pupils with
each of the combined track recommendations is low, we aggregated them into broader
categories and labeled these by adding the words and higher to the label of each cate-
gory’s lowest track. For example, the pre-vocational education: mixed/theoretical learning
path and higher label aggregates the following two combined track recommendations: 1)
pre-vocational education: mixed/theoretical learning path or senior general secondary edu-
cation and 2) pre-vocational education: mixed/theoretical learning path or senior general
secondary education or pre-university education. This results in ten possible values of
the teacher’s recommendation variable, which we code as 1 (practical training) to 10
(pre-university education) in our empirical analysis.
Immigration status. The label native Dutch indicates a pupil whose parents were
both born in the Netherlands, whereas the labels first generation immigrant and second
generation immigrant refer to pupils who have at least one parent born abroad and
who themselves were born in the Netherlands or abroad, respectively. The label third
generation immigrant is used for a pupil whose at least one parent is a second generation
immigrant. We further differentiate the first, second, and third generation immigrants
by their migration background. The label Western refers to a pupil with a migration
background from the European countries excluding Turkey, North America and Oceania,
Indonesia, and Japan, whereas the label non−Western is used otherwise.5 For the first
generation immigrants, the migration background is determined by their country of birth.
For the second and third generation immigrants, the migration background is determined
by the mother’s country of birth or migration background, respectively, unless the mother
was born in the Netherlands; then the migration background is determined by the father’s
country of birth or migration background, respectively.
Parental education background. This variable takes the following three values.
The label very disadvantaged is used for pupils of whom one of the parents has completed
at most primary education, whereas the other parent has completed at most practical
education or the middle management-oriented or basic profession-oriented learning paths
in pre-vocational education. The label disadvantaged is used for pupils of whom both
parents have completed at most practical education or the middle management-oriented
or basic profession-oriented learning paths in pre-vocational education. For the rest of
the pupils, we use the label not disadvantaged.
Mother’s (father’s) income. We measure parental income by quartiles of the
check whether the merger influences our results, we provide a robustness check where the two tracks
are separate.
5We use the definition employed by Statistics Netherlands. Pupils with a migration background from
Indonesia and Japan are classified as Western because the current Indonesia was a Dutch colony and
the Netherlands and Japan has a long trading history.
116
Data
personal gross annual income distribution, which includes income from work and own
company, payment of income insurance, and social benefits (with the exception of child
benefits and child related budget). As we do not have information on income for the
year 2010, our measure of parental income is based on the second calendar year of each
academic year. For example, we use income in the year 2011 to determine parental income
for the pupils in the last year of primary education in the academic year 2010/11. The
label without income is used for parents with no personal income.
Mother’s (father’s) education. We aggregated the 18 levels of highest achieved
education provided by Statistics Netherlands into the following five categories. The label
at most training to assistant is assigned to all parents whose highest level of education
is primary, practical, or pre-vocational education, lower grades of senior general or pre-
university education, or the lowest level of vocational education. Parents who obtained
one of the two middle levels of vocational education receive the basic or professional
training label, whereas parents who obtained the highest vocational education or finished
higher grades of senior general secondary or pre-university education are assigned the
middle managerial training label. Parents who hold any degree of a university of applied
sciences or a university receive the respective labels. Parents for whom we do not have any
information about the highest achieved education level are assigned the label missing.
3.3.2. Sample definition
Our target group is the population of pupils who were in the final year of primary public
education in the academic years 2010/11 – 2013/14.6 From this population, we select
those pupils for whom we observe the variables discussed above. Table 3.1 lists the sample
selection criteria and documents their effects on the sample size. We exclude about 20%
of the pupils for whom the Cito score is not available. We delete an additional 5% of the
pupils for whom the Cito score is lower than 501 or higher than 5507 or whose teacher’s
recommendation, gender, or legal parents’ identifiers are not available. Furthermore, we
eliminate about 2% of the pupils who have parents with no record on their income, which
leaves us with about 72% of the observations from the initial sample. Our final sample
has 550353 observations.
3.3.3. Missing Cito scores
As missing Cito scores may lead to the sample selection problem, we investigate the main
reasons why Cito scores are not observed for some pupils. Table 3.2 shows that, out of
6Pupils in special education and special primary education are excluded from the analysis.
7We do not know why the Cito score is occasionally measured to be below 501 or above 550, but are
not overly worried about this abnormality, as it occurs for less than 0.02% of the pupils in the data.
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Table 3.1: Sample construction.
Requirement Obs. %
Pupils in last year of primary education 760404 100.00
Cito score available 607436 79.88
Cito score between 501 and 550 607322 79.87
Teacher’s recommendation available 589169 77.48
Gender available 588293 77.37
Mother’s identifier available 587386 77.25
Father’s identifier available 569898 74.95
Mother’s income information available 564460 74.23
Father’s income information available 550353 72.38
Note. The second column lists the numbers of pupils left after eliminating
those who do not meet the requirements in the first column up to and
including the same row. The third column reports those same numbers
as a percentage of the first row’s number of all pupils in the last year of
primary education in the academic years 2010/11 – 2013/14.
20.12% of the pupils with missing Cito scores, 12.40% are in schools where Cito scores
are missing for all the pupils in the same school. An additional 2.06% of the pupils attend
schools where Cito scores are missing for at least 90% of the schoolmates. It appears that
the observability of Cito scores is mainly determined by school level factors. For example,
some schools might choose to administrate another test or not to administrate any test
at all. Out of the remaining pupils with missing Cito scores, 2.86% and 0.26% are in
schools where Cito scores are missing for 100% or at least 90% of the pupils from the
same school and year. Therefore, some of the remaining selection is driven by school-year
factors. One plausible explanation is that the decision to administrate the Cito test is
made on yearly basis. For the remaining 2.53% of the pupils, Cito scores are missing for
other reasons.
Table 3.2: Drivers of missing Cito scores.
Category Obs. %
Missing Cito score 152968 20.12
Cito score missing for 100% of pupils in the same school 94307 12.40
Cito score missing for more than 90% of pupils in the same school 15678 2.06
Cito score missing for 100% of pupils in the same school and year 21769 2.86
Cito score missing for more than 90% of pupils in the same school and year 1996 0.26
Other reasons 19218 2.53
Note. The first row lists the number and share of pupils with a missing Cito score from Table 3.1. The rest
of the rows list potential reasons and the number and share of pupils affected by each reason excluding whose
who meet the requirement in the first column up to the same row.
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Table 3.3: Summary statistics: teachers’ recommendations.
Recommendation %
1 Practical training 0.37
2 Pre-vocational education: basic profession-oriented learning path (VMBO BL) 5.72
3 Pre-vocational education: basic profession-oriented learning path and higher 4.07
4 Pre-vocational education: middle management-oriented learning path (VMBO KL) 8.58
5 Pre-vocational education: middle management-oriented learning path and higher 2.77
6 Pre-vocational education: mixed/theoretical learning path (VMBO GL/TL) 18.12
Pre-vocational education: mixed learning path (VMBO GL) 1.48
Pre-vocational education: theoretical learning path (VMBO TL) 16.64
7 Pre-vocational education: mixed/theoretical learning path and higher 11.79
Pre-vocational education: mixed learning path and higher 3.93
Pre-vocational education: theoretical learning path and higher 7.86
8 Senior general secondary education (HAVO) 18.69
9 Senior general secondary education and higher 11.03
10 Pre-university education (VWO) 18.85
Note. This table reports shares of teachers’ recommendations in the final sample of 550353 pupils. The
Pre-vocation education: mixed/theoretical learning path recommendation merges the Pre-vocation education:
mixed learning path and Pre-vocation education: theoretical learning path recommendations. The words and
higher are used to indicate teachers’ recommendations that consist of at least two tracks, where the first
part of the label corresponds to the lowest track. For example, the Pre-vocational education: mixed/theoretical
learning path and higher label aggregates the following two track recommendations: 1) Pre-vocational educa-
tion: mixed/theoretical learning path or Senior general secondary education track; 2) Pre-vocational education:
mixed/theoretical learning path or Senior general secondary education, or Pre-university education track. The
number in the first column is used to code the teacher’s recommendation variable in our empirical analysis.
In that context, we will simply refer to it as the teacher’s recommendation.
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3.3.4. Summary statistics
Tables 3.3 and 3.4 report summary statistics of the final sample. Table 3.3 shows the
distribution of teachers’ recommendations for secondary school tracks. Pupils are most
commonly given the pre-university track recommendation (18.85% of pupils), followed by
the senior general track recommendation (18.69%), the pre-vocational mixed/theoretical
track recommendation (18.12%), and the composite recommendations of the pre-vocational
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Note. Each bar in the graph corresponds to a Cito score and shows the shares of teachers’ recommen-
dations given for pupils with the corresponding score. The acronyms for teachers’ recommendations are
defined in Table 3.3.
Figure 3.2: Relationships between Cito scores and teachers’ recommendations.
Table 3.4 reports that the mean Cito score equals 535.55 and that the sample is well
balanced in terms of gender, with the shares of boys and girls roughly equal to one half.
Almost 71% of the pupils are native Dutch, whereas 4.95% and 13.44% of the pupils
are second generation Western and non-Western immigrants, respectively. An additional
8.15% of the pupils are third generation Western immigrants, whereas the remaining
3% of the pupils are assigned another immigration background. The great majority
of the pupils (88.11%) do not have a disadvantaged parental education background,
whereas 7.08% and 4.81% are classified as having a disadvantaged and very disadvantaged
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1st generation Western immigrant 0.66
1st generation non-Western immigrant 0.83
2nd generation Western immigrant 4.95
2nd generation non-Western immigrant 13.44
3rd generation Western immigrant 8.15










Parental income Mother Father
In first quartile (Q1) 21.13 5.23
In second quartile (Q2) 28.10 7.68
In third quartile (Q3) 24.87 21.33
In fourth quartile (Q4) 14.63 64.90
Without income 11.27 0.87
Parental education
At most training to assistant 12.92 10.21
Basic or professional training 8.23 7.52
Middle managerial training 13.51 11.20
University of applied sciences 14.12 14.22
University 8.13 10.71
Missing 43.09 46.14
Note. For all the variables except test score, the table reports per-
centage shares of the respective categories in the final sample of
550353 pupils. For the variable test score, the table reports the
25th and 75th percentiles, mean, and standard deviation.
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parental education background. The shares of the academic cohorts vary between 23.19%
and 26.08% of all pupils in the sample. Mothers’ income is considerably lower than
fathers’ income: 21.13%, 28.10%, 24.87%, and 14.63% of the mothers have income in,
respectively, the first, second, third, and fourth quartile of the annual income distribution,
whereas the corresponding shares of the fathers are 5.23%, 7.68%, 21.33%, and 64.90%.
Furthermore, 11.27% of the mothers do not have any personal income, compared to only
0.87% of the fathers.
Information on the highest received education level of individuals is mainly obtained
from education registers and the Labor Force Survey. As the registers are not available
for older cohorts, this information is not available for the entire population of the Nether-
lands. Therefore, the highest educational level achieved is not observed for 43.09% of the
mothers and 46.14% of the fathers.
Figure 3.2 shows the distribution of teachers’ recommendations for each Cito score.
The graph documents that pupils with the same Cito score receive different recommen-
dations. For example, around 45% of the pupils with a Cito score of 545, which is lowest
score for which pupils are given the pre-university track recommendation by the Cito
test, are granted lower recommendations by their teachers. Additionally, even around
8% of the pupils with the highest Cito score receive lower recommendations than the
highest track. The degree of heterogeneity of teachers’ recommendations is also high for
other Cito scores.
3.4. Descriptive Evidence on Teacher Discretion
In this section, we provide descriptive evidence on teacher discretion in track recom-
mendations, by documenting the associations between teachers’ recommendations and
observed pupils’ characteristics (including test scores). In our main specification, we
employ an ordered probit model with school fixed effects, making the estimation compu-
tationally demanding in larger samples. Therefore, the analysis in this section is based
on a random sample of 25% of the schools, which consists of 137365 observations. We
use the label full sample for this random sample.
Given that the teacher’s recommendation is ordered as in Table 3.3, we start our
analysis by estimating an ordered probit model. In particular, a teacher recommends
yi = j (with j = 1, . . . , 10 representing the tracks as in Table 3.3) to pupil i if and only
if
αj−1 ≤ y∗i < αj,
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iβ + ri + εi
is a latent index of a pupil’s perceived fit to higher secondary education tracks, xi is
a vector of pupil i’s background characteristics, ri captures year fixed effects, εi is an
error term; α1, . . . , α10 are unknown thresholds; α0 = −∞ and α9 = ∞. We assume
that, conditional on the background characteristics xi and the year fixed effects ri, εi
follows a standard normal distribution. Then, the ordered probit model implies simple
expressions for the probabilities P[yi = j|xi, ri] of observing teacher recommendation
yi = j; j = 1, . . . , 10; given xi and ri in terms of x
′
iβ + ri, the thresholds, and the
cumulative standard normal distribution.
The first two columns of Table 3.5 show that the estimated effects of the pupil’s
test score, gender, immigration status, parental education background, and most of her
mother’s and father’s income dummies are statistically significantly different from zero,
whereas the same applies for only one of the year dummies. Although the levels of the
individual coefficients do not have a useful interpretation, their signs equal those of the
marginal effects on the probability that the track recommendation weakly exceeds j,
j = 1, . . . , 10, i.e. P[yi ≥ j|xi, ri]. Therefore, the estimates imply that the probability
that a pupil is recommended a higher track increases in the test score, is higher for
girls than boys, and (mostly) increases in her mother’s and father’s income. Pupils with
mothers (respectively, fathers) who do not have any personal income are more likely
to be recommended a higher track than their counterparts with mothers (respectively,
fathers) who have income in the first quartile of the annual gross income distribution.
Compared to pupils with a very disadvantaged parental education background, those
with a disadvantaged background are less likely whereas those without a disadvantaged
background are more likely to be issued a higher secondary track recommendation.
In our sample, Cito scores are missing for about 20% of the pupils, and therefore,
the estimates presented above may be prone to sample selection bias. As Section 3.3
establishes that most of the selection is likely to be driven by school level factors, we
include school fixed effects to tackle the potential sample selection problem. Contrary
to linear models, nonlinear models are subject to the incidental parameter problem if
the number of groups in each school is not sufficiently large. That is, if some dummies
are not consistently estimated, the other estimates are also affected. Therefore, to avoid
the incidental parameter problem, we only consider schools that have at least 50 pupils
in the full sample, which leaves us with 124608 observations. To compare the results
of the two models, we re-estimate the model above using the restricted sample. The
two middle and two last columns in Table 3.5 show the results obtained for this sample
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using the ordered probit and the ordered probit with school fixed effects models. The
signs of all the estimates are the same across both models. However, with school fixed
effects, the estimated coefficients are generally of a lower magnitude and more frequently
insignificant. The difference between the two sets of estimates can be explained either
by sample selection bias or by teachers’ characteristics if teachers in certain schools
discriminate against particular groups of pupils.
Table 3.5: Ordered probit (OP) estimates.
Full sample Restricted sample
OP OP OP with school FE
Test score 0.192∗∗∗ (0.001) 0.194∗∗∗ (0.001) 0.208∗∗∗ (0.001)
Female 0.052∗∗∗ (0.007) 0.054∗∗∗ (0.007) 0.057∗∗∗ (0.007)
Immigration status
1st generation Western immigrant 0.240∗∗∗ (0.041) 0.249∗∗∗ (0.044) 0.151∗∗∗ (0.044)
1st generation non-Western immigrant 0.185∗∗∗ (0.037) 0.174∗∗∗ (0.040) 0.058 (0.038)
2nd generation Western immigrant 0.127∗∗∗ (0.015) 0.128∗∗∗ (0.016) 0.062∗∗∗ (0.015)
2nd generation non-Western immigrant 0.127∗∗∗ (0.017) 0.120∗∗∗ (0.019) 0.008 (0.013)
3rd generation Western immigrant 0.088∗∗∗ (0.013) 0.089∗∗∗ (0.014) 0.025∗∗ (0.012)
3rd generation non-Western immigrant 0.130∗∗∗ (0.030) 0.125∗∗∗ (0.032) 0.020 (0.030)
Parental education background
Disadvantaged −0.069∗∗∗ (0.024) −0.069∗∗∗ (0.026) −0.038∗ (0.023)
Not disadvantaged 0.206∗∗∗ (0.022) 0.209∗∗∗ (0.024) 0.198∗∗∗ (0.020)
Mother’s income
Q2 0.017∗ (0.009) 0.011 (0.010) 0.000 (0.009)
Q3 0.106∗∗∗ (0.010) 0.106∗∗∗ (0.011) 0.071∗∗∗ (0.010)
Q4 0.290∗∗∗ (0.013) 0.289∗∗∗ (0.014) 0.176∗∗∗ (0.012)
Without income 0.033∗∗∗ (0.013) 0.031∗∗ (0.014) 0.023∗ (0.012)
Father’s income
Q2 −0.031∗ (0.017) −0.038∗∗ (0.018) −0.030 (0.019)
Q3 −0.075∗∗∗ (0.016) −0.083∗∗∗ (0.017) −0.044∗∗∗ (0.017)
Q4 0.080∗∗∗ (0.016) 0.075∗∗∗ (0.016) 0.079∗∗∗ (0.016)
Without income 0.061∗ (0.033) 0.039 (0.034) 0.023 (0.034)
Year
2011/12 −0.033∗∗ (0.014) −0.030∗∗ (0.015) −0.025 (0.016)
2012/13 −0.013 (0.015) −0.014 (0.016) −0.006 (0.017)
2013/14 −0.006 (0.016) −0.009 (0.017) −0.002 (0.018)
Thresholds
α1 97.252∗∗∗ (0.693) 98.156∗∗∗ (0.755) 104.859∗∗∗ (0.744)
α2 99.757∗∗∗ (0.706) 100.691∗∗∗ (0.770) 107.544∗∗∗ (0.762)
α3 100.373∗∗∗ (0.708) 101.304∗∗∗ (0.771) 108.195∗∗∗ (0.763)
α4 101.257∗∗∗ (0.716) 102.206∗∗∗ (0.781) 109.158∗∗∗ (0.772)
α5 101.500∗∗∗ (0.718) 102.449∗∗∗ (0.783) 109.419∗∗∗ (0.774)
α6 102.725∗∗∗ (0.726) 103.693∗∗∗ (0.792) 110.747∗∗∗ (0.783)
α7 103.404∗∗∗ (0.727) 104.367∗∗∗ (0.793) 111.470∗∗∗ (0.784)
α8 104.485∗∗∗ (0.733) 105.462∗∗∗ (0.799) 112.638∗∗∗ (0.790)
α9 105.187∗∗∗ (0.734) 106.159∗∗∗ (0.800) 113.381∗∗∗ (0.791)
Observations 137365 124608 124608
Note. Dependent variable: teachers’ recommendations ordered as in Table 3.3. The restricted sample is
obtained by eliminating pupils who attend primary schools with less than 50 pupils in the full sample.
Standard errors clustered at the school level are reported in parentheses. */**/*** denote statistical
significance at the 10/5/1% level.
We evaluate the magnitude of the estimates in two ways. First, we express all the
estimates in terms of the effect of increasing the Cito score by one point, by calculating
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ratios of the remaining estimates and the estimate of the coefficient on the test score.
The first two columns of Table 3.6 show that not having a disadvantaged parental edu-
cation background is equivalent to scoring 0.952 points on the Cito test. Likewise, being
a first generation Western immigrant compared to a native Dutch and having a mother
with income in the highest quartile is worth additional 0.725 and 0.846 Cito points,
respectively. The rest of the ratios are smaller than 0.5 in absolute value, meaning that
belonging to the remaining categories of immigration status, parental education back-
ground, and mother’s income is worth less than half a point. Likewise, the ratios for the
year and father’s income dummies are very small in absolute value, which implies that
there are no systematic differences between the four years considered in this study and
between pupils with different levels of father’s income.
Next, we calculate the predicted probabilities that a typical pupil with a Cito score
of 545 is issued the pre-university track recommendation and check how this probability
varies with different background characteristics. The Cito score of 545 is an interesting
margin to consider because it is the lowest score for which pupils are issued the pre-
university track recommendation by the Cito test as is shown in Table 3.A.1. Therefore,
teachers are more likely to deviate from the recommendation of the highest track and
their discretion is more likely to have a higher impact on secondary school placements.
The third column of Table 3.6 shows that the probabilities for observationally identi-
cal pupils with a very disadvantaged parental education background and without a dis-
advantaged background are equal to, respectively, 0.396 and 0.468. Hence, a typical pupil
who has a Cito score of 545 and a very disadvantaged parental education background
is 7.3 percentage points more likely to obtain the pre-university track recommendation
than a pupil without a disadvantaged parental education background. The corresponding
differences for first generation Western immigrants compared to native Dutch and pupils
whose mother’s have income in the highest quartile of the annual income distribution
compared to those in the lowest quartile are 5.6 and 6.6 percentage points. Changes in
probabilities for pupils with other immigration status and mother’s income as well as
for the rest of the background characteristics are smaller than 5 percentage points. Ta-
ble 3.A.2 in Appendix 3.A reports predicted probabilities and associated marginal effects
that typical pupils with Cito scores of 537 and 529 are issued at least the senior general
and at least the pre-vocational mixed/theoretical track recommendations, respectively.
The results in this table provide very similar insights to the ones discussed above.
We check the sensitivity of our results with respect to the following specification
choices. As some of the remaining selection on Cito scores appears to be driven by school-
year factors, the second two columns of Table 3.A.3 in Appendix 3.A report the results
of an ordered probit regression with school-year fixed effects. The estimates are very
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Table 3.6: Estimates expressed in test score equivalents, predicted probabilities, and marginal effects.
Ratios Pred. prob. Marginal effects
Gender
Male 0.458
Female 0.274∗∗∗ (0.034) 0.479 0.021∗∗∗ (0.003)
Immigration status
Native Dutch 0.468
1st generation Western immigrant 0.725∗∗∗ (0.212) 0.525 0.056∗∗∗ (0.016)
1st generation non-Western immigrant 0.279 (0.183) 0.490 0.022 (0.014)
2nd generation Western immigrant 0.296∗∗∗ (0.072) 0.491 0.023∗∗∗ (0.006)
2nd generation non-Western immigrant 0.038 (0.063) 0.471 0.003 (0.005)
3rd generation Western immigrant 0.118∗∗ (0.055) 0.478 0.009∗∗ (0.004)
3rd generation non-Western immigrant 0.098 (0.145) 0.476 0.008 (0.011)
Parental education background
Very disadvantaged 0.396
Disadvantaged −0.182∗ (0.111) 0.382 −0.014∗ (0.008)
Not disadvantaged 0.952∗∗∗ (0.096) 0.468 0.073∗∗∗ (0.007)
Mother’s income
Q1 0.442
Q2 −0.002 (0.046) 0.442 0.000 (0.004)
Q3 0.339∗∗∗ (0.047) 0.468 0.026∗∗∗ (0.004)
Q4 0.846∗∗∗ (0.056) 0.508 0.066∗∗∗ (0.004)
Without income 0.108∗ (0.059) 0.451 0.008∗ (0.005)
Father’s income
Q1 0.439
Q2 −0.143 (0.089) 0.428 −0.011 (0.007)
Q3 −0.209∗∗∗ (0.079) 0.423 −0.016∗∗∗ (0.006)
Q4 0.380∗∗∗ (0.076) 0.468 0.029∗∗∗ (0.006)
Without income 0.109 (0.165) 0.447 0.008 (0.013)
Year
2010/11 0.471
2011/12 −0.120 (0.075) 0.461 −0.009 (0.006)
2012/13 −0.029 (0.080) 0.468 −0.002 (0.006)
2013/14 −0.009 (0.086) 0.470 −0.001 (0.007)
Note. The first two columns report the ratios between the estimates of the corresponding
variables and the test score variable obtained in the last two columns of Table 3.5. The third
and the last two columns report predicted probabilities and the corresponding marginal effects,
respectively, that a typical pupil with a Cito score of 545 is issued the pre-university track
recommendation. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. */**/*** denote statistical
significance at the 10/5/1% level.
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similar to the ones obtained using school fixed effects. Further, to avoid the incidental
parameter problem and to obtain results based on the full sample, we estimate ordinary
least squares (OLS) regressions with and without school fixed effects, where the teacher’s
recommendation is treated as a continuous variable. Table 3.A.3 in Appendix 3.A shows
that, similarly to the ordered probit regressions, the magnitudes of the estimates shrink
when school fixed effects are added and that dummies for not having a disadvantaged
parental education background, having a mother with income in the highest quartile of
the annual income distribution, and being a first generation Western immigrant are the
strongest predictors (excluding the test score). The OLS estimates remain very similar
when school fixed effects are substituted with school-year fixed effects.
As the main goal of this section is to investigate relations between pupils’ charac-
teristics and teachers’ recommendations conditional on test scores, we also estimate an
ordered probit model with school fixed effects where we control for test scores in the
most flexible way possible, that is by adding interactions between test score dummies
and year dummies, and obtain very similar estimates to the ones in the last two columns
of Table 3.5 (see Table 3.A.4 in Appendix 3.A). Additionally, we investigate whether
the results change if the pre-vocational education: mixed/theoretical learning path rec-
ommendation and its composite counterpart are separated into mixed and theoretical
track recommendations. As pupils who are likely to receive the practical training rec-
ommendation are usually exempted from the Cito test, we also estimate a model where
pupils with this recommendation are excluded. Lastly, anecdotal evidence suggests that
some secondary schools take into account only the lowest track if a composite track
recommendation is issued. Therefore, we consider a specification where composite track
recommendations are merged together with their homogeneous counterparts. Table 3.A.4
in Appendix 3.A shows that the estimates are insensitive to the three specification choices
discussed above.
The analysis above suggests that parental education background is the strongest pre-
dictor for teachers’ recommendations. This variable, however, provides a coarse measure
of parental education. Therefore, we consider a specification where parental education
background is measured by the highest education level of the mother and the father. This
variable, however, is not observed for 43.09% of the mothers and 46.14% of the fathers
mainly because educational registers are not available for older cohorts. Hence, mother’s
and father’s education is observed for fewer older parents. If, for example, teachers issue
lower recommendations to pupils with older parents, the estimates are subject to sample
selection bias when parents with missing information on education are excluded. We
partially solve this problem by including to our sample parents for whom the highest
achieved education level is not observed and assigning the label missing to them.
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Table 3.7: Ordered probit estimates with mother’s and father’s education, their test score equivalents,
predicted probabilities, and marginal effects.
Estimates Ratios Pred. prob. Marginal effects
Test score 0.207∗∗∗ (0.001)
Gender
Male 0.578
Female 0.058∗∗∗ (0.007) 0.279∗∗∗ (0.034) 0.599 0.021∗∗∗ (0.003)
Immigration status
Native Dutch 0.589
1st generation Western immigrant 0.145∗∗∗ (0.044) 0.703∗∗∗ (0.211) 0.641 0.052∗∗∗ (0.015)
1st generation non-Western immigrant 0.039 (0.038) 0.186 (0.183) 0.603 0.014 (0.014)
2nd generation Western immigrant 0.063∗∗∗ (0.015) 0.305∗∗∗ (0.072) 0.611 0.023∗∗∗ (0.005)
2nd generation non-Western immigrant 0.007 (0.013) 0.036 (0.063) 0.591 0.003 (0.005)
3rd generation Western immigrant 0.021∗ (0.012) 0.104∗ (0.056) 0.596 0.008∗ (0.004)
3rd generation non-Western immigrant 0.027 (0.030) 0.131 (0.147) 0.599 0.010 (0.011)
Mother’s education
At most training to assistant 0.476
Basic or professional training 0.019 (0.015) 0.090 (0.071) 0.483 0.007 (0.005)
Middle managerial training 0.109∗∗∗ (0.013) 0.526∗∗∗ (0.065) 0.516 0.041∗∗∗ (0.005)
University of applied sciences 0.187∗∗∗ (0.014) 0.904∗∗∗ (0.068) 0.546 0.070∗∗∗ (0.005)
University 0.304∗∗∗ (0.018) 1.467∗∗∗ (0.086) 0.589 0.113∗∗∗ (0.007)
Missing 0.067∗∗∗ (0.012)
Father’s education
At most training to assistant 0.485
Basic or professional training 0.004 (0.016) 0.020 (0.078) 0.487 0.002 (0.006)
Middle managerial training 0.101∗∗∗ (0.014) 0.489∗∗∗ (0.068) 0.523 0.038∗∗∗ (0.005)
University of applied sciences 0.181∗∗∗ (0.014) 0.874∗∗∗ (0.070) 0.553 0.068∗∗∗ (0.005)




Q2 0.003 (0.009) 0.015 (0.045) 0.570 0.001 (0.003)
Q3 0.054∗∗∗ (0.010) 0.259∗∗∗ (0.047) 0.589 0.020∗∗∗ (0.004)
Q4 0.097∗∗∗ (0.012) 0.468∗∗∗ (0.057) 0.604 0.035∗∗∗ (0.004)
Without income 0.011 (0.012) 0.054 (0.059) 0.573 0.004 (0.004)
Father’s income
Q1 0.570
Q2 −0.025 (0.018) −0.123 (0.089) 0.561 −0.009 (0.007)
Q3 −0.040∗∗ (0.016) −0.195∗∗ (0.079) 0.556 −0.015∗∗ (0.006)
Q4 0.050∗∗∗ (0.016) 0.239∗∗∗ (0.076) 0.589 0.018∗∗∗ (0.006)
Without income 0.026 (0.034) 0.126 (0.166) 0.580 0.010 (0.013)
Year
2010/11 0.593
2011/12 −0.030∗ (0.016) −0.144∗ (0.075) 0.583 −0.011∗ (0.006)
2012/13 −0.013 (0.017) −0.064 (0.080) 0.589 −0.005 (0.006)
2013/14 −0.014 (0.018) −0.066 (0.087) 0.588 −0.005 (0.007)
Observations 124608
Note. The first two columns correspond to a similar regression as in the last two columns of Table 3.5
with the main difference that mother’s and father’s education is used instead of the parental education
background variable. The remaining columns are based on the estimates obtained in the first two
columns of the present table and are defined in the same way as in Table 3.6. Standard errors clustered
at the school level are reported in parentheses. */**/*** denote statistical significance at the 10/5/1%
level.
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The first two columns of Table 3.7 show that the estimated coefficients of parental
education variables are positive and statistically significant. More interestingly, the sec-
ond two columns show that mother’s and father’s education seems to have a higher
effect on teachers’ recommendations than the parental education background variable.
For example, a mother with a university degree (instead of the lowest education level) is
worth 1.467 points on the Cito test and a father with such a degree accounts for 1.342
points. The effect of being a first generation Western immigrant remains similar, whereas
the effect of having a mother with income in the fourth quartile of the annual income
distribution decreases from 0.846 to 0.468 Cito points. The middle column reports that
probabilities of obtained the pre-university track recommendation for observationally
identical pupils with a Cito score of 545 whose mothers have finished at most training to
assistant, basic or professional training, middle managerial training, university of applied
sciences, or university are equal to, respectively, 0.476, 0.483, 0.516, 0.546, and 0.589.
Hence, a typical pupil who has a Cito score of 545 and a mother with a university degree
is 11.3 percentage points more likely to obtain the pre-university track recommendation
than a pupil whose mother obtained at most training to assistant. The corresponding
difference for fathers is equal to 10.3 percentage points.8
To summarize, the results show that, conditional on the Cito score, there are quan-
titatively substantial associations between teachers’ recommendations and parental ed-
ucation and less substantial associations with immigrations status and mother’s income.
The relations between teachers’ recommendations and gender as well as father’s income
are quantitatively unsubstantial.
3.5. The Nature of Teacher Discretion
The previous section confirms that teacher discretion matters and favors the enrolment
of pupils with more educated parents in higher secondary school tracks. We proceed by
discussing a method to assess the nature of teacher discretion.
On the one hand, the positive association between parental education and teachers’
recommendations could be the result of teachers rationally and efficiently incorporating
information about pupils that is not captured by the Cito test. For example, teachers
may know that pupils need more help with homework in secondary school, that higher
educated parents find it comparatively easy to provide such help in the more advanced,
theory-oriented secondary school tracks, and that secondary schools do not offer assis-
8The effects are similar when typical pupils with Cito scores of 537 and 529 are considered (see Ta-
ble 3.A.5 in Appendix 3.A).
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tance that can substitute for such parental input. Alternatively, teachers may know that
pupils with more educated parents generally have higher intrinsic motivation to study
in secondary school. Either way, it would be rational for teachers to recommend higher
tracks to pupils with more educated parents. We will call this type of teacher discre-
tion positive, because it can be rationalized in terms of rationally expected outcomes in
secondary school.
On the other hand, the association could also be driven by taste or mistaken beliefs
if, for example, teachers mistakenly think that pupils who have less educated parents
will not perform as well in a higher track. We will refer to this type of teacher discretion
as negative, as it may not be efficient.
As discussed in the introduction, positive and negative teacher discretion have radi-
cally different policy implications. Therefore, it is of importance to empirically distinguish
them. To do so, we propose an approach inspired by Hoffman et al.’s (2018) analysis of
discretion in hiring. Assume that a teacher adjusts recommendations given by the Cito
test only if she has some additional correct information about pupils’ future perfor-
mance in secondary education. Consider two otherwise identical teachers who differ in
their willingness to adjust recommendations provided by the Cito test. If the two teach-
ers are facing the same pool of pupils, the more willing teacher issues the highest track
recommendation to on average more talented pupils than the less willing teacher. Under
the positive discretion scenario, therefore, there is a positive relationship between the
teachers’ propensity to adjust recommendations provided by the Cito test and the qual-
ity of pupils who are issued the highest track recommendation. If, on the other hand, the
main driving force is negative discretion, then the teacher who is biased or has mistaken
beliefs issues the highest track recommendation to on average less talented pupils than
the teacher who does not adjust recommendations given by the Cito test. Under the
negative discretion scenario, therefore, the sign of the relationship is reversed. Hence,
finding a positive relationship between teachers’ propensity to adjust Cito recommen-
dations and the quality of pupils issued the highest track recommendation would signal
that the main driver is positive discretion, whereas a negative relation would imply that
negative discretion dominates. Additionally, it is also possible to consider pupils who
are issued the lowest track recommendation by their teachers. Then, the sign of the
relationships should be reversed, i.e. a negative relation implies that positive discretion
dominates and a positive relation implies that negative discretion dominates.
We suggest to investigate the nature of teachers’ discretion empirically in the following
way. Let Sji be the set of pupils in pupil i’s group and ji be pupil i’s teacher. Then
we define the exception rate Eji as the share of pupils for whom the teacher adjusts
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where TRk and CRk are recommendations provided by the teacher and the Cito test,
respectively, and where | · | denotes the cardinality of a set. We base our empirical
strategy on estimates of the following linear model for the sample of pupils who received
the highest (lowest) track recommendation by their teachers:
ysi = x
′
iπ1 + Ejiπ2 + µpsi + ξssi + ti + ωi,
where ysi is a measure of pupil i’s performance in secondary education, such as grade
retention or track switching, xi is a vector of pupil i’s background characteristics, Eji is
teacher ji’s exception rate, µpsi and ξssi are primary and secondary school fixed effects,
respectively, and ωi is an error term. We also include track fixed effects ti, because some
pupils who were recommended the highest (lowest) track will have actually enrolled in
lower (higher) tracks.
We include primary and secondary school fixed effects to limit two sorts of confound-
ing effects. First, our theoretical predictions are based on the assumption that teachers
with different willingness to adjust Cito recommendations asses similar pools of pupils.
In our sample, pupils are by and large issued their track recommendations by a single
teacher from their school. Moreover, different types of parents and teachers might sort
into different neighborhoods and thus different teachers would asses pupils from different
pools. Consider, for example, the case that among the pupils that are issued a recommen-
dation for the highest track those with low unobserved ability are assigned to teachers
who have high exception rates, whereas pupils with high unobserved ability have teach-
ers with low exception rates. Now assume additionally that teachers exert only positive
discretion. Then, we could find a negative association pointing to a negative discretion
effect, although our model predicts that in the positive discretion scenario the associ-
ation between secondary school performance and teachers’ exception rates is positive.
To eliminate this confounding effect, we use primary school fixed effects and exploit the
variation of exception rates across teachers within a given school.
Second, it is important that teachers’ exception rates do not capture any effects
that are unrelated with pupils’ abilities. Consider the highest track and assume that
teachers with high willingness to exert discretion work in neighborhoods with worse
secondary schools, whereas teachers with low willingness to exert discretion work in
9If the same teacher teaches in multiple academic years, exception rates are calculated for each year
separately.
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neighborhoods with better secondary schools. Additionally, assume again that teachers
exert only positive discretion. In this case the relationship between the exception rate
and secondary school performance might turn out to be negative instead of positive. We
control for this with secondary school fixed effects.
3.6. Conclusions
In the Netherlands, educational opportunities are strongly influenced by secondary school
track placements. As universities mainly admit pupils with a diploma from the pre-
university track and transferring to a higher track is challenging due to differences in
curricula, small mistakes in initial tracking decisions may lead to very different educa-
tional careers. Yet, OECD (2016) and Inspectorate of Education (2016) show that there
is a significant performance overlap in PISA scores among Dutch pupils from different
educational tracks signaling that pupils are not placed to tracks efficiently. One potential
source of this inefficiency is the reliance on subjective teachers’ assessments. Although
tracking placements in the Netherlands had already been strongly influenced by teach-
ers’ recommendations, a reform introduced in the academic year 2014/15 puts even more
emphasis on teachers’ opinions. Therefore, the question whether teachers’ assessments
are mainly providing additional information about pupils’ human capital or are based
on discriminatory views or mistaken beliefs about pupils is even more important.
The first step in answering this question is to investigate the characteristics of pupils
who get higher recommendations from their teachers. In this paper, we confirm the
finding of the Dutch Inspectorate of Education that pupils who have higher educated
parents are more likely to be issued higher track recommendations. Immigration status
and mother’s income seem to be less quantitatively substantial factors, whereas gender
and father’s income do not appear to play a significant role. These associations alone,
however, cannot be used to conclude that the reliance on teachers’ assessments should
be abolished.
Although in a recent report the OECD provides the recommendation to the Nether-
lands to limit teacher discretion (OECD, 2016), there is no scientific evidence whether
this change would improve matches between pupils and secondary education tracks.
Therefore, we propose a method to investigate whether complementing the standardized
test with teachers’ assessments produces higher quality matches than relying solely on
the test.
The question whether teachers use their discretion to incorporate additional informa-
tion about human capital instead of discriminatory views or mistaken beliefs is neither
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specific to the Netherlands nor to educational tracking. In many countries, universities
complement test scores with recommendation letters by previous teachers or interviews
when deciding on admissions. In this case, discretion of letter writers and officers who
evaluate recommendation letters and conduct interviews may be important. For example,
Harvard University has recently been accused of discriminating against Asian-American
students during the admissions process. Although Asian-American students score higher
than their white counterparts on standardized tests and extracurricular activities, their
admission rates are lower (The Economist, 2018). An analysis as in this paper can be
used to assess teacher discretion in this and similar cases.
Appendix 3.A
Table 3.A.1: Links between Cito scores and Cito recommendations.
Cito score Recommendation
501 – 520 Pre-vocational education: basic profession-oriented learning path
519 – 525
Pre-vocational education: basic profession-oriented learning path
Pre-vocational education: middle management-oriented learning path
523 – 528 Pre-vocational education: middle management-oriented learning path
529 – 533 Pre-vocational education: mixed/theoretical learning path
533 – 536
Pre-vocational education: mixed/theoretical learning path
Senior general secondary education
535 – 541
Pre-vocational education: mixed/theoretical learning path
Senior general secondary education/ pre-university education track
537 – 540 Senior general secondary education
540 – 544 Senior general secondary education/ pre-university education track
545 – 550 Pre-university education
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Note. Source: OECD (n.d.) “Diagram of the education system: The Netherlands”, OECD Education
GPS.
Figure 3.A.1: The Dutch education system.
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Table 3.A.2: Additional predicted probabilities and marginal effects obtained using the ordered probit
model with the parental education background variable.
Cito score = 537 Cito score = 529
Pred. prob. Marginal effects Pred. prob. Marginal effects
Gender
Male 0.541 0.661
Female 0.562 0.021∗∗∗ (0.003) 0.680 0.019∗∗∗ (0.002)
Immigration status
Native Dutch 0.552 0.670
1st generation Western immigrant 0.607 0.055∗∗∗ (0.016) 0.720 0.049∗∗∗ (0.014)
1st generation non-Western immigrant 0.573 0.021 (0.014) 0.690 0.019 (0.013)
2nd generation Western immigrant 0.575 0.023∗∗∗ (0.006) 0.691 0.021∗∗∗ (0.005)
2nd generation non-Western immigrant 0.555 0.003 (0.005) 0.673 0.003 (0.004)
3rd generation Western immigrant 0.561 0.009∗∗ (0.004) 0.679 0.008∗∗ (0.004)
3rd generation non-Western immigrant 0.560 0.008 (0.011) 0.677 0.007 (0.010)
Parental education background
Very disadvantaged 0.478 0.601
Disadvantaged 0.464 −0.014∗ (0.009) 0.587 −0.014∗ (0.008)
Not disadvantaged 0.552 0.074∗∗∗ (0.007) 0.670 0.070∗∗∗ (0.007)
Mother’s income
Q1 0.526 0.671
Q2 0.526 0.000 (0.004) 0.670 0.000 (0.003)
Q3 0.552 0.026∗∗∗ (0.004) 0.694 0.024∗∗∗ (0.003)
Q4 0.591 0.065∗∗∗ (0.004) 0.728 0.057∗∗∗ (0.004)
Without income 0.534 0.008∗ (0.005) 0.678 0.008∗ (0.004)
Father’s income
Q1 0.523 0.643
Q2 0.511 −0.011 (0.007) 0.633 −0.010 (0.007)
Q3 0.506 −0.016∗∗∗ (0.006) 0.628 −0.015∗∗∗ (0.006)
Q4 0.552 0.029∗∗∗ (0.006) 0.670 0.027∗∗∗ (0.006)
Without income 0.531 0.008 (0.013) 0.651 0.008 (0.012)
Year
2010/11 0.561 0.672
2011/12 0.552 −0.009 (0.006) 0.664 −0.008 (0.005)
2012/13 0.559 −0.002 (0.006) 0.670 −0.002 (0.006)
2013/14 0.560 −0.001 (0.007) 0.672 −0.001 (0.006)
Note. The results in this table are obtained by using the ordered probit estimates in the last two columns
of Table 3.5. The first three columns report predicted probabilities and the corresponding marginal effects
that a typical pupil with a Cito score of 537 is issued at least the senior general track recommendation. The
last three columns consider a typical student with a Cito score of 529 and report predicted probabilities
and the corresponding marginal effects that he is issued at least the pre-vocational mixed/theoretical
track recommendation. Standard errors of marginal effects are reported in parentheses. */**/*** denote






















Table 3.A.3: Ordered probit regressions with school-year fixed effects and OLS regressions.
School-year sample Full sample
School FE School-year FE OLS OLS school FE OLS school-year FE
Test score 0.215∗∗∗ (0.003) 0.220∗∗∗ (0.003) 0.212∗∗∗ (0.001) 0.215∗∗∗ (0.001) 0.218∗∗∗ (0.001)
Female 0.063∗∗∗ (0.016) 0.065∗∗∗ (0.016) 0.057∗∗∗ (0.007) 0.058∗∗∗ (0.007) 0.058∗∗∗ (0.007)
Immigration status
1st generation Western immigrant 0.174∗ (0.102) 0.189∗ (0.104) 0.236∗∗∗ (0.043) 0.135∗∗∗ (0.040) 0.122∗∗∗ (0.040)
1st generation non-Western immigrant −0.059 (0.103) −0.080 (0.100) 0.222∗∗∗ (0.040) 0.104∗∗∗ (0.037) 0.108∗∗∗ (0.038)
2nd generation Western immigrant 0.017 (0.028) 0.017 (0.028) 0.129∗∗∗ (0.016) 0.056∗∗∗ (0.014) 0.053∗∗∗ (0.014)
2nd generation non-Western immigrant −0.023 (0.026) −0.026 (0.026) 0.142∗∗∗ (0.019) 0.025∗∗ (0.013) 0.034∗∗∗ (0.013)
3rd generation Western immigrant 0.029 (0.023) 0.035 (0.023) 0.086∗∗∗ (0.013) 0.018∗ (0.011) 0.019∗ (0.011)
3rd generation non-Western immigrant 0.018 (0.061) 0.019 (0.062) 0.133∗∗∗ (0.032) 0.022 (0.029) 0.037 (0.029)
Parental education background
Disadvantaged −0.082 (0.056) −0.098∗ (0.055) −0.096∗∗∗ (0.027) −0.056∗∗ (0.023) −0.063∗∗∗ (0.023)
Not disadvantaged 0.172∗∗∗ (0.051) 0.159∗∗∗ (0.050) 0.246∗∗∗ (0.024) 0.227∗∗∗ (0.020) 0.207∗∗∗ (0.020)
Mother’s income
Q2 0.012 (0.018) 0.021 (0.018) 0.024∗∗ (0.010) 0.010 (0.009) 0.016∗ (0.009)
Q3 0.064∗∗∗ (0.020) 0.075∗∗∗ (0.020) 0.123∗∗∗ (0.011) 0.081∗∗∗ (0.009) 0.083∗∗∗ (0.009)
Q4 0.152∗∗∗ (0.023) 0.161∗∗∗ (0.023) 0.284∗∗∗ (0.014) 0.161∗∗∗ (0.011) 0.155∗∗∗ (0.011)
Without income 0.017 (0.028) 0.021 (0.029) 0.035∗∗ (0.014) 0.025∗∗ (0.012) 0.027∗∗ (0.012)
Father’s income
Q2 −0.006 (0.047) 0.005 (0.046) −0.036∗ (0.019) −0.028 (0.018) −0.022 (0.018)
Q3 −0.012 (0.041) −0.004 (0.041) −0.085∗∗∗ (0.017) −0.043∗∗∗ (0.016) −0.039∗∗ (0.016)
Q4 0.075∗ (0.039) 0.082∗∗ (0.039) 0.080∗∗∗ (0.017) 0.075∗∗∗ (0.016) 0.074∗∗∗ (0.016)
Without income 0.079 (0.072) 0.106 (0.076) 0.053 (0.034) 0.036 (0.033) 0.045 (0.033)
Year
2011/12 −0.060 (0.037) −0.265∗∗∗ (0.010) −0.041∗∗∗ (0.015) −0.036∗∗ (0.015)
2012/13 −0.064∗ (0.038) −0.382∗∗∗ (0.021) −0.031∗∗ (0.016) −0.028∗ (0.016)
2013/14 −0.054 (0.041) −0.225∗∗∗ (0.022) −0.025 (0.017) −0.024 (0.017)
Observations 29041 29041 137365 137365 137365
Note. The models in this table are similar to the main specification presented in the last two columns of Table 3.5 with the following differences.
The results in the first four columns are obtained by eliminating school and year combinations with fewer than 50 pupils in a given school and year,
whereas the rest of the columns are based on the full sample. The first four columns report ordered probit estimates with school and school-year fixed
effects. In the remaining six columns, teachers’ recommendations is treated as a continuous variable and OLS regressions without fixed effects, with
school fixed effects, and with school-year fixed effects are estimated. Standard errors clustered at the school level are reported in parentheses. */**/***
denote statistical significance at the 10/5/1% level.
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Table 3.A.4: Specification checks.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Test score 0.209∗∗∗ (0.001) 0.210∗∗∗ (0.001) 0.221∗∗∗ (0.002)
Female 0.064∗∗∗ (0.007) 0.056∗∗∗ (0.007) 0.058∗∗∗ (0.007) 0.058∗∗∗ (0.008)
Immigration status
1st generation Western immigrant 0.133∗∗∗ (0.046) 0.153∗∗∗ (0.044) 0.156∗∗∗ (0.045) 0.158∗∗∗ (0.048)
1st generation non-Western immigrant 0.060 (0.037) 0.072∗ (0.039) 0.061 (0.038) 0.056 (0.044)
2nd generation Western immigrant 0.067∗∗∗ (0.015) 0.063∗∗∗ (0.015) 0.066∗∗∗ (0.015) 0.071∗∗∗ (0.016)
2nd generation non-Western immigrant 0.016 (0.013) 0.015 (0.013) 0.009 (0.013) 0.016 (0.014)
3rd generation Western immigrant 0.027∗∗ (0.012) 0.026∗∗ (0.011) 0.026∗∗ (0.011) 0.029∗∗ (0.013)
3rd generation non-Western immigrant 0.029 (0.029) 0.020 (0.029) 0.018 (0.031) 0.006 (0.035)
Parental education background
Disadvantaged −0.018 (0.021) −0.052∗∗ (0.023) −0.053∗∗ (0.023) −0.083∗∗∗ (0.025)
Not disadvantaged 0.218∗∗∗ (0.018) 0.199∗∗∗ (0.020) 0.188∗∗∗ (0.020) 0.181∗∗∗ (0.022)
Mother’s income
Q2 0.002 (0.009) 0.009 (0.009) −0.002 (0.010) 0.005 (0.010)
Q3 0.070∗∗∗ (0.010) 0.079∗∗∗ (0.010) 0.072∗∗∗ (0.010) 0.080∗∗∗ (0.011)
Q4 0.172∗∗∗ (0.012) 0.182∗∗∗ (0.011) 0.175∗∗∗ (0.012) 0.189∗∗∗ (0.012)
Without income 0.022∗ (0.012) 0.025∗∗ (0.012) 0.024∗ (0.012) 0.032∗∗ (0.014)
Father’s income
Q2 −0.028 (0.018) −0.036∗ (0.019) −0.029 (0.019) −0.028 (0.021)
Q3 −0.038∗∗ (0.016) −0.048∗∗∗ (0.017) −0.043∗∗ (0.017) −0.036∗∗ (0.018)
Q4 0.077∗∗∗ (0.016) 0.074∗∗∗ (0.016) 0.079∗∗∗ (0.016) 0.085∗∗∗ (0.018)
Without income 0.023 (0.034) 0.021 (0.034) 0.018 (0.035) 0.041 (0.038)
Year
2011/12 −0.044∗∗∗ (0.015) −0.025 (0.016) 0.000 (0.017)
2012/13 −0.009 (0.017) −0.011 (0.017) 0.054∗∗∗ (0.019)
2013/14 −0.004 (0.019) −0.011 (0.018) 0.096∗∗∗ (0.020)
Observations 124608 124608 124134 124134
Note. The models in this table are similar to the main specification presented in the last two columns of Table 3.5 with the
following differences. In the first model, the test score variable and year dummies are substituted with interactions of test score
dummies and year dummies. In the second model, the Pre-vocational education: mixed/theoretical learning path is divided into
the Pre-vocational education: mixed learning path and Pre-vocational education: theoretical learning path recommendations. The
composite counterpart is separated similarly. In the third model, pupils with the practical training recommendation are excluded
from the analysis. The fourth model reports the same results as the previous model but with composite and the corresponding
homogeneous tracks merged into one level. For example, the Senior general secondary education and Senior general secondary
education and higher tracks are merged together. Standard errors clustered at the school level are reported in parentheses.
*/**/*** denote statistical significance at the 10/5/1% level.
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Table 3.A.5: Additional predicted probabilities and marginal effects obtained using the ordered probit
model with mother’s and father’s education.
Cito score = 537 Cito score = 529
Pred. prob. Marginal effects Pred. prob. Marginal effects
Gender
Male 0.627 0.748
Female 0.648 0.020∗∗∗ (0.002) 0.765 0.017∗∗∗ (0.002)
Immigration status
Native Dutch 0.637 0.756
1st generation Western immigrant 0.687 0.050∗∗∗ (0.015) 0.797 0.041∗∗∗ (0.012)
1st generation non-Western immigrant 0.651 0.013 (0.013) 0.767 0.011 (0.011)
2nd generation Western immigrant 0.659 0.022∗∗∗ (0.005) 0.774 0.018∗∗∗ (0.004)
2nd generation non-Western immigrant 0.640 0.003 (0.005) 0.758 0.002 (0.004)
3rd generation Western immigrant 0.645 0.008∗ (0.004) 0.762 0.006∗ (0.003)
3rd generation non-Western immigrant 0.647 0.010 (0.011) 0.764 0.008 (0.009)
Mother’s education
At most training to assistant 0.570 0.698
Basic or professional training 0.577 0.007 (0.005) 0.704 0.006 (0.005)
Middle managerial training 0.610 0.040∗∗∗ (0.005) 0.732 0.035∗∗∗ (0.004)
University of applied sciences 0.637 0.068∗∗∗ (0.005) 0.756 0.058∗∗∗ (0.004)
University 0.678 0.108∗∗∗ (0.006) 0.789 0.091∗∗∗ (0.005)
Father’s education
At most training to assistant 0.536 0.667
Basic or professional training 0.538 0.002 (0.006) 0.669 0.001 (0.005)
Middle managerial training 0.574 0.037∗∗∗ (0.005) 0.701 0.034∗∗∗ (0.005)
University of applied sciences 0.603 0.067∗∗∗ (0.005) 0.727 0.059∗∗∗ (0.005)
University 0.637 0.101∗∗∗ (0.006) 0.756 0.089∗∗∗ (0.005)
Mother’s income
Q1 0.618 0.755
Q2 0.620 0.001 (0.003) 0.756 0.001 (0.003)
Q3 0.637 0.019∗∗∗ (0.003) 0.771 0.016∗∗∗ (0.003)
Q4 0.653 0.034∗∗∗ (0.004) 0.783 0.028∗∗∗ (0.003)
Without income 0.622 0.004 (0.004) 0.758 0.003 (0.004)
Father’s income
Q1 0.620 0.741
Q2 0.611 −0.009 (0.007) 0.733 −0.008 (0.006)
Q3 0.605 −0.014∗∗ (0.006) 0.729 −0.012∗∗ (0.005)
Q4 0.637 0.018∗∗∗ (0.006) 0.756 0.015∗∗∗ (0.005)
Without income 0.629 0.009 (0.012) 0.749 0.008 (0.010)
Year
2010/11 0.648 0.760
2011/12 0.637 −0.010∗ (0.005) 0.751 −0.009∗ (0.005)
2012/13 0.643 −0.005 (0.006) 0.756 −0.004 (0.005)
2013/14 0.643 −0.005 (0.006) 0.756 −0.004 (0.005)
Note. The results in this table are obtained by using the ordered probit estimates in the first two columns
of Table 3.7. The rest of the table is defined in the same way as in Table 3.A.2. Standard errors of marginal
effects are reported in parentheses. */**/*** denote statistical significance at the 10/5/1% level.
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Chapter 4
Estimation of Spatial Sample
Selection Models: A Partial
Maximum Likelihood Approach
This chapter is based on the identically entitled working paper,
which is co-authored with Pavel Čı́̌zek.
4.1. Introduction
The assumption about independent observations is often not met even in the analysis
of cross-sectional data. Since cross-sectional dependence can be captured by a certain
spatial or economic ordering in many economic applications, spatial models have be-
come an extensively used tool in applied econometrics. In this paper, we propose spatial
extensions of sample selection models. We introduce spatial dependence into a sample
selection model via a spatial lag of a latent dependent variable or a spatial error in
both the selection and outcome equations. To our best knowledge, this is the first paper
which analyzes a sample selection model with a spatial lag of a latent dependent vari-
able, facilitating easy estimation in applications such as peer effects in education with
non-randomly missing data (see Section 4.2 for more details). A spatial sample selection
model with a spatial error, which can be used, for instance, in agricultural yield stud-
ies, has been analyzed before, but the proposed estimators are either computationally
demanding or they do not have desirable small sample performance.
The computational difficulties in the spatial sample selection models stem from the
(spatially) correlated errors: their joint density function cannot be expressed as a product
of the density functions for each observation, and the full maximum likelihood estimator
(MLE) becomes computationally very demanding as it involves high dimensional inte-
gration. It is possible to overcome this obstacle by using the heteroskedastic maximum
likelihood estimator (HMLE), which takes into account only heteroskedasticity stem-
ming from spatial correlation while neglecting the corresponding spatial autocorrelation
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to obtain consistent but inefficient estimates.1 Based on this idea, Flores-Lagunes and
Schnier (2012) in the context of a sample selection model with a spatial error in both
the selection and outcome equations proposed to use the generalized method of moments
(GMM) estimator.2 The estimator however has poor small sample properties (see Section
4 in their paper and Section 4.5). Doğan and Taşpınar (2014) suggest to estimate the
same model using the Markov chain Monte Carlo approach in the context of Bayesian
estimation, whereas earlier McMillen (1995) suggested to use the Expectation Maximiza-
tion algorithm. Both of these methods are however computationally demanding in larger
samples due to the necessity to invert the spatial weight matrix numerous times, and
moreover, a rigorous theory is not developed for either of them.
In the closely related context of binary choice models with spatial errors, Wang et al.
(2013) therefore suggested an intermediate approach between the full MLE and HMLE
that is based on the idea that all observations are divided into clusters of two observa-
tions and the dependence within clusters is taken into account, whereas the dependence
between clusters is not employed in the estimation. This approach avoids the compu-
tationally demanding full MLE, while it facilitates the estimation of the spatial error
structure by taking the correlation within clusters into account. Wang et al. (2013) ap-
ply the partial maximum likelihood estimator (PMLE) to a spatial error probit model. In
this paper, the PMLE approach is generalized to sample selection models with a spatial
lag of a latent dependent variable or a spatial error and their special cases.
Since the special cases of the considered sample selection models include probit and
Tobit models (see Section 4.2), this paper also extends Wang et al. (2013)’s results to the
probit and Tobit models with a spatial lag of the latent dependent variable and to the
Tobit model with a spatial error.3 We analyze the asymptotic properties of the proposed
PMLE using the near epoch dependent random fields framework introduced by Jenish
and Prucha (2012). Note that the asymptotic results derived for a spatial error probit
model in Wang et al. (2013) cannot be directly applied to our models because the struc-
ture of the spatial sample selection models is more complicated and requires additional
treatment. For example, the uniform Lp-boundedness of the (bivariate) likelihood scores
cannot be established by simply assuming that the support of exogeneous regressors is
bounded since the observed dependent variables also enter the cumulative distribution
1Poirier and Ruud (1988) developed the result under fairly general conditions for a probit model with
serial correlation in a time series setting, whereas Robinson (1982) established the same result for a
Tobit model.
2For empirical studies that use the estimator suggested by Flores-Lagunes and Schnier (2012), see
Section 5 of Flores-Lagunes and Schnier (2012), Mukherjee and Singer (2010), and Ward et al. (2014).
3 The Tobit model with a spatial lag of the observed dependent variable has been recently analyzed by
Xu and Lee (2015a).
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function of the bivariate normal distribution. Moreover, Wang et al. (2013) base their
analysis on α-mixing processes and make assumptions about dependence based on the
observed responses instead of deriving more primitive conditions.4 They also impose a
strong assumption on the expansion speed of the sampling region5 and suggest to es-
timate the variance matrix of the proposed estimator based on the approach proposed
by Conley (1999), who explicitly models the sampling process from a regular lattice and
assumes that the data generating process is strongly spatially stationary. This assump-
tion is in general not satisfied, for example, for the Cliff-Ord type models (see Kelejian
and Prucha, 2007, for a further discussion). We relax these assumptions and suggest to
estimate the asymptotic variance matrix using parametric bootstrap.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, the sample selection models are
defined, whereas the PMLE is introduced in Section 4.3. In Section 4.4, its consistency
and asymptotic normality are established, and the estimator of the asymptotic variance
matrix is discussed. In Section 4.5, we study the finite sample properties, while Section
4.6 concludes. Proofs are provided in Appendices.
It proves helpful to introduce the following notation. Let An, n ∈ N, be some matrix
indexed by n; we denote the ijth element, the ith row, and the jth column of An by
Aij,n, Ai·,n, and A·j,n, respectively. Similarly, if vn is a vector, then vi,n denotes the ith
element of vn. (The same notation applies for vectors and matrices that are not indexed





′ with its qmth
element, qth row, and mth column denoted by Agqm,n, Agq·,n, and Ag·m,n, respectively;
Agġ,n = [Aik,n Ail,n; Ajk,n Ajl,n] andAg,n = Agg,n withAg,n = [Ag11,n Ag12,n; Ag21,n Ag22,n].
Similarly, vg,n = (vi,n, vj,n)
′ with its qth element denoted by vgq,n. Furthermore, for any
random vector Y , let ‖Y ‖p = [E‖Y ‖p]1/p, p ≥ 1, denote its Lp-norm, where ‖ · ‖ is the
Euclidean norm. For an n×n matrix A, the Euclidean, row sum, and column sum matrix











i=1 |Aij|, respectively.6 Note that these norms are sub-multiplicative:
‖AB‖a ≤ ‖A‖a‖B‖a, where ‖ · ‖a denotes one of the mentioned norms.
4See conditions (vii) and (i) of Theorems 1 and 2 by Wang et al. (2013), respectively.
5See condition (ii) of Theorem 2 by Wang et al. (2013).
6See Horn and Johnson (1985, pp. 291, 294-295) for more details.
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4.2. Model
To define the sample selection model, consider first the following latent selection (s) and




























for i = 1, . . . , 2n,7 where 2n represents the actual sample size and n serves as the sample-
size index, y∗si,n and y
∗o




i·,n are 1 × Ls and 1 × Lo di-
mensional vectors of exogenous variables, and usi,n and u
o
i,n are the error terms for the
selection and outcome equations, respectively; the corresponding vectors and matrices





















i=1 and analogously for the outcome equation. The spatial nonstochastic
weight matrices W sn and W
o
n are assumed to be known, contain nonnegative elements,
and have zero elements on the main diagonal. For example, the elements of W sn and W
o
n
can be indirectly proportional to the strength of an economic relationship or distance
between two observations, or they can be equal to 0 or 1, indicating unrelated or related
(neighboring) observations (e.g., see LeSage and Pace, 2009). If the ijth element of the
spatial weight matrix is nonzero, there is a direct dependence between the latent vari-
ables of observations i and j. If the ijth element of the spatial weight matrix is zero, it
does not mean that observations i and j are independent because there might exist an
observation k that has an effect on the latent variables of both observations i and j.
The relation between the observed outcomes and latent variables in (4.1) is defined
as ysi,n = 1(y
∗s






i,n, so that the selection equation determines which
cases are observed, while the outcome equation determines the magnitude of the observed
responses. (In general, yoi,n is missing for observation i rather than being zero if y
s
i,n = 0,
but the definition is made for the simplicity of notation similarly to Chen and Zhou,
2010, among others and does not affect the likelihood function.) This version of a sample
selection model is chosen because it is used in many empirical applications and includes
other important models. For example, under normality of errors, modelling just ysi,n
leads to probit, and taking equations in (4.1) identical results in Tobit. Generalizations
to other sample selection models might also be considered. For instance, a binary sample
selection model with ysi,n = 1(y
∗s






i,n > 0) or a model with a Tobit
selection equation defined as ysi,n = max{0, y∗si,n} and yoi,n = 1(ysi,n > 0)y∗oi,n. Finally, the
7For notational convenience, we assume that the number of observations is even.
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variables are defined in the same way as before. The results presented in the paper are
also derived and hold for this sample selection model with spatial errors. Adjusting for


















An important feature of the latent model in (4.1) is that spatial lags of the latent
instead of observed variables are included in both the selection and outcome equations.




j,n = 1. Thus, the outcome
equations with a lag of the latent variable and a lag of the observed variable differ
primarily by the presence of y∗oj,n with y
s
j,n = 0 on the right hand side of the equation.
Note also that εoi,n(λ
o




j,n = 0. For the selection
equation, ysj,n and y
∗s
j,n differ though, and plausibility of the model depends on whether
only individuals’ decisions or also their motives are observable to others. By means of
two empirical examples we will illustrate, where models (4.1) and (4.2) can be a plausible
specification; see also a related discussion in Qu and Lee (2012) for the censored model.
Example 1 (Peer effects in education with non-randomly missing data). The peers
effects in education literature investigates whether students are affected by behaviours
of their peers. For example, students could increase their effort level if their peers study
hard. In such situations, typically test scores are used to measure the unobserved effort
level and, if test scores are observed for all students, the second equation in (4.1) is
employed with y∗oi,n being replaced with y
o
i,n (e.g., see Lin, 2010). Unfortunately, in some
cases test scores are missing for some students. For example, Booij et al. (2017) found
that, in the department of economics and business of the University of Amsterdam, only
46% of the students write all the first-year exams during the first year of study. The
sample selection problem arises if a student’s decision to attend the exam and his score
depend on the student’s abilities to succeed in the subject. Such a situation can be
handled using the model in (4.1) with ysi,n and y
∗o
i,n being a student’s decision to take an
exam and his (potential) score from that exam, respectively.
This model does not only allow for the effort level of students to be affected by their
peers but also incorporates peer interactions in the decision to attend the exam. These
interactions could be modelled either by a spatial lag of the latent dependent variable
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or a spatial lag of the observed dependent variable. Since students decide whether to
attend the exam simultaneously, their decisions are likely to be affected by their beliefs
about their peers’ attendance rather than actual choices. Therefore, this situation might
be better approximated by a spatial lag of the latent dependent variable as in equation
(4.1) rather than the observed one. Likewise, we also include a lag of the latent rather
than observed dependent variable in the outcome equation. Students who did not attend
the exam could had influenced their peers by solving assignments together and attending
the same tutorial classes. Therefore, the outcome equation should also capture these
interactions.
Model (4.1) can also be used to study cases when a missing data problem arises
due to non-responsiveness to a survey. Consider, for example, the National Longitudinal
Study of Adolescent Health data, which has been extensively used to study peer effects
in education (e.g., Calvò-Armengol et al., 2009; Lin, 2010). In this data, Hoshino (2016)
found that information on GPA is missing for 11% of the respondents (after taking into
account missing data on the exogeneous variables used in his study). It might be the
case that unobserved abilities of a student affect both his decision to reveal his GPA and
his GPA itself. Model (4.1) can thus be used to account for this kind of sample selection,
where a lag of the latent variable is included in the outcome equation and is not included
in the selection equation as the students filled-in the questionnaire independently.
Example 2 (Agricultural yield). Ward et al. (2014) apply the GMM estimator proposed
by Flores-Lagunes and Schnier (2012) to estimate a cereal yield response function taking
into account potential sample selection bias due to farmers’ endogenous decision about
whether to plant cereals. Flores-Lagunes and Schnier (2012) consider the latent model in
(4.2) with spatially correlated errors and W sn = W
o
n (see, for instance, equations (1) and
(2) in their paper), but for the estimation, observations with ysi,n = 0 are omitted from
the weight matrix in the outcome equation (see footnote 16 of their paper). The estimator
is thus inconsistent with the model. Ward et al. (2014) overcame this issue by choosing
W on 6= W sn in such a way that W oij,n can have positive values only if ysi,n = ysj,n = 1. In this
case, the weight matrix depends on potentially endogenous farmers’ decisions whether
to plant cereals. This approach however requires further research as neither PMLE nor
the GMM estimator proposed by Flores-Lagunes and Schnier (2012) are designed for
the cases when the weight matrix in the outcome equation depends on the outcomes in
the selection equation. On the one hand, if the correlation among unobservables in the
outcome equation is driven by production technology or knowledge spillovers, then the
farmers who decided not to plant a field do not likely have a lot of influence on those
who decided to plant a field, and the weight matrix W on 6= W sn considered in Ward et al.
(2014) should be chosen. On the other hand, if the correlation among unobservables is
144
Model
mainly driven by unobserved geographical and meteorological characteristics, then both
planted and not planted fields are affected similarly if they are close to each other. Since
the unobserved geographical and meteorological characteristics affect both the decision
to plant a field and a cereal yield response function, a nonstochastic weight matrix which

































where the observed responses ysi,n = 1(y
∗s






i,n, and for b ∈ {s, o},
matrices Sbn(λ) = (I2n−λW bn)−1 and errors εbn(λ) = Sbn(λ)ubn. These definitions of εsn(λs0)
and εon(λ
o
0) are equivalent to those in the spatial error model (4.2), and models (4.2)






0) in the latter model.
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The spatial weight matrices in the original and reduced form models have to satisfy the
following assumption.
Assumption 1. (i) The matrices I2n − λsW sn and I2n − λoW on are nonsingular for all
(λs, λo)′ ∈ Λ, where Λ is the space of the spatial parameters.9 (ii) The row and column






o) are bounded uniformly in
n ∈ N and (λs, λo)′ ∈ Λ.
The first condition implies that there is a unique solution to y∗sn and y
∗o







0) in (4.2). Since there is no natural parameter space for spatial
parameters, this condition is usually ensured by normalizing spatial weight matrices
and bounding the parameter space. In applications, the weight matrices are typically
normalized in such a way that the sum of each row is equal to 1 and the parameter space
of (λs, λo) is chosen to be (−1, 1)× (−1, 1). However, if there is no theoretical reason for
the row normalization, this might lead to misspecification. Kelejian and Prucha (2010)
instead suggest to normalize the weight matrices by their largest absolute eigenvalues.
The second condition restricts dependence to a manageable degree. This is a classical
assumption in the spatial econometrics literature (e.g., see Kelejian and Prucha, 1998,
1999, 2010).
8For the simplicity of notation, we do not consider models with both spatial lags and spatial errors in
both the selection and outcome equations. These models can however be analyzed in a similar way as
the spatial lag model.
9This assumption does not exclude processes that are spatially non-stationary as it allows for the
strength of dependence to depend on location.
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4.3. Partial Maximum Likelihood Estimator
The (partial) maximum likelihood estimator requires a parametric specification of the
distribution of the error terms. Although we could consider a general elliptically con-
toured distribution of (usi,n, u
o
i,n)
′, we restrict our attention to the Gaussian case as it
turns out to be not only the most frequently used one, but also the most complicated
one (relative to heavier-tailed distributions) due to the necessity to study and bound the
moments of the logarithm of the bivariate normal cumulate distribution function and




, λs, λo, ρ, σ2)′.
Assumption 2. (i) The error terms (usi,n, u
o
i,n)
′ iid∼ N (0,Σ(θ0)), where Σ(θ0) = [1 ρ0σ0;
ρ0σ0 σ
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i·,n are always observed.
Assumption 2(i) is strong but standard in the literature that analyzes parametric
sample selection models (see Heckman, 1974, 1979). The variance of usi,n is normalized
to 1 in order to ensure identification. The correlation coefficient ρ0 controls the selection
bias; if ρ0 is zero, the outcome equation can be estimated independently of the selection
equation. Even in that case, standard estimators for spatial linear models, for example,
MLE (see Lee, 2004) or GMM (see Kelejian and Prucha, 1998), cannot be applied in
order to estimate the outcome equation in (4.1) for a subsample of observations with
ysi,n = 1 because y
∗o
j,n on the right hand side of the outcome equation is missing if y
s
j,n = 0.
If data are missing at random, the methods developed by Wang and Lee (2013) for
estimation of spatial autoregressive models are applicable to model (4.1) and a version
of the MLE estimator10 can be applied to the outcome equation in (4.2) for a subsample
of observations with ysi,n = 1. Neither method is applicable if ρ0 6= 0 though.










are present in both the spatial lag and spatial error models in (4.3) and (4.2), respec-
tively, we need to make the assumption that the exogenous variables and the error terms
are mutually independent as in Assumption 2(ii). Finally, Assumption 2(iii) states that
the exogenous variables and spatial weights have to be observed even for missing obser-
vations. The observability of the exogenous variables in the outcome equation for missing
observations is not required neither in the standard parametric sample selection model
nor in model (4.2) with spatial errors. If the model contains a spatial lag, the partial
maximum likelihood estimator is however based on the reduced form in (4.3), which re-
quires full observability. This assumption is not too strong since Xsi·,n contains variables
10If uoi,n|Xoi·,n ∼ N (0, σ20), then y∗oi,n|Xoi·,n ∼ N (Xoi·,nβo0 , Soi·,n(λo0)So·i,n(λo0)σ20). If the dependent variable
is missing randomly, yoi,n|Xoi·,n follows the same distribution.
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in Xoi·,n in many empirical applications (e.g., Buchinsky, 1998; Vella, 1998; Sharma et al.,
2013). The assumption about observability of spatial weights is not very restrictive ei-
ther, at least if the spatial weights are based on distances between observations, which
are typically not difficult to obtain even for missing observations.
For instance, both exogenous variables and spatial weights are available for missing
observations in Examples 1 and 2. In studies on peer effects in education, weight matrices
are typically constructed by assigning the value 1 to the ijth element of the weight matrix
if students i and j are in the same classroom and the value zero otherwise. The resulting
matrix is usually row normalized. As studies on peer effects in education usually use
educational registers, both classroom compositions and background variables are also
available for students who skipped a few exams. Likewise, in agricultural yield studies,
spatial weight matrices are usually constructed based on the proximity of fields, hence
also available for missing observations. The meteorological variables considered in Ward
et al. (2014) are also available for fields that were not planted.
Due to the spatial dependence, the error terms εsi,n(λ
s) and εoi,n(λ
o) in latent models
(4.3) and (4.2) are heteroskedastic and cross-correlated. Hence, the full MLE is computa-
tionally demanding in this setting. Based on the idea introduced by Wang et al. (2013),
we therefore suggest to estimate the models by applying the partial maximum likelihood
estimator. Specifically, we divide 2n observations into n mutually disjoint pairs based
on the idea that the internal correlation between two observations in a pair is more
important than the external correlation with observations in the other pairs, at least if
observations within a pair are “close” to each other. If only very weakly correlated ob-
servations are paired, the estimator will be similar to HMLE and there will be no gains
from forming the pairs. The way how the observations are paired thus has an effect on
the estimation precision, and it is desirable to group observations in such a way that the
variance of the estimator is minimized. Given that the asymptotic variance is a function
of unknown parameters, a two-step procedure might be considered, where the initial es-
timates based on some primitive grouping are used to construct an optimal grouping. It
is unfortunately very difficult, if not impossible, to construct the asymptotic distribution
of such a two-step estimator because the grouping becomes data dependent. Moreover, it
is not clear how to obtain an optimal grouping practically as it would involve huge com-
putational costs unless very rough approximations of the asymptotic variance are used.
For these reasons, we suggest to group observations based on deterministic variables that
potentially capture the strength of dependence between observations, for example, the
Euclidean distance between observations (see Section 4.5.1 for details). As discussed in
Wang et al. (2013), it is also possible to try a finite number of different grouping schemes
and to choose the one which delivers the smallest standard errors.
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Let a grouping of observations be described by an index set Gn containing n pairs
g = (i, j)′ of observations i and j; ∪g∈Gn{g1, g2} = {1, . . . , 2n}. Let y∗sg,n = (y∗sg1,n, y∗sg2,n)′





′ be 2-dimensional vectors of latent variables in a group g ∈ Gn.



























with observed responses ysg,n and y
o
g,n, where all variables are defined in the same way as
in Section 4.2 except that now they are defined for a group g instead of an individual


























′, and so on. The grouped spatial error model can be defined analogously.
Before constructing the log-likelihood function Qn(θ) and its population counterpart
Q0(θ), note that the log-likelihood function will be composed of four parts because
there are four scenarios: one observation in a pair is missing (ysg1,n = 1 and y
s
g2,n = 0
or vice versa), no observations are missing (ysg1,n = y
s
g2,n = 1), and two observations
are missing (ysg1,n = y
s
g2,n = 0). To simplify notation, we therefore define an index set
A = {10, 01, 11, 00} based on the values that ysg1,n and ysg2,n take and the corresponding




g2,n = a). In order to construct the likelihood
function, we also need to introduce some additional notation. Let ζg,n = 2y
s
g,n− ι2, where






















































Further, let zg,n(θ) = y
o
g,n − Sog·,n(λo)Xonβo, and for any a ∈ A, Rag,n(θ) be the correla-

















































Then the log-likelihood function based on a grouping Gn is defined by (see the derivation
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where fag,n(θ), a ∈ A, represent the log-density functions, φ(·) is the standard normal
density function, and φ2(·,Σ) and Φ2(·,Σ) are the bivariate normal density and distri-
bution functions, respectively, with zero mean and variance matrix Σ.
Although the log-likelihood function looks complicated, it is not difficult to implement
and to maximize. If there is the spatial error instead of the spatial lag in the selection or





and qeg,n(θ) = X̃
s
g·,nβ
s, respectively, where X̃sg·,n is constructed in the same way as S̃
s
g·,n(λ).
4.4. Asymptotic Properties of Partial Maximum Likelihood Estimator
The main difficulty in proving asymptotic properties of PMLE stems from analyzing the
nonlinear objective function based on heterogeneous and spatially dependent processes.
Hence, this dependence has to be restricted to a manageable degree. We do so by em-
ploying the near epoch dependent (NED) random fields framework developed by Jenish
and Prucha (2012). We consider a topological structure proposed in their paper. Let the
location of an observation i be defined by li ∈ D̃n, where D̃n is a finite sample region of
a d̃-dimensional lattice D̃ ⊂ Rd̃, d̃ > 1, equipped with the Euclidean metric. Since the
likelihood function in (4.4) is in terms of likelihood contributions for pairs, let a group




′ = (l′i, l
′
j)
′ ∈ D̃n × D̃n = Dn, which is a
finite sample region of a 2d̃-dimensional lattice D = D̃× D̃ ⊂ R2d̃. Given this definition,
the distance between two groups g and ġ depends on configurations of four points in Rd̃.
Similarly to Bai et al. (2012), we consider a distance metric between two points in R2d̃
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defined by d(lg, lġ) = min{‖lg1 − lġ1‖, ‖lg1 − lġ2‖, ‖lg2 − lġ1‖, ‖lg2 − lġ2‖}, i.e. the minimum
distance between two points in sets (lg1 , lg2) and (lġ1 , lġ2). The distance between any two
subsets A,B ⊆ D is defined as d(A,B) = inf{d(g, ġ) : lg ∈ A, lġ ∈ B}, where the fact
that the observations are indexed by natural numbers allows us to write d(g, ġ) ≡ d(lg, lġ)
for two groups g and ġ with locations lg, lġ ∈ R2d̃.
Assumption 3. Individual units in the economy are located or living in a region D̃n ⊂
D̃ ⊂ Rd̃. The cardinality of Dn = D̃n × D̃n satisfies limn→∞ |Dn| = ∞. The distance
d(g, ġ) between any two different groups g and ġ is larger than or equal to a specific
positive constant, which we normalize to 1.
Region D corresponds to a space of economic or geographic characteristics or a mix-
ture of them. In Example 2, a geographical space can simply be used. Although there is
no natural location for an observation i in Example 1, a location can be constructed. As-
sume that there are t = 1, . . . , T tutorial groups with at most S̄ students in each group.
Let ti be the tutorial group of student i and ai be his rank in tutorial group ti based
on the alphabetical ordering. Then student i’s location can be given by li = (tiS̄, ai)
′.
Assumption 3 implies that the increasing domain asymptotics is used (as an alternative
to the infill domain asymptotics): the distance restriction in Assumption 3 implies that
there is a finite number of units in any bounded region and that the sample region Dn
has to expand when the sample grows.
For reference, the definitions of α-mixing and NED properties presented in Jenish
and Prucha (2009, 2012) are reviewed first.
Definition 1. Let {ηg,n}g∈Gn be a triangular array of real random variables defined on
a probability space (Ω,F , P ). Moreover, let A and B be two σ-algebras of F and
α(A,B) = sup(|P (A ∩B)− P (A)P (B)|, A ∈ A, B ∈ B).
For A ⊆ Dn and B ⊆ Dn, let σn(A) = σ(ηg,n : lg ∈ A) and αn(A,B) = α(σn(A), σn(B)).
Then the α-mixing coefficients for the random fields {ηg,n}g∈Gn are defined as




(αn(A,B), |A| ≤ k, |B| ≤ m, d(A,B) ≥ s),
where | · | denotes the cardinality of a set.
This definition is similar to the time series literature. The major difference is that, in
the random fields setting, the α-mixing coefficients do not only depend on the distance
between two sets but also on the sizes of the sets. The definition of the NED property
follows.
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Definition 2. Let {Zg,n}g∈Gn and {ηg,n}g∈Gn be random fields located on Dn, and addi-
tionally, {Zg,n}g∈Gn satisfy ‖Zg,n‖p < ∞, p ≥ 1. Moreover, let {tg,n}g∈Gn be an array of
positive constants. Then the random field {Zg,n}g∈Gn is said to be Lp-near epoch depen-
dent on the random field {ηg,n}g∈Gn if
‖Zg,n − E[Zg,n|Fg,n(s)]‖p ≤ tg,nψ(s)
for some sequence ψ(s) ≥ 0 with lims→∞ ψ(s) = 0, where Fg,n(s) = σ(ηġ,n : d(g, ġ) ≤ s).
The NED random field is uniform if and only if sup
n,g
tg,n <∞.
In Definition 2, the term Zg,n −E[Zg,n|Fg,n(s)] measures the prediction error of Zg,n
based on the information contained in {ηġ,n : d(g, ġ) ≤ s}. The NED property then
states that the prediction error converges to zero as s increases. Note that NED is not a
property of a random variable itself as α-mixing is, but it is a property of a mapping.
4.4.1. Consistency
To prove consistency, we need to introduce additional assumptions.
Assumption 4. (i) {(Xsg·,n, Xog·,n)}g∈Gn is an α-mixing random field with α-mixing
coefficients ᾱ(k,m, s) ≤ (k + m)τ α̂(s), τ ≥ 0, for some α̂(s) → 0 as s → ∞ such that∑∞
s=1 s
2d̃−1α̂(s) <∞. (ii) sup
n,i







given p ≥ 1, where b ∈ {s, o}.
Assumption 4(i) states that the exogenous variables may be cross-sectionally depen-
dent under some restrictions. Assumption 4(ii) implies that infinitely many moments
of the exogenous variables exist. This is less restrictive than the assumption that the
support of the exogenous variables is bounded, which is usual in the (spatial) literature
studying discrete choice or limited dependent variable models.11 (Note that the proofs
require only finitely many moments but with a quite large p and that finding the exact
p would require a lot of effort such as calculating the third order derivatives of the bi-
variate normal distribution functions in (4.4).) Moreover, the large number p of finite
moments is related to the assumed normality of the errors and the need to bound the
moments of the logarithm of the bivariate normal cumulative distribution function and
their derivatives. For heavier-tailed error distributions (e.g., the Laplace distribution), a
substantially smaller number of moments would have to exist.
The elements of the spatial weight matrices determine the strength of dependence
between observations. An important question is under which structures of spatial weight
11E.g., see condition (v) of Theorem 1 by Pinkse and Slade (1998) and condition (vi) of Theorem 1 by
Wang et al. (2013).
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matrices the limit laws based on the NED framework hold. Given that the likelihood
function is specified in terms of (the inverses Ssn(λ
s) and Son(λ
o) of) I2n − λsW sn and
I2n − λoW on and the grouping is determined by the user of the method, we impose
restrictions on the weight matrices indirectly by the following assumption.
Assumption 5. lim
s→∞














b)‖, b ∈ {s, o}.






g,n(θ)}g∈Gn is a NED random field on
the α-mixing random field {ηg,n = (Xsg·,n, Xog·,n, usg,n, uog,n)}g∈Gn . Although it is not clear
how to find the conditions for the weight matrices and groupings that imply Assumption
5, it is possible to check whether weight matrices with certain structures and proposed
grouping schemes satisfy this assumption. For instance, if tutorial groups are analyzed
in Example 1, it is typically assumed that the ijth element of the weight matrix is equal
to zero if students i and j are from different tutorial groups. Thus assuming that the
number of students in each tutorial group is even, it is beneficial to form only pairs
of students who are in the same tutorial group. Given the definition of locations for
Example 1 presented bellow Assumption 3, if d(g, ġ) ≥ S̄, students in pairs g and ġ
are from different tutorial groups implying that ‖Sbgġ,n(λb)‖ = 0 and Assumption 5 is
trivially satisfied.
Next, we make an assumption about the 2 × 2 submatrices of matrices Ωssn (θ) and
Ωoon (θ) and Σ
a
g,n(θ), a ∈ A, defined in Section 4.3.





a ∈ A, are bounded away from zero uniformly in n ∈ N, g ∈ Gn, and θ ∈ Θ, where Θ is
the parameter space of θ.
Assumption 6 ensures that the above mentioned 2×2 (sub)matrices are invertible for
each pair. Thus, the observations should be grouped in such a way that this assumption
is not violated. Its validity can be checked using a grid covering possible values of the




Σag,n(θ), a ∈ A, do not depend on regression parameters βs, βo, and variance σ2.
Assumption 7. The parameter space Θ is a compact subset of RL.
Assumption 8. The population log-likelihood function Q0(θ) is uniquely maximized at
θ0.
Whereas Assumption 7 is a standard assumption for nonlinear extremum estimators,
Assumption 8 is the identification condition for PMLE. We assume rather than prove
identification because it is a very challenging task. Wooldridge (1994) claims that usually
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some additional knowledge about the distribution of conditioning variables is needed to
establish identification, and therefore, it is assumed rather than proved in many cases.
For example, for a spatial autoregressive model with a nonlinear transformation of the
dependent variable, Xu and Lee (2015b) derive only conditions for identification in finite
sample and assume that identification continues to hold in the limit.
Finally, the consistency of the proposed PMLE follows.
Theorem 1. Under Assumptions 1–8, θ̂n − θ0 = op(1) as n→∞.
4.4.2. Asymptotic Normality
In order to establish asymptotic normality, we need to strengthen the assumptions re-







g,n(θ0)/∂θ}g∈Gn have to decrease to zero at a certain relatively fast rate,
see Assumption 10 below, because the likelihood function is not only nonlinear but con-
tains indicator functions as well. Additionally, some standard regularity conditions are
required.
Assumption 9. {(Xsg·,n, Xog·,n)}g∈Gn is an α-mixing random field with α-mixing coef-




2d̃(τ∗+1)−1α̂δ/(4+2δ)(s) <∞, where τ∗ = δτ/(2 + δ), τ ≥ 0.
Assumption 10. The NED coefficients satisfy
∑∞
s=1 s
2d̃−1ψ(p−2)/(12p−12)(s) < ∞, for
some p > 2 with ψ(s) defined in Assumption 5.
Assumption 11. θ0 is in the interior of the parameter space Θ.







exists, is finite and nonsingular. (ii) The







is bounded away from zero uni-
formly in n ∈ N. (iii) J(θ0) = lim
n→∞
Jn(θ0) exists and is finite.
Given the non-singular Jacobian and Hessian matrices corresponding to the popula-
tion partial maximum likelihood function, the asymptotic normality follows.
Theorem 2. Under Assumptions 1–3, 4(ii)–12,
√
n(θ̂n−θ0)
d−→ N (0, H−1(θ0)J(θ0)H−1(θ0))
as n→∞.
Finally, since the likelihood function does not account for the dependence between
groups, the variance matrix of PMLE is not equal to the inverse of the Fisher information
matrix. Thus, PMLE is in general not efficient as the full MLE is.
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4.4.3. Estimation of the Variance Matrix
Although we do not model the dependence between pairs in the likelihood function,
it has to be accounted for when the variance matrix is estimated. On the one hand,
it is relatively easy to estimate the Hessian matrix Hn(θ0) = E[∂
2Qn(θ0)/∂θ∂θ
′] as
it can be obtained using its sample analog and a consistent estimate of θ: Ĥn(θ̂n) =
∂2Qn(θ̂n)/∂θ∂θ
′. On the other hand, estimation of the variance matrix Jn(θ0) and its limit
J(θ0) is complicated due to the dependence between groups. It is theoretically possible
to consider a spatial analog of a heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC)
estimator of the variance matrix that has been extensively analyzed in the time series
literature (i.e., Newey and West, 1987, and Andrews, 1991). Conley (1999) adapted the
HAC estimator for the spatially stationary observations. Noting that the Cliff-Ord type
models are in general not spatially stationary, Kelejian and Prucha (2007) and Kim and
Sun (2011) relaxed the stationarity assumption, but considered only processes linear in
error terms. This is not the case for ∂Qn(θ0)/∂θ here, and therefore, the HAC estimator
is not easily applicable in the present setting.
On the other hand, it is not uncommon to estimate the variance of an estimator of
a spatial model using the bootstrap when it is very difficult or practically impossible to
obtain a closed form expression of the variance matrix (e.g., a residual based bootstrap
method is used by Su and Yang, 2015, in spatial dynamic panel data models). Given
that the considered sample selection models are completely parametrically specified, it
is possible to use the parametric bootstrap to estimate Jn(θ0). Note that we suggest to
bootstrap Jn(θ0) instead of the complete variance matrix of the estimator to guarantee
good computational speed. The bootstrap procedure for estimating Jn(θ0) can be de-
scribed for the spatial lag model as follows (the spatial error model can be dealt with
analogously).

















′ of size 2n from the
distribution N (0,Σ(θ̂n)), where Σ(θ̂n) = [1 ρ̂nσ̂n; ρ̂nσ̂n σ̂2n].




























































4. Compute the score Γ
(b)
n (θ̂n) = ∂Q
(b)
n (θ̂n)/∂θ for B bootstrap samples; Q
(b)
n (θ̂n) is












n, where b = 1, . . . , B.
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Since the functional form of the derivatives of the likelihood function is rather com-
plicated, we suggest to use numerical differentiation to evaluate Γ
(b)
n in step 4. As our
simulation study shows (see Section 4.5), numerical differentiation in this setting works
well.
4.5. Monte Carlo Simulations
4.5.1. Experimental Design
We consider the following data generating process:
y∗sn = (I2n − λsW sn)−1(Xsnβs + usn)
y∗on = (I2n − λoW on)−1(Xonβo + uon)








o + (I2n − λoW on)−1uon















with Xsi1,n = X
o





iid∼ N (0, 1), Xsi3,n
iid∼ χ2(1), and Xoi3,n
iid∼ χ2(1).
The error terms (usi,n, u
o
i,n)









3) = (1,−1, 1, 1,−1), while βs1 is chosen such that P [ysi,n = 1|W sn;λs] =
2/3. We analyze all the possible combinations of the spatial parameters λs and λo taking
values from the set {0, 0.4, 0.85}.
LetDn represent great-cycle distances in miles between counties in the US.
12 Similarly
to Xu and Lee (2015a), we use counties in the 10 Upper Great Plains States for 2n =
760.13 For 2n = 344, counties in Nebraska, South Dakota, Minessota, and Iowa are
used, whereas only the first two states are utilized for 2n = 158.14 The weight matrices
12The data is available at http://data.nber.org/data/county-distance-database.html.
13The ten states include Nebraska, South Dakota, Minnesota, Iowa, Colorado, Kansas, Missouri, Mon-
tana, North Dakota, and Wyoming.
14To obtain a sample size that is an even number, Adams county in Nebraska is excluded for 2n ∈
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are generated as follows: W̃ sij,n = W̃
o
ij,n = 1(Dij,n ≤ 50) · 1/Dij,n. We row-normalize
W̃ sn and W̃
o




n . Wang et al. (2013) propose to group adjacent
observations, for instance, using the Euclidean distance. Based on this idea, we formulate











eij,n = 1, eii,n = 0, eij,n = eji,n,
where eij,n is a binary variable, which is equal to 1 if observations i and j form a pair
and to zero otherwise; D̃ij,n = 1(Dij,n ≤ 50)Dij,n. We use D̃n instead of Dn in the ILP
problem in order to reduce the burden of computation. The effect on the grouping is
small since the algorithm groups nearby observations.
The partial maximum likelihood estimator (PMLE) is compared to the heteroskedas-
tic maximum likelihood estimator (HMLE), which has a likelihood function of a form
similar to (4.4) but for univariate rather than bivariate observations. The model with
the spatial error is also estimated by the GMM estimator proposed by Flores-Lagunes
and Schnier (2012). Two versions of the GMM estimator are explored: with the identity
weight matrix (GMM) and with the optimal weight matrix (GMM2).
Given that βs and βo are 3-dimensional vectors, bias, standard deviation, and root
mean squared error (RMSE) are calculated for each element of βs and βo separately.
In Tables 4.A.1, 4.A.2, 4.A.4, 4.A.6, and 4.A.7 in Appendix 4.A, however, only the
Euclidean norms of the vectors of the corresponding statistics are reported, i.e. stat(β̂bn) =
‖(stat(β̂b1n), stat(β̂b2n), stat(β̂b3n))‖, where b ∈ {s, o} and stat ∈ {bias, s.d., rmse}.
In many empirical applications, marginal effects play a crucial role. For this reason,






















the formulas are presented in Appendix 4.C.2. (In the spatial error model, the marginal
effects are conditional on Xsi·,n and X
o




n.) For spatial lag models,
three types of marginal effects might be considered – total, direct, and indirect – as
discussed by LeSage and Pace (2009). In this paper, we discuss only total marginal
effects. Since the marginal effects are different for each individual, we use the average










where mfx(h)(θ) = (2n)−1
∑2n
i=1 mfx
(h)(i, θ) with mfx(h)(i, θ) being one of the four
marginal effects evaluated for an individual i using parameter θ at iteration h = 1, . . . , H.









Knowing that the estimator presented in this paper is based on parametric assump-
tions, we examine its robustness to distributional misspecification. In particular, we
consider the spatial lag model with the error terms being drawn from t- and Wishart
distributions with 10 degrees of freedom. For the t-distribution, we draw bivariate ran-
dom numbers from t10(0,Σ) and normalize them to have unit variance. For the Wishart
distribution, we draw 2 × 2 matrices from the Wishart distribution with 10 degrees of
freedom and variance matrix Σ, take the two diagonal elements and normalize them to
have zero mean and unit variance. In both distributions, the resulting correlation pa-
rameter is equal to 0.5. It is interesting to compare the performance of PMLE under
these two designs with the design where the error terms are obtained from the normal
distribution because the t-distribution has heavier tails whereas the Wishart distribution
generates errors that are asymmetric and not elliptically contoured.
To investigate the finite sample performance of standard errors estimates obtained
by the parametric bootstrap method defined in Section 4.4.3, we perform z-tests of the
nominal significance level of 5% for the null hypotheses that the respective parameters
are equal to their true values and obtain empirical sizes of the tests.
Finally, note that the empirical means, standard deviations, and RMSEs are based
on 1000 replications of each experiment. For bootstrapping standard errors, the number
of bootstrap samples is chosen to be B = 100.
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4.5.2. Monte Carlo Results
Spatial lag model. First of all, let us discuss the sample selection model with the spatial
lag in both the selection and outcome equations. Tables 4.A.1 and 4.A.2 in Appendix
4.A report biases, standard deviations, and RMSEs of HMLE and PMLE for sample
sizes 158, 344, and 760. In general, the results show superiority of the former estimator.
Even though the estimates of βs when λs = 0.85 and 2n = 158 obtained using both
HMLE and PMLE are severely biased, the bias is smaller when the latter estimator is
used. Specifically, the bias of HMLE is 19%, 18%, and 39% larger compared to PMLE
when λo is equal to 0, 0.40, and 0.85, respectively. Additionally, when λo = 0.85, the
bias of the estimates of σ2 obtained by HMLE is on average 103%, 70%, and 78% higher
when the sample size is, respectively, equal to 158, 344, and 760. Furthermore, in almost
all the cases, the standard deviation of HMLE is higher than the standard deviation
of PMLE. The difference is especially pronounced when λo = 0.85 with the standard
deviations of the HMLE estimates for λo, ρ, and σ2 being on average 147%, 35%, and
69% higher than the ones obtained using PMLE. Likewise, in terms of RMSE, PMLE
outperforms HMLE in the great majority of the cases.
Note that the biases, standard deviations, and RMSEs of β̂s1 obtained using both
estimators in the case where the sample size is equal to 158 and λs = λo = 0.85 are
very high. This result is driven by one Monte Carlo iteration: Figure 4.G.1 in Appendix
4.G reports the estimates of βs1 obtained in all the iterations, whereas Figure 4.G.2 in
Appendix 4.G reports the same estimates excluding the Monte Carlo iteration prominent
in the former figure. After the exclusion of the prominent iteration, the bias, standard
deviation, and RMSE of HMLE and PMLE are equal to, respectively, 0.545, 1.045, 1.178
and 0.408, 0.771, 0.872 implying that the qualitative implications about the superiority
of PMLE remain.
Further, as the sample size increases, the bias, standard deviation, and RMSE of both
estimators decrease. Despite this fact, PMLE still outperforms HMLE even in the largest
sample. For the rest of our analysis, we consider only samples with 344 observations.
Regarding the marginal effects, the magnitude of the bias obtained by PMLE is in the
great majority of the cases lower than the one of HMLE, whereas the standard deviation
and RMSE are always lower. The difference for the bias is especially pronounced for
mfx3 and mfx4 when λ
o = 0.85, whereas the difference for the standard deviation
and RMSE is especially noticeable for mfx1 and mfx2 when λ
s = 0.85 and for mfx3
and mfx4 when λ
o = 0.85. This result is consistent with our findings above about the
parameter estimates. Note that both mfx1 and mfx2 depend only on the parameters of
the selection equation and that the relative difference in the performance of HMLE and
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PMLE in the estimation of the selection equation parameters is especially pronounced
when λs = 0.85. Furthermore, both mfx3 and mfx4 depend on λ
o, which is noticeably
better estimated by PMLE than HMLE.
Spatial error model. Next, we discuss the spatial error sample selection model
(Tables 4.A.4–4.A.5 in Appendix 4.A). The HMLE estimator in the spatial error case
performs much worse compared to the spatial lag case: there are large biases in the
estimates of βs, λs, and λo when the spatial parameters in the respective equations
are not equal to zero, although severe biases are not present in the estimates of the
correlation coefficient. The estimates of βs and λs obtained by GMM and GMM2 are
in most of the cases severely biased. These results are consistent with the simulation
results in Flores-Lagunes and Schnier (2012). Finally, there are biases in the estimates
of βs obtained by PMLE, which increase with the magnitude of λs, whereas the other
parameters are estimated well.
In most of the cases, PMLE outperforms HMLE with respect to both standard devi-
ation and RMSE. Although the estimates of λo (and in some cases σ2) obtained by the
GMM estimators have lower standard deviations and RMSEs than the ones obtained by
PMLE when λo ∈ {0, 0.40}, the rest of the parameters are estimated noticeably better
by PMLE.
Table 4.A.5 in Appendix 4.A shows that the bias in the parameter estimates does
not have a substantial influence on the marginal effects: for all the estimators, the bias
is very small. The PMLE estimator, however, outperforms the remaining estimators in
terms of both standard deviation and RMSE. When λo = 0.85, the standard deviation
(and RMSE) of the estimates of mfx3 and mfx4 obtained by HMLE is on average 15%
and 22% higher compared to PMLE. The superiority of PMLE compared to the GMM
estimator is especially pronounced for mfx3 and mfx4 when λ
s = 0.85, where the stan-
dard deviation (and RMSE) obtained by the GMM estimator is, respectively, on average
11 and 4 times higher than the ones obtained by PMLE. Although the marginal effects
are estimated better when the GMM2 estimator is employed, the standard deviation
(RMSE) obtained by the GMM2 estimator is on average 55% (56%), 61% (61%), 21%
(24%), and 12% (12%) higher than the ones obtained by PMLE for, respectively, mfx1,
mfx2, mfx3, and mfx4.
Distributional misspecification. Tables 4.A.6 and 4.A.7 in Appendix 4.A report
the performance of PMLE and HMLE under distributional misspecification in the context
of the spatial lag model. Similarly to the case where the errors are drawn from the normal
distribution, PMLE outperforms HMLE in terms of bias when the errors are obtained
from the t-distribution, whereas the performance of the two estimators under the Weibull
distribution is similar. With respect to standard deviation and RMSE, the two estimators
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perform similarly in all the three cases: the standard deviations and RMSEs of HMLE are
almost always higher than the ones obtained by PMLE. The largest relative advantage
is observed for the estimate of λo when λo = 0.85, where the standard deviation (RMSE)
obtained by HMLE is on average 2.8 (2.7), 1.8 (1.8), and 2.2 (2.1) higher than the
ones obtained by HMLE when the errors are drawn from the normal, t-, and Weibull
distributions, respectively.
Estimates of standard errors. The performance of the parametric bootstrap is
investigated in the context of the spatial lag model. Table 4.A.8 in Appendix 4.A reports
the empirical sizes of the z-tests for the null hypotheses that the parameters are equal to
the true values. Although the empirical sizes of most of the tests are close to the nominal
5% level, there are a few exceptions. The empirical size of the test that ρ = 0.5 is on
average 4.7pp higher than the nominal 5% level, whereas the empirical size of the test
that σ2 = 1 is on average 4.9pp higher when λo = 0.85. Nevertheless, the Monte Carlo
study shows that the parametric bootstrap works reasonably well in finite samples.
4.6. Conclusions
This paper examines the sample selection model with a spatial lag of a latent dependent
variable or a spatial error in both the selection and outcome equations. We propose
to estimate this model by the partial maximum likelihood estimator which is based on
the idea that all observations are divided into pairs in such a way that dependence
within a pair is more important than dependence between pairs; the likelihood function
is constructed as a product of marginal likelihood contributions for these pairs. Since the
likelihood function does not capture the dependence between pairs, complexity is reduced
and the model can be easily estimated. Using the limit laws for the NED random fields,
we establish consistency and asymptotic normality of the PMLE. Our simulation study
shows that the proposed estimator performs quite well in small samples, and in most
cases, outperforms the ordinary MLE, HE, HMLE, and the GMM estimator proposed
by Flores-Lagunes and Schnier (2012). Moreover, PMLE and the developed asymptotic
theory can be easily applied to other limited dependent variable models, that is, probit
and Tobit models, because the sample selection model has all the components of the
former models and they are thus special cases of the sample selection model.
The studied model can be extended in several ways. First, it is based on strong
distributional assumptions about the error terms. Although it can be applied to other
parametric families of distributions, an interesting exercise is to check the finite sample
properties of the quasi-PMLE under non-normality. Second, the asymptotic distribution
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of the proposed estimator depends on the way how the observations are divided into
groups. It is desirable to find an optimal grouping scheme based on some criterion, for
example, such that the sum of variances of parameters of interest is minimized. Given
the complexity of the variance matrix of PMLE, this is a very difficult task. Nevertheless,
as our simulation shows, PMLE performs quite well even with a non-optimal grouping.
Appendix 4.A Results of Monte Carlo Experiments
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Table 4.A.1: Biases and standard deviations of parameter estimates in the context of the sample
selection model with a spatial lag in both the selection and outcome equations.
bias s.d.
λs λo 2n = 158 2n = 344 2n = 760 2n = 158 2n = 344 2n = 760
HMLE PMLE HMLE PMLE HMLE PMLE HMLE PMLE HMLE PMLE HMLE PMLE
0.00 0.00 β̂s 0.123 0.123 0.044 0.043 0.019 0.019 0.721 0.719 0.449 0.446 0.281 0.281
β̂o 0.001 0.000 0.006 0.005 0.002 0.002 0.411 0.412 0.255 0.255 0.165 0.165
λ̂s -0.010 -0.012 -0.012 -0.014 -0.006 -0.006 0.200 0.190 0.147 0.141 0.084 0.080
λ̂o -0.009 -0.010 -0.002 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 0.140 0.125 0.099 0.092 0.060 0.055
ρ̂ -0.035 -0.040 -0.004 -0.005 0.001 0.000 0.367 0.370 0.204 0.204 0.128 0.128
σ̂2 -0.020 -0.017 -0.006 -0.005 -0.004 -0.003 0.174 0.175 0.111 0.111 0.072 0.072
0.00 0.40 β̂s 0.080 0.082 0.041 0.040 0.024 0.024 0.736 0.734 0.442 0.441 0.283 0.281
β̂o 0.008 0.006 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.387 0.376 0.234 0.230 0.152 0.148
λ̂s -0.004 -0.008 -0.012 -0.012 -0.004 -0.005 0.200 0.187 0.141 0.135 0.079 0.076
λ̂o -0.009 -0.011 -0.008 -0.008 -0.001 -0.002 0.109 0.097 0.078 0.070 0.046 0.042
ρ̂ -0.025 -0.023 -0.014 -0.011 0.002 0.002 0.373 0.358 0.224 0.217 0.135 0.131
σ̂2 -0.020 -0.012 -0.012 -0.008 -0.007 -0.005 0.194 0.183 0.123 0.119 0.080 0.076
0.00 0.85 β̂s 0.093 0.098 0.045 0.044 0.018 0.019 0.709 0.700 0.459 0.452 0.289 0.285
β̂o 0.021 0.008 0.009 0.005 0.003 0.005 0.517 0.428 0.368 0.284 0.234 0.190
λ̂s -0.007 -0.014 -0.004 -0.003 0.001 0.000 0.208 0.191 0.142 0.131 0.084 0.080
λ̂o -0.005 -0.012 -0.004 -0.005 -0.003 -0.003 0.081 0.044 0.086 0.030 0.061 0.019
ρ̂ -0.037 -0.032 -0.012 -0.011 0.001 0.003 0.482 0.372 0.305 0.230 0.190 0.147
σ̂2 -0.182 -0.101 -0.109 -0.064 -0.040 -0.024 0.411 0.260 0.280 0.174 0.238 0.128
0.40 0.00 β̂s 0.101 0.099 0.048 0.047 0.016 0.016 0.719 0.712 0.413 0.411 0.284 0.283
β̂o 0.004 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.394 0.397 0.252 0.252 0.162 0.162
λ̂s -0.011 -0.013 -0.008 -0.010 -0.002 -0.002 0.146 0.138 0.102 0.097 0.065 0.063
λ̂o -0.002 -0.006 -0.007 -0.007 -0.002 -0.002 0.134 0.126 0.095 0.089 0.058 0.053
ρ̂ -0.027 -0.024 -0.002 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.357 0.355 0.209 0.208 0.133 0.132
σ̂2 -0.023 -0.020 -0.012 -0.010 -0.005 -0.004 0.158 0.157 0.105 0.104 0.068 0.068
0.40 0.40 β̂s 0.097 0.099 0.034 0.034 0.024 0.023 0.713 0.714 0.426 0.424 0.273 0.270
β̂o 0.004 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.001 0.001 0.364 0.352 0.237 0.231 0.158 0.155
λ̂s -0.007 -0.012 -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 0.151 0.146 0.099 0.092 0.062 0.059
λ̂o -0.003 -0.007 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 0.108 0.097 0.074 0.068 0.045 0.042
ρ̂ -0.026 -0.019 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 0.372 0.355 0.204 0.197 0.133 0.129
σ̂2 -0.039 -0.030 -0.018 -0.014 -0.010 -0.008 0.184 0.173 0.123 0.116 0.081 0.077
0.40 0.85 β̂s 0.100 0.101 0.036 0.038 0.023 0.023 0.702 0.695 0.422 0.415 0.279 0.277
β̂o 0.007 0.023 0.012 0.004 0.009 0.000 0.543 0.415 0.357 0.282 0.237 0.191
λ̂s 0.004 -0.005 -0.000 -0.004 -0.001 -0.003 0.157 0.145 0.105 0.097 0.064 0.060
λ̂o -0.006 -0.013 -0.005 -0.005 0.001 -0.002 0.080 0.041 0.101 0.029 0.022 0.018
ρ̂ -0.040 0.009 -0.020 -0.001 -0.020 -0.003 0.453 0.337 0.292 0.207 0.183 0.134
σ̂2 -0.161 -0.076 -0.101 -0.061 -0.060 -0.032 0.395 0.252 0.327 0.171 0.174 0.116
0.85 0.00 β̂s 0.384 0.322 0.125 0.111 0.049 0.045 1.797 1.570 0.693 0.641 0.407 0.389
β̂o 0.014 0.013 0.003 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.376 0.376 0.229 0.227 0.154 0.152
λ̂s -0.004 -0.008 -0.002 -0.004 -0.001 -0.001 0.078 0.068 0.053 0.047 0.032 0.029
λ̂o -0.005 -0.009 -0.005 -0.005 -0.000 -0.001 0.152 0.137 0.106 0.097 0.060 0.055
ρ̂ 0.017 0.011 0.037 0.027 0.004 0.003 0.423 0.402 0.242 0.226 0.155 0.147
σ̂2 -0.037 -0.033 -0.012 -0.011 -0.008 -0.007 0.153 0.153 0.099 0.100 0.068 0.068
0.85 0.40 β̂s 0.356 0.303 0.121 0.108 0.047 0.044 1.938 1.463 0.697 0.646 0.410 0.387
β̂o 0.002 0.004 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.352 0.340 0.238 0.229 0.154 0.149
λ̂s -0.010 -0.012 -0.002 -0.004 0.001 0.001 0.098 0.088 0.051 0.045 0.032 0.029
λ̂o -0.008 -0.010 -0.006 -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 0.114 0.098 0.081 0.072 0.048 0.042
ρ̂ -0.009 -0.010 0.009 0.006 0.001 -0.001 0.434 0.398 0.252 0.231 0.161 0.146
σ̂2 -0.044 -0.035 -0.021 -0.019 -0.009 -0.009 0.178 0.166 0.116 0.109 0.078 0.072
0.85 0.85 β̂s 14.816 10.665 0.117 0.102 0.050 0.046 1367.749 1357.736 0.706 0.625 0.413 0.389
β̂o 0.027 0.009 0.013 0.004 0.002 0.005 0.551 0.411 0.418 0.273 0.241 0.185
λ̂s 0.003 -0.007 0.002 -0.003 0.001 -0.000 0.074 0.068 0.049 0.044 0.030 0.027
λ̂o 0.003 -0.009 -0.012 -0.007 -0.001 -0.003 0.053 0.039 0.140 0.028 0.023 0.018
ρ̂ -0.102 -0.004 -0.075 -0.014 -0.031 -0.007 0.510 0.375 0.322 0.232 0.214 0.151
σ̂2 -0.222 -0.102 -0.111 -0.065 -0.049 -0.027 0.364 0.230 0.323 0.155 0.179 0.115
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Table 4.A.2: RMSEs of parameter estimates in the context of the sample selection model with a spatial
lag in both the selection and outcome equations.
λs λo 2n = 158 2n = 344 2n = 760
HMLE PMLE HMLE PMLE HMLE PMLE
0.00 0.00 β̂s 0.764 0.761 0.459 0.456 0.286 0.285
β̂o 0.411 0.412 0.255 0.255 0.165 0.165
λ̂s 0.200 0.190 0.147 0.141 0.085 0.080
λ̂o 0.140 0.126 0.099 0.092 0.060 0.055
ρ̂ 0.369 0.373 0.204 0.204 0.128 0.128
σ̂2 0.176 0.176 0.112 0.111 0.072 0.072
0.00 0.40 β̂s 0.764 0.762 0.451 0.449 0.288 0.286
β̂o 0.387 0.376 0.234 0.230 0.152 0.148
λ̂s 0.200 0.187 0.141 0.135 0.079 0.076
λ̂o 0.109 0.098 0.078 0.071 0.046 0.042
ρ̂ 0.374 0.359 0.224 0.217 0.135 0.131
σ̂2 0.195 0.184 0.123 0.119 0.080 0.076
0.00 0.85 β̂s 0.744 0.740 0.469 0.462 0.292 0.288
β̂o 0.521 0.429 0.370 0.284 0.234 0.190
λ̂s 0.209 0.192 0.142 0.131 0.084 0.080
λ̂o 0.081 0.045 0.086 0.031 0.061 0.019
ρ̂ 0.484 0.374 0.305 0.230 0.190 0.147
σ̂2 0.450 0.278 0.300 0.185 0.241 0.131
0.40 0.00 β̂s 0.764 0.755 0.427 0.425 0.287 0.286
β̂o 0.394 0.397 0.252 0.252 0.162 0.162
λ̂s 0.147 0.139 0.102 0.098 0.065 0.063
λ̂o 0.134 0.127 0.095 0.089 0.058 0.053
ρ̂ 0.358 0.355 0.209 0.208 0.133 0.132
σ̂2 0.159 0.158 0.105 0.105 0.068 0.068
0.40 0.40 β̂s 0.754 0.755 0.436 0.433 0.278 0.275
β̂o 0.365 0.352 0.238 0.231 0.158 0.155
λ̂s 0.151 0.146 0.099 0.092 0.062 0.059
λ̂o 0.108 0.097 0.074 0.068 0.045 0.042
ρ̂ 0.373 0.355 0.204 0.197 0.133 0.129
σ̂2 0.188 0.176 0.124 0.117 0.081 0.077
0.40 0.85 β̂s 0.744 0.737 0.436 0.431 0.283 0.281
β̂o 0.545 0.417 0.358 0.283 0.238 0.191
λ̂s 0.157 0.145 0.105 0.097 0.064 0.060
λ̂o 0.081 0.043 0.101 0.029 0.022 0.018
ρ̂ 0.455 0.337 0.292 0.207 0.184 0.134
σ̂2 0.427 0.263 0.342 0.181 0.184 0.120
0.85 0.00 β̂s 2.090 1.800 0.788 0.723 0.432 0.412
β̂o 0.376 0.376 0.229 0.227 0.154 0.152
λ̂s 0.078 0.068 0.053 0.047 0.032 0.029
λ̂o 0.152 0.137 0.106 0.097 0.060 0.055
ρ̂ 0.424 0.402 0.244 0.227 0.155 0.147
σ̂2 0.158 0.156 0.100 0.100 0.068 0.068
0.85 0.40 β̂s 2.184 1.681 0.783 0.721 0.434 0.409
β̂o 0.353 0.340 0.238 0.230 0.154 0.149
λ̂s 0.098 0.089 0.051 0.045 0.032 0.029
λ̂o 0.114 0.099 0.081 0.072 0.048 0.042
ρ̂ 0.434 0.398 0.252 0.231 0.161 0.146
σ̂2 0.183 0.169 0.117 0.111 0.078 0.073
0.85 0.85 β̂s 1368.463 1358.438 0.788 0.692 0.433 0.407
β̂o 0.555 0.411 0.420 0.274 0.241 0.185
λ̂s 0.074 0.068 0.050 0.044 0.030 0.027
λ̂o 0.053 0.040 0.141 0.029 0.023 0.019
ρ̂ 0.520 0.375 0.331 0.232 0.216 0.151
σ̂2 0.426 0.252 0.342 0.168 0.186 0.118
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Table 4.A.3: Biases, standard deviations, and RMSEs of total marginal effects
estimates in the context of the sample selection model with a spatial lag in both
the selection and outcome equations (2n = 344).
λs λo mfx(θ0) HMLE PMLE
bias s.d. rmse bias s.d. rmse
0.00 0.00 mfx1 0.193 0.002 0.032 0.032 0.001 0.031 0.031
mfx2 -0.193 -0.001 0.030 0.030 -0.000 0.029 0.029
mfx3 0.782 -0.002 0.131 0.131 -0.004 0.126 0.126
mfx4 -1.000 -0.006 0.112 0.112 -0.003 0.104 0.104
0.00 0.40 mfx1 0.193 0.002 0.032 0.032 0.001 0.031 0.031
mfx2 -0.193 -0.001 0.031 0.031 -0.001 0.029 0.029
mfx3 1.433 -0.000 0.229 0.229 -0.005 0.210 0.210
mfx4 -1.657 -0.006 0.209 0.209 -0.001 0.189 0.189
0.00 0.85 mfx1 0.193 0.004 0.033 0.033 0.004 0.031 0.031
mfx2 -0.193 -0.002 0.032 0.032 -0.002 0.030 0.030
mfx3 6.306 0.241 1.771 1.787 0.009 1.345 1.344
mfx4 -6.584 -0.295 1.666 1.691 -0.030 1.236 1.236
0.40 0.00 mfx1 0.303 0.005 0.054 0.054 0.004 0.052 0.052
mfx2 -0.303 -0.002 0.048 0.048 -0.001 0.047 0.047
mfx3 0.663 -0.010 0.162 0.162 -0.009 0.158 0.158
mfx4 -1.000 0.000 0.101 0.101 0.001 0.096 0.096
0.40 0.40 mfx1 0.303 0.003 0.052 0.052 0.002 0.049 0.049
mfx2 -0.303 -0.004 0.047 0.048 -0.003 0.045 0.045
mfx3 1.298 0.011 0.236 0.236 0.006 0.221 0.221
mfx4 -1.657 -0.014 0.202 0.202 -0.008 0.188 0.188
0.40 0.85 mfx1 0.303 0.005 0.054 0.054 0.003 0.050 0.050
mfx2 -0.303 -0.007 0.049 0.049 -0.005 0.046 0.046
mfx3 6.093 0.232 1.666 1.681 0.016 1.291 1.290
mfx4 -6.584 -0.287 1.604 1.629 -0.035 1.179 1.179
0.85 0.00 mfx1 0.757 0.052 0.282 0.287 0.028 0.231 0.232
mfx2 -0.757 -0.056 0.273 0.279 -0.034 0.204 0.207
mfx3 0.304 -0.130 0.469 0.486 -0.093 0.404 0.415
mfx4 -1.000 -0.005 0.117 0.117 -0.004 0.108 0.108
0.85 0.40 mfx1 0.757 0.057 0.278 0.283 0.033 0.221 0.223
mfx2 -0.757 -0.060 0.260 0.267 -0.036 0.196 0.199
mfx3 0.849 -0.105 0.543 0.552 -0.078 0.471 0.477
mfx4 -1.657 -0.012 0.226 0.226 -0.009 0.208 0.208
0.85 0.85 mfx1 0.757 0.061 0.312 0.318 0.027 0.210 0.212
mfx2 -0.757 -0.070 0.363 0.370 -0.032 0.218 0.220
mfx3 5.196 0.299 1.829 1.852 -0.059 1.298 1.298
mfx4 -6.584 -0.222 1.619 1.633 0.017 1.183 1.182
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Table 4.A.4: Biases, standard deviations, and RMSEs of parameter estimates in the context of the
sample selection model with a spatial error in both the selection and outcome equations (2n = 344).
λs λo HMLE GMM GMM2 PMLE
bias s.d. rmse bias s.d. rmse bias s.d. rmse bias s.d. rmse
0.00 0.00 β̂s 0.286 2.617 2.698 0.824 3.580 4.044 0.728 3.234 3.649 0.100 0.511 0.559
β̂o 0.006 0.254 0.254 0.001 0.284 0.285 0.003 0.271 0.272 0.005 0.254 0.254
λ̂s 0.029 0.418 0.419 -0.038 0.593 0.594 -0.079 0.592 0.597 -0.041 0.396 0.398
λ̂o 0.006 0.323 0.323 0.023 0.113 0.115 0.027 0.113 0.116 -0.020 0.241 0.242
ρ̂ 0.026 0.218 0.219 0.040 0.320 0.323 0.010 0.269 0.269 0.004 0.202 0.202
σ̂2 -0.053 0.137 0.147 -0.082 0.090 0.122 -0.019 0.100 0.102 -0.024 0.112 0.114
0.00 0.40 β̂s 0.299 2.854 2.939 0.749 2.960 3.419 0.787 3.223 3.707 0.108 1.108 1.138
β̂o 0.000 0.279 0.280 0.009 0.303 0.304 0.011 0.299 0.301 0.001 0.276 0.276
λ̂s 0.038 0.434 0.436 -0.151 0.641 0.659 -0.091 0.655 0.661 -0.039 0.395 0.397
λ̂o -0.366 0.417 0.555 -0.075 0.094 0.120 -0.068 0.096 0.118 -0.045 0.192 0.198
ρ̂ 0.016 0.229 0.229 0.023 0.307 0.308 -0.005 0.273 0.273 -0.001 0.208 0.208
σ̂2 -0.014 0.170 0.171 -0.058 0.094 0.110 0.002 0.102 0.102 -0.015 0.132 0.132
0.00 0.85 β̂s 0.547 4.552 4.726 0.836 3.303 3.806 0.920 3.630 4.196 0.088 0.491 0.535
β̂o 0.020 0.623 0.623 0.050 0.622 0.635 0.061 0.628 0.638 0.020 0.555 0.555
λ̂s 0.068 0.491 0.496 -0.253 0.684 0.729 -0.206 0.706 0.735 -0.048 0.382 0.385
λ̂o -0.484 0.733 0.879 -0.089 0.054 0.104 -0.087 0.058 0.104 -0.017 0.046 0.049
ρ̂ 0.014 0.339 0.339 -0.129 0.321 0.346 -0.142 0.296 0.328 0.003 0.241 0.241
σ̂2 0.206 0.677 0.707 0.156 0.177 0.236 0.216 0.199 0.294 -0.010 0.180 0.180
0.40 0.00 β̂s 0.264 2.847 2.913 0.767 3.550 3.969 0.733 3.516 3.926 0.084 0.626 0.660
β̂o 0.002 0.246 0.247 0.007 0.272 0.273 0.011 0.267 0.269 0.002 0.248 0.248
λ̂s -0.394 0.474 0.616 -0.441 0.621 0.762 -0.434 0.623 0.759 -0.103 0.357 0.372
λ̂o 0.018 0.308 0.308 0.005 0.115 0.115 0.008 0.116 0.117 -0.008 0.233 0.233
ρ̂ 0.017 0.229 0.230 0.048 0.330 0.334 0.005 0.289 0.289 -0.002 0.211 0.211
σ̂2 -0.051 0.135 0.144 -0.084 0.085 0.119 -0.021 0.094 0.096 -0.025 0.113 0.115
0.40 0.40 β̂s 0.322 2.968 3.058 0.739 3.219 3.633 0.876 3.733 4.244 0.100 0.617 0.659
β̂o 0.006 0.286 0.287 0.014 0.309 0.311 0.021 0.305 0.310 0.006 0.281 0.281
λ̂s -0.352 0.512 0.622 -0.577 0.656 0.874 -0.489 0.682 0.839 -0.110 0.368 0.384
λ̂o -0.367 0.420 0.558 -0.088 0.100 0.133 -0.083 0.098 0.129 -0.046 0.188 0.194
ρ̂ 0.028 0.238 0.240 0.039 0.312 0.314 -0.007 0.288 0.288 -0.000 0.208 0.208
σ̂2 -0.022 0.171 0.173 -0.063 0.095 0.114 -0.001 0.101 0.101 -0.018 0.130 0.131
0.40 0.85 β̂s 0.608 4.673 4.875 0.883 3.550 4.075 0.874 3.332 3.877 0.093 0.624 0.658
β̂o 0.007 0.626 0.626 0.035 0.643 0.657 0.051 0.636 0.646 0.005 0.551 0.551
λ̂s -0.308 0.559 0.638 -0.667 0.715 0.978 -0.638 0.720 0.962 -0.081 0.342 0.352
λ̂o -0.458 0.705 0.841 -0.090 0.052 0.104 -0.085 0.052 0.100 -0.018 0.047 0.050
ρ̂ 0.086 0.320 0.332 -0.110 0.323 0.341 -0.125 0.301 0.326 0.014 0.210 0.211
σ̂2 0.256 0.719 0.763 0.147 0.160 0.217 0.203 0.188 0.277 0.008 0.184 0.184
0.85 0.00 β̂s 0.545 4.112 4.275 0.041 2.987 2.989 0.061 3.352 3.358 0.227 1.859 1.921
β̂o 0.001 0.277 0.277 0.012 0.538 0.539 0.000 0.354 0.355 0.000 0.271 0.271
λ̂s -0.648 0.747 0.989 -0.903 0.645 1.110 -0.903 0.653 1.114 -0.026 0.112 0.115
λ̂o 0.014 0.330 0.330 -0.017 0.120 0.121 -0.011 0.119 0.120 -0.001 0.239 0.239
ρ̂ 0.010 0.363 0.363 -0.050 0.439 0.441 -0.041 0.366 0.368 -0.004 0.294 0.294
σ̂2 -0.051 0.142 0.151 9.925 316.227 316.383 -0.011 0.142 0.142 -0.021 0.120 0.122
0.85 0.40 β̂s 0.482 4.006 4.145 0.034 2.880 2.880 0.022 2.899 2.900 0.232 1.925 1.988
β̂o 0.002 0.305 0.305 0.005 0.572 0.572 0.004 0.446 0.447 0.002 0.286 0.286
λ̂s -0.691 0.767 1.033 -1.040 0.672 1.238 -0.951 0.692 1.176 -0.024 0.101 0.104
λ̂o -0.355 0.442 0.567 -0.102 0.105 0.147 -0.096 0.107 0.143 -0.028 0.177 0.179
ρ̂ 0.053 0.339 0.343 -0.009 0.437 0.437 -0.014 0.380 0.380 0.002 0.253 0.253
σ̂2 -0.018 0.179 0.180 5.337 169.987 170.071 0.022 0.441 0.442 -0.016 0.127 0.128
0.85 0.85 β̂s 0.470 4.158 4.276 0.002 2.997 2.997 0.046 2.933 2.934 0.171 1.574 1.617
β̂o 0.014 0.639 0.639 0.093 0.976 1.010 0.105 0.671 0.703 0.011 0.554 0.554
λ̂s -0.709 0.785 1.058 -1.182 0.698 1.373 -1.130 0.709 1.334 -0.024 0.091 0.094
λ̂o -0.517 0.723 0.888 -0.092 0.062 0.111 -0.083 0.054 0.099 -0.016 0.047 0.050
ρ̂ 0.132 0.355 0.379 -0.088 0.424 0.433 -0.117 0.407 0.424 -0.001 0.208 0.208
σ̂2 0.311 0.720 0.784 0.574 14.469 14.480 0.162 0.153 0.223 -0.012 0.167 0.167
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Table 4.A.5: Biases, standard deviations, and RMSEs of marginal effects estimates in the context of
the sample selection model with a spatial error in both the selection and outcome equations (2n = 344).
λs λo mfx(θ0) HMLE GMM GMM2 PMLE
bias sd rmse bias sd rmse bias sd rmse bias sd rmse
0.00 0.00 mfx1 0.193 0.001 0.016 0.016 0.004 0.020 0.021 0.005 0.022 0.022 0.001 0.016 0.016
mfx2 -0.193 0.000 0.014 0.014 -0.001 0.019 0.019 -0.002 0.021 0.021 0.000 0.014 0.014
mfx3 0.782 -0.010 0.086 0.087 -0.013 0.099 0.100 -0.011 0.097 0.098 -0.008 0.087 0.087
mfx4 -1.000 -0.000 0.047 0.047 0.000 0.047 0.047 -0.000 0.048 0.048 0.000 0.047 0.047
0.00 0.40 mfx1 0.193 -0.001 0.016 0.016 0.002 0.023 0.023 0.004 0.024 0.025 -0.001 0.016 0.016
mfx2 -0.193 -0.000 0.014 0.014 -0.001 0.018 0.018 -0.003 0.019 0.020 -0.000 0.014 0.014
mfx3 0.776 -0.002 0.092 0.092 -0.002 0.193 0.193 -0.004 0.109 0.109 -0.001 0.089 0.089
mfx4 -1.000 -0.001 0.048 0.048 -0.001 0.048 0.048 -0.001 0.049 0.049 -0.001 0.047 0.047
0.00 0.85 mfx1 0.193 0.001 0.017 0.017 0.003 0.025 0.025 0.004 0.028 0.028 0.001 0.017 0.017
mfx2 -0.193 -0.000 0.014 0.014 -0.001 0.025 0.025 -0.002 0.026 0.026 -0.000 0.014 0.014
mfx3 0.722 0.006 0.140 0.140 0.038 0.145 0.149 0.053 0.164 0.172 0.006 0.118 0.118
mfx4 -1.000 -0.001 0.072 0.072 -0.001 0.077 0.077 0.000 0.087 0.087 0.000 0.059 0.059
0.40 0.00 mfx1 0.190 -0.001 0.017 0.017 0.001 0.023 0.023 0.002 0.024 0.024 -0.001 0.017 0.017
mfx2 -0.190 -0.000 0.016 0.016 -0.002 0.021 0.021 -0.003 0.023 0.023 -0.000 0.016 0.016
mfx3 0.794 -0.002 0.083 0.083 -0.005 0.109 0.109 -0.002 0.091 0.091 -0.000 0.083 0.083
mfx4 -1.000 -0.000 0.046 0.046 -0.000 0.047 0.047 -0.000 0.048 0.048 -0.000 0.047 0.047
0.40 0.40 mfx1 0.190 -0.001 0.018 0.018 0.002 0.026 0.026 0.004 0.027 0.027 -0.000 0.018 0.018
mfx2 -0.190 -0.000 0.015 0.015 -0.001 0.025 0.025 -0.002 0.027 0.027 -0.000 0.015 0.015
mfx3 0.780 -0.002 0.088 0.088 -0.008 0.097 0.098 -0.003 0.096 0.096 -0.001 0.088 0.088
mfx4 -1.000 -0.001 0.047 0.047 -0.001 0.048 0.048 -0.001 0.048 0.048 -0.001 0.046 0.046
0.40 0.85 mfx1 0.190 -0.001 0.018 0.018 0.004 0.029 0.029 0.004 0.028 0.029 -0.001 0.018 0.018
mfx2 -0.190 0.001 0.016 0.016 -0.000 0.026 0.026 -0.001 0.025 0.025 0.001 0.015 0.015
mfx3 0.700 0.009 0.139 0.140 0.043 0.212 0.216 0.067 0.132 0.148 0.009 0.122 0.122
mfx4 -1.000 -0.000 0.070 0.070 -0.001 0.074 0.074 -0.001 0.068 0.068 -0.001 0.058 0.058
0.85 0.00 mfx1 0.158 0.001 0.024 0.024 0.001 0.034 0.034 0.001 0.037 0.037 0.001 0.024 0.024
mfx2 -0.158 -0.001 0.023 0.023 0.000 0.033 0.033 -0.000 0.034 0.034 -0.001 0.022 0.022
mfx3 0.881 -0.007 0.076 0.077 -0.052 1.551 1.551 -0.003 0.105 0.105 -0.006 0.076 0.076
mfx4 -1.000 -0.002 0.047 0.047 0.005 0.240 0.240 -0.002 0.051 0.051 -0.002 0.047 0.047
0.85 0.40 mfx1 0.158 -0.001 0.025 0.025 -0.000 0.039 0.039 0.002 0.038 0.038 -0.001 0.024 0.024
mfx2 -0.158 -0.000 0.023 0.023 0.002 0.035 0.035 -0.000 0.034 0.034 -0.000 0.023 0.023
mfx3 0.862 -0.004 0.079 0.079 -0.030 0.855 0.856 -0.005 0.111 0.111 -0.003 0.076 0.076
mfx4 -1.000 0.002 0.047 0.047 0.007 0.178 0.178 0.001 0.048 0.048 0.002 0.046 0.046
0.85 0.85 mfx1 0.158 0.001 0.025 0.025 0.001 0.041 0.041 0.002 0.042 0.042 0.001 0.024 0.024
mfx2 -0.158 -0.000 0.022 0.022 0.002 0.045 0.045 0.001 0.039 0.039 -0.001 0.022 0.022
mfx3 0.764 0.002 0.126 0.126 0.045 0.494 0.496 0.046 0.118 0.127 -0.002 0.112 0.112
mfx4 -1.000 0.002 0.073 0.073 0.013 0.369 0.369 0.001 0.070 0.070 0.001 0.060 0.060
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Table 4.A.6: Biases and standard deviations of parameter estimates in the context of the sample
selection model with a spatial lag in both the selection and outcome equations under misspecification
of the distribution of the error terms (2n = 344).
normal t Weibull
λs λo bias s.d. bias s.d. bias s.d.
HMLE PMLE HMLE PMLE HMLE PMLE HMLE PMLE HMLE PMLE HMLE PMLE
0.00 0.00 β̂s 0.044 0.043 0.449 0.446 0.061 0.061 0.458 0.458 0.196 0.196 0.545 0.543
β̂o 0.006 0.005 0.255 0.255 0.003 0.003 0.251 0.251 0.026 0.026 0.292 0.291
λ̂s -0.012 -0.014 0.147 0.141 -0.006 -0.006 0.137 0.134 -0.008 -0.010 0.134 0.129
λ̂o -0.002 -0.004 0.099 0.092 -0.001 -0.002 0.098 0.091 -0.006 -0.007 0.104 0.096
ρ̂ -0.004 -0.005 0.204 0.204 -0.013 -0.012 0.214 0.213 0.114 0.114 0.232 0.230
σ̂2 -0.006 -0.005 0.111 0.111 -0.023 -0.022 0.125 0.125 0.128 0.129 0.156 0.155
0.00 0.40 β̂s 0.041 0.040 0.442 0.441 0.063 0.063 0.465 0.462 0.189 0.188 0.523 0.521
β̂o 0.002 0.001 0.234 0.230 0.001 0.002 0.237 0.232 0.007 0.006 0.272 0.270
λ̂s -0.012 -0.012 0.141 0.135 -0.009 -0.009 0.141 0.133 -0.006 -0.006 0.126 0.122
λ̂o -0.008 -0.008 0.078 0.070 -0.000 -0.002 0.075 0.069 -0.012 -0.013 0.079 0.070
ρ̂ -0.014 -0.011 0.224 0.217 -0.010 -0.010 0.220 0.218 0.106 0.104 0.238 0.236
σ̂2 -0.012 -0.008 0.123 0.119 -0.029 -0.025 0.136 0.132 0.117 0.120 0.170 0.166
0.00 0.85 β̂s 0.045 0.044 0.459 0.452 0.089 0.093 0.475 0.470 0.214 0.215 0.520 0.518
β̂o 0.009 0.005 0.368 0.284 0.006 0.008 0.417 0.286 0.009 0.004 0.396 0.302
λ̂s -0.004 -0.003 0.142 0.131 -0.008 -0.010 0.139 0.133 -0.003 -0.006 0.135 0.128
λ̂o -0.004 -0.005 0.086 0.030 -0.008 -0.006 0.127 0.057 -0.007 -0.008 0.088 0.031
ρ̂ -0.012 -0.011 0.305 0.230 0.001 -0.002 0.301 0.238 0.043 0.035 0.298 0.256
σ̂2 -0.109 -0.064 0.280 0.174 -0.106 -0.073 0.343 0.232 -0.019 0.027 0.335 0.210
0.40 0.00 β̂s 0.048 0.047 0.413 0.411 0.064 0.062 0.426 0.425 0.159 0.159 0.502 0.500
β̂o 0.003 0.003 0.252 0.252 0.002 0.002 0.243 0.243 0.021 0.020 0.290 0.287
λ̂s -0.008 -0.010 0.102 0.097 -0.009 -0.009 0.105 0.100 0.002 0.001 0.097 0.092
λ̂o -0.007 -0.007 0.095 0.089 -0.004 -0.003 0.098 0.090 0.006 0.005 0.103 0.096
ρ̂ -0.002 -0.001 0.209 0.208 -0.004 -0.004 0.217 0.216 0.118 0.117 0.236 0.233
σ̂2 -0.012 -0.010 0.105 0.104 -0.025 -0.024 0.124 0.124 0.123 0.123 0.158 0.158
0.40 0.40 β̂s 0.034 0.034 0.426 0.424 0.071 0.071 0.451 0.447 0.165 0.165 0.505 0.503
β̂o 0.004 0.006 0.237 0.231 0.003 0.003 0.234 0.227 0.003 0.003 0.269 0.263
λ̂s -0.004 -0.005 0.099 0.092 -0.006 -0.008 0.099 0.096 0.001 -0.000 0.090 0.087
λ̂o -0.003 -0.004 0.074 0.068 -0.002 -0.003 0.073 0.065 -0.004 -0.005 0.077 0.069
ρ̂ -0.004 -0.002 0.204 0.197 -0.008 -0.003 0.212 0.200 0.105 0.104 0.220 0.214
σ̂2 -0.018 -0.014 0.123 0.116 -0.034 -0.031 0.130 0.124 0.100 0.104 0.157 0.150
0.40 0.85 β̂s 0.036 0.038 0.422 0.415 0.062 0.064 0.436 0.428 0.183 0.182 0.499 0.492
β̂o 0.012 0.004 0.357 0.282 0.004 0.015 0.374 0.288 0.007 0.016 0.397 0.304
λ̂s -0.000 -0.004 0.105 0.097 -0.004 -0.009 0.099 0.094 0.007 0.003 0.093 0.089
λ̂o -0.005 -0.005 0.101 0.029 -0.002 -0.004 0.086 0.029 -0.007 -0.008 0.102 0.031
ρ̂ -0.020 -0.001 0.292 0.207 -0.029 0.002 0.314 0.228 0.050 0.062 0.285 0.222
σ̂2 -0.101 -0.061 0.327 0.171 -0.114 -0.065 0.316 0.175 -0.024 0.033 0.368 0.203
0.85 0.00 β̂s 0.125 0.111 0.693 0.641 0.141 0.128 0.671 0.634 0.176 0.168 0.724 0.685
β̂o 0.003 0.002 0.229 0.227 0.004 0.004 0.228 0.226 0.019 0.017 0.264 0.259
λ̂s -0.002 -0.004 0.053 0.047 -0.002 -0.005 0.051 0.045 -0.004 -0.005 0.050 0.045
λ̂o -0.005 -0.005 0.106 0.097 -0.006 -0.006 0.104 0.094 0.004 0.002 0.110 0.097
ρ̂ 0.037 0.027 0.242 0.226 0.025 0.020 0.256 0.239 0.100 0.090 0.275 0.255
σ̂2 -0.012 -0.011 0.099 0.100 -0.016 -0.015 0.123 0.122 0.082 0.083 0.143 0.142
0.85 0.40 β̂s 0.121 0.108 0.697 0.646 0.142 0.128 0.707 0.668 0.189 0.183 0.759 0.722
β̂o 0.001 0.000 0.238 0.229 0.002 0.003 0.225 0.219 0.008 0.007 0.256 0.244
λ̂s -0.002 -0.004 0.051 0.045 -0.000 -0.003 0.051 0.046 -0.002 -0.004 0.050 0.045
λ̂o -0.006 -0.005 0.081 0.072 -0.002 -0.003 0.075 0.067 -0.000 -0.001 0.082 0.071
ρ̂ 0.009 0.006 0.252 0.231 0.009 0.006 0.252 0.232 0.077 0.073 0.277 0.250
σ̂2 -0.021 -0.019 0.116 0.109 -0.030 -0.027 0.135 0.129 0.075 0.077 0.149 0.142
0.85 0.85 β̂s 0.117 0.102 0.706 0.625 0.137 0.121 0.701 0.655 0.190 0.181 0.741 0.693
β̂o 0.013 0.004 0.418 0.273 0.000 0.014 0.399 0.269 0.011 0.010 0.372 0.281
λ̂s 0.002 -0.003 0.049 0.044 -0.001 -0.005 0.051 0.045 0.004 -0.000 0.048 0.044
λ̂o -0.012 -0.007 0.140 0.028 -0.008 -0.006 0.101 0.031 -0.006 -0.006 0.103 0.030
ρ̂ -0.075 -0.014 0.322 0.232 -0.053 -0.002 0.320 0.227 -0.000 0.041 0.325 0.240
σ̂2 -0.111 -0.065 0.323 0.155 -0.095 -0.057 0.356 0.173 -0.055 0.002 0.329 0.187
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Table 4.A.7: RMSEs of parameter estimates in the context of the sample selection model with a spatial
lag in both the selection and outcome equations under misspecification of the distribution of the error
terms (2n = 344).
λs λo normal t Weibull
HMLE PMLE HMLE PMLE HMLE PMLE
0.00 0.00 β̂s 0.459 0.456 0.483 0.482 0.658 0.656
β̂o 0.255 0.255 0.251 0.251 0.313 0.312
λ̂s 0.147 0.141 0.137 0.135 0.134 0.130
λ̂o 0.099 0.092 0.098 0.091 0.104 0.097
ρ̂ 0.204 0.204 0.214 0.213 0.259 0.257
σ̂2 0.112 0.111 0.127 0.127 0.202 0.202
0.00 0.40 β̂s 0.451 0.449 0.494 0.491 0.632 0.630
β̂o 0.234 0.230 0.237 0.232 0.285 0.281
λ̂s 0.141 0.135 0.141 0.133 0.126 0.122
λ̂o 0.078 0.071 0.075 0.069 0.080 0.072
ρ̂ 0.224 0.217 0.221 0.219 0.260 0.258
σ̂2 0.123 0.119 0.139 0.135 0.206 0.205
0.00 0.85 β̂s 0.469 0.462 0.510 0.509 0.679 0.677
β̂o 0.370 0.284 0.418 0.286 0.397 0.303
λ̂s 0.142 0.131 0.139 0.133 0.135 0.128
λ̂o 0.086 0.031 0.127 0.057 0.088 0.032
ρ̂ 0.305 0.230 0.301 0.238 0.301 0.258
σ̂2 0.300 0.185 0.359 0.243 0.335 0.212
0.40 0.00 β̂s 0.427 0.425 0.460 0.457 0.598 0.595
β̂o 0.252 0.252 0.243 0.244 0.312 0.310
λ̂s 0.102 0.098 0.105 0.100 0.097 0.092
λ̂o 0.095 0.089 0.098 0.090 0.103 0.097
ρ̂ 0.209 0.208 0.217 0.216 0.264 0.261
σ̂2 0.105 0.105 0.126 0.126 0.200 0.200
0.40 0.40 β̂s 0.436 0.433 0.482 0.479 0.614 0.612
β̂o 0.238 0.231 0.234 0.227 0.283 0.277
λ̂s 0.099 0.092 0.099 0.096 0.090 0.087
λ̂o 0.074 0.068 0.073 0.065 0.077 0.069
ρ̂ 0.204 0.197 0.213 0.200 0.243 0.237
σ̂2 0.124 0.117 0.134 0.128 0.186 0.183
0.40 0.85 β̂s 0.436 0.431 0.466 0.459 0.643 0.637
β̂o 0.358 0.283 0.375 0.289 0.398 0.307
λ̂s 0.105 0.097 0.099 0.094 0.093 0.089
λ̂o 0.101 0.029 0.086 0.029 0.102 0.031
ρ̂ 0.292 0.207 0.316 0.228 0.289 0.231
σ̂2 0.342 0.181 0.336 0.187 0.368 0.206
0.85 0.00 β̂s 0.788 0.723 0.768 0.717 0.873 0.825
β̂o 0.229 0.227 0.228 0.226 0.271 0.265
λ̂s 0.053 0.047 0.051 0.045 0.050 0.045
λ̂o 0.106 0.097 0.104 0.094 0.110 0.097
ρ̂ 0.244 0.227 0.257 0.240 0.292 0.270
σ̂2 0.100 0.100 0.124 0.123 0.165 0.165
0.85 0.40 β̂s 0.783 0.721 0.802 0.750 0.905 0.863
β̂o 0.238 0.230 0.225 0.219 0.258 0.247
λ̂s 0.051 0.045 0.051 0.046 0.050 0.046
λ̂o 0.081 0.072 0.075 0.067 0.082 0.071
ρ̂ 0.252 0.231 0.252 0.232 0.287 0.260
σ̂2 0.117 0.111 0.138 0.131 0.167 0.162
0.85 0.85 β̂s 0.788 0.692 0.791 0.729 0.905 0.846
β̂o 0.420 0.274 0.400 0.270 0.373 0.282
λ̂s 0.050 0.044 0.051 0.046 0.048 0.044
λ̂o 0.141 0.029 0.101 0.031 0.104 0.031
ρ̂ 0.331 0.232 0.324 0.227 0.325 0.244
σ̂2 0.342 0.168 0.369 0.182 0.333 0.187
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Table 4.A.8: Empirical sizes of the z-tests with the null hypotheses that the parameters are
equal to the corresponding true values in the context of the sample selection model with a
spatial lag in both the selection and outcome equations (2n = 344).











s λ̂o ρ̂ σ̂2
0.00 0.00 5.00 5.30 3.80 5.30 6.30 4.80 7.10 5.40 10.30 6.50
0.00 0.40 5.20 5.70 5.50 5.10 5.40 5.30 5.10 5.90 11.00 7.00
0.00 0.85 5.20 6.20 5.60 5.50 5.60 5.30 5.50 7.70 9.50 10.40
0.40 0.00 3.80 4.00 4.50 5.10 6.10 5.60 6.50 4.70 11.20 6.40
0.40 0.40 4.50 5.10 4.90 4.90 5.70 5.60 3.90 5.60 10.30 7.00
0.40 0.85 4.70 4.60 4.10 6.50 6.50 7.40 5.70 6.00 8.10 10.00
0.85 0.00 6.80 5.80 5.70 5.00 4.10 5.40 9.40 5.10 8.00 5.10
0.85 0.40 5.70 4.80 6.00 5.60 4.90 5.80 7.10 5.70 10.50 6.30
0.85 0.85 4.30 4.30 4.10 6.40 5.70 6.60 6.30 5.40 8.30 9.30
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Appendix 4.B Some Additional Notation
If A is a matrix, Diag(A) indicates a square diagonal matrix with the diagonal ele-
ments of A on the main diagonal of Diag(A), while diag(A) denotes a vector of the
diagonal elements in A. If a is a vector, then Diag(a) indicates a square diagonal ma-
trix with the elements of vector a on the main diagonal. If τ1 and τ2 are scalars, then
Diag{τ1, τ2} denotes a diagonal matrix with τ1, τ2 on the main diagonal. For some con-
stant k, Diag(·)k := (Diag(·))k. For some matrix A, maxeig(A) and mineig(A) denote
the maximum and minimum eigenvalue of A, respectively. If R and R11g,n(θ) are correla-





constants C1, C2, . . . , which can be different in different places.
Appendix 4.C Likelihood Function and Marginal Effects
4.C.1 The likelihood function
There are four scenarios: ysg1,n = 1 and y
s
g2,n = 0, y
s
g1,n = 0 and y
s





and ysg1,n = y
s
g2,n = 0. We derive the log-likelihood contribution based on the third
scenario, while for the other scenarios it can be done in a similar way. Let f(·) with-
out any index denote a generic density function. Then the Bayes rule and Assumption
2(ii) imply that d11g,nf(y
s
g,n = ι2, y
o
g,n|Xsn, Xon) = d11g,nf(ysg,n = ι2, y∗og,n|Xsn, Xon) = P [ysg,n =




g,n|Xon) = d11g,nφ2(y∗og,n−Sog·,n(λo)Xonβo,Ωoog,n(θ)) = d11g,nφ2(yog,n−Sog·,n(λo)Xonβo,Ωoog,n(θ)).
Next,




s) > 0|y∗og,n, Xsn, Xon]
= P [−εsg,n(λs) < Ssg·,n(λs)Xsnβs|εog,n(λo), Xsn, Xon]
= P [−εsg,n(λs) < S̃sg·,n(λs)Xsnβs|εog,n(λo), Xsn, Xon],





g,n(θ) in Section 4.3 with ζg,n = ι2, note that
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Thus, −εsg,n(λs)|εog,n(λo), Xsn, Xon ∼ N (Ω̃sog,n(θ)Ωoo−1g,n (θ)εog,n(λo),Σ11g,n(θ)), where Σ11g,n(θ) =
Ω̃ssg,n(θ) − Ω̃sog,n(θ) Ωoo−1g,n (θ)Ω̃so
′
g,n(θ). Substituting for ε
o
g,n(λ
o) from model (4.3) and inter-
changing y∗og,n and y
o
g,n as before, the likelihood contribution equals
d11g,nP [y
s
















g,n−Sog·,n(λo)Xonβo). The result in (4.4) follows by not-
ing that zg,n(θ) = y
o
g,n − Sog·,n(λo)Xonβo and v11g,n(θ) = Diag(Σ11g,n(θ))−1/2(S̃sg·,n(λs)Xsnβs−
µ11g,n(θ)). The log-likelihood contributions based on the other scenarios can be obtained
similarly, see (4.4).
4.C.2 Marginal effects
Spatial lag model. Let P [ys = 1|Xsn] =
(
P [ys1,n = 1|Xsn], . . . , P [ys2n,n = 1|Xsn]
)′
. Then








0l is a matrix of marginal effects associated






















LeSage and Pace (2009) propose to use three types of marginal effects for a spatial
lag model: total ((∂P [ys = 1|Xsn]/∂Xs
′




indirect that is equal to the difference of the first two marginal effects; ι2n denotes here
the 2n-dimensional vector of ones. The average total, average direct, and average indirect
effects are obtained by calculating the averages of these vectors.
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Next, note that



















































































where the third equality follows by Theorem 24.5 of Greene (2008), which states that if
y and z have a bivariate normal distribution with means µy and µz, standard deviations
σy and σz, and correlation coefficient ρ, then E[y|z > a] = µy + ρσyφ(αz)/(1 − Φ(αz))
with αz = (a− µz)/σz. Thus, the marginal effect of E[y∗oi,n|ysi,n = 1, Xsn, Xon] with respect
to Xo·l,n depends on whether the explanatory variable is present in both the selection and
outcome equations or only in one. Without loss of generality, let the first L1 explanatory
variables be the same in both the selection and outcome equations and ordered in the





E[y∗o1,n|ys1,n = 1, Xsn, Xon], . . . , E[y∗o2n,n|ys2n,n = 1, Xsn, Xon]
)′
.
Case 1. l ≤ L1:
Let


































Case 2. l > L1:
Now the exogenous variable is present only in the outcome equation, thus the formula
simplifies:
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The total, direct, and indirect marginal effects for both cases are obtained analogously
to ∂P [ys = 1|Xsn]/∂Xs
′
·l,n.
Spatial error model. In the spatial error case, the indirect marginal effects are equal to
zero. It is thus enough to consider the marginal effects with respect to “own” exogenous
variables:











Ωssii,n(θ0). As before, the marginal effect
of E[y∗oi,n|ysi,n = 1, Xsi·,n, Xoi·,n] with respect to Xoil,n depends on whether the explanatory
variable is in both equations or only in one.
Case 1. l ≤ L1:
∂E[y∗oi,n|ysi,n = 1, Xsi·,n, Xoi·,n]
∂Xoil,n














Case 2. l > L1:
∂E[y∗oi,n|ysi,n = 1, Xsi·,n, Xoi·,n]
∂Xoil,n
= βo0l.
Appendix 4.D Some Theorems and Technical Lemmas
The appendix contains important theorems as well as several technical lemmas, which
will be used later to prove lemmas and theorems in Appendices 4.E and 4.F. The proofs
of Lemmas 4.D.5–4.D.10 are provided in supplementary Appendix 4.I.
Theorem 4.D.1 (Follows from Theorem 1 of Jenish and Prucha, 2012). Under Assump-
tion 3, if
(i) {Zg,n}g∈Gn is uniformly L1-NED on an α-mixing random field {ηg,n}g∈Gn,
(ii) Zg,n is Lp-bounded uniformly in n ∈ N and g ∈ Gn, for some p > 1,
(iii) the α-mixing coefficients of the input process {ηg,n}g∈Gn satisfy ᾱ(k,m, s) ≤ (k +
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Theorem 4.D.2 (Follows from Proposition 3 of Jenish and Prucha, 2012). Consider
transformations of Zg,n given by a family of functions hg,n : RKZ → RKh. Suppose that,
for all (z, z•) ∈ RKZ × RKZ and all g ∈ Gn and n ∈ N,













(v) {Zg,n}g∈Gn is L2-NED of size −λ on {ηg,n}g∈Gn with scaling factors {tg,n}g∈Gn.






∥∥B(s)g,n‖Zg,n − Z(s)g,n‖∥∥r/(2r−2)r .
Theorem 4.D.3 (Follows from Corollary 1 of Jenish and Prucha, 2012). For KZ-
dimensional random vectors Zg,n, g ∈ Gn, let Sn =
∑





Under Assumption 3, if
(i) {Zg,n}g∈Gn is a zero mean random field,
(ii) Zg,n is uniformly L2+δ-bounded, for some δ > 0,
(iii) {Zg,n}g∈Gn is L2-NED random field on an α-mixing random field {ηg,n}g∈Gn with
NED coefficients ψ(s) and NED scaling factors {tg,n}g∈Gn,




(v) NED scaling factors satisfy sup
n,g
tg,n <∞,
(vi) the α-mixing coefficients of {ηg,n}g∈Gn satisfy ᾱ(k,m, s) ≤ (k +m)τ α̂(s), for some












d−→ N (0, IKZ ) as n→∞.
Theorem 4.D.4 (Follows from Theorem 17.8 of Davidson, 1994). Let for some p ≥ 1,
‖Xg,n − E[Xg,n|Fg,n(s)]‖p ≤ tXg,nψX(s) and ‖Yg,n − E[Yg,n|Fg,n(s)]‖p ≤ tYg,nψY (s). Then
‖Xg,n+Yg,n−E[Xg,n+Yg,n|Fg,n(s)]‖p ≤ tg,nψ(s), where tg,n = max{tXg,n, tYg,n} and ψ(s) =
ψX(s) + ψY (s).
Specifically, if {Xg,n}g∈Gn and {Yg,n}g∈Gn are uniform Lp-NED random fields, then
{Xg,n + Yg,n}g∈Gn is a uniform Lp-NED random field as well.
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Lemma 4.D.5. Let v := v(θ) be a 2-dimensional vector, R := R(θ) be a 2 × 2 di-
mensional correlation matrix with the off-diagonal element ρ := ρ(θ), |ρ| < 1, and




















































where (keeping the dependence on θ implicit)





































































V ∼ N (0, R), Ṽ1 ∼ N (ρv2, 1− ρ2), Ṽ2 ∼ N (ρv1, 1− ρ2).
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Lemma 4.D.6. Let v and R be a 2-dimensional vector and a 2 × 2 dimensional cor-
relation matrix with the off-diagonal element ρ, |ρ| < 1, respectively. Then for some



























Φ2(0, R) ≥ C3(1− |ρ|)1/2.





















= 2L(θ)F−1(θ)f(θ) +M(θ)(f(θ)⊗ f(θ)),
∂2(f ′(θ)F−1(θ)f(θ))
∂θ∂θ′
= 2(f ′(θ)F−1(θ)⊗ Ip)
∂ vecL(θ)
∂θ′
+ 2(f ′(θ)⊗ L(θ))∂ vecF
−1(θ)
∂θ′
+ (f ′(θ)⊗ f ′(θ)⊗ Ip)
∂ vecM(θ)
∂θ′





















and K1n is the commutation matrix.
16
Lemma 4.D.8. Let A and B be m× n and p× q matrices. Then ‖A⊗B‖ = ‖A‖‖B‖.
Lemma 4.D.9. Let X ∼ N (0, R), where R is a 2 × 2 dimensional correlation matrix
with the off-diagonal element ρ, |ρ| < 1. Then for a 2-dimensional vector of constants
v = (v1, v2)
′,
E[XX ′|X ≤ v] = R− v1ξ1(v,R)A1(R)− v2ξ2(v,R)A2(R) + (1− ρ2)κ(v,R)A3(R),
16Let A be an m×n matrix. Then there exists a unique mn×mn permutation matrix which transforms





















Lemma 4.D.10. If for some p ≥ 1, ‖Xi,n − E[Xi,n|Fi,n(s)]‖2p ≤ tXi,nψX(s) and ‖Yi,n −
E[Yi,n|Fi,n(s)]‖2p ≤ tYi,nψY (s), then ‖Xi,nYi,n − E[Xi,nYi,n|Fi,n(s)]‖p ≤ ti,nψ(s), where
ti,n = max{‖Xi,n‖2ptYi,n, ‖Yi,n‖2ptXi,n, tXi,ntYi,n} and ψ(s) = ψX(s) + ψY (s) + ψX(s)ψY (s).
Specifically, if {Xi,n}ni=1 and {Yi,n}ni=1 are uniformly L2p-NED, then {Xi,nYi,n}ni=1 is uni-
formly Lp-NED.
Appendix 4.E Some Useful Lemmas
The appendix contains several lemmas that establish the uniform (Lp-) bounds and the
NED property of the random variables in the studied sample selection models. The proofs
of Lemmas 4.E.1–4.E.5 are provided in supplementary Appendix 4.J.
Lemma 4.E.1.









0, where b ∈ {ss, oo}.
(ii) Under Assumptions 1(ii) and 7, ‖Ωcg,n(θ)‖ and
∥∥∂ vec Ωcg,n(θ)/∂θ′∥∥ are uniformly
bounded in n ∈ N, g ∈ Gn, and θ ∈ Θ, where c ∈ {ss, so, oo}.
(iii) Under Assumptions 1(ii), 6, and 7, ‖Ωb−1g,n (θ)‖,
∥∥∂ vec Ωb−1g,n (θ)/∂θ′∥∥, and ∥∥∂|Ωbg,n(θ)|/∂θ∥∥
are uniformly bounded in n ∈ N, g ∈ Gn, and θ ∈ Θ, where b ∈ {ss, oo}.
Lemma 4.E.2.











(ii) Under Assumptions 1(ii), 6, and 7, ‖R11g,n(θ)‖,
∥∥∂|R11g,n(θ)|/∂θ∥∥, and ∥∥∥∂ vecR11−1g,n (θ)/∂θ′∥∥∥
are uniformly bounded in n ∈ N, g ∈ Gn, and θ ∈ Θ.
Lemma 4.E.3. Under Assumptions 1(ii), 2(i), 4(ii), 6, and 7, sup
θ∈Θ
‖Sbg·,n(λb)Xbnβb‖,






‖v11g,n(θ)‖ are Lp-bounded uniformly in
n ∈ N and g ∈ Gn, for any given p ≥ 1.





∥∥∂v11g,n(θ)/∂θ′∥∥ are Lp-bounded uniformly in n ∈ N and g ∈ Gn, for any given p ≥ 1.
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Lemma 4.E.5. Under Assumptions 1(ii), 2(i), 4(ii), 5, and 7, {d11g,n}g∈Gn, {zg,n(θn)}g∈Gn,
and {v11g,n(θn)}g∈Gn are uniformly L2-NED on random field {ηg,n = (Xsg·,n, Xog·,n, usg,n, uog,n)}g∈Gn
with NED coefficients ψ1/6(s), where ψ(s) is defined in Assumption 5 and θn → θ,
θn, θ ∈ Θ.
Appendix 4.F Proofs of Asymptotic Results
Proof of Theorem 1: We apply Theorem 2.1 of Newey and McFadden (1994). Let
Q0(θ) = limn→∞E[Qn(θ)]. It is sufficient to verify that (i) Q0(θ) is uniquely maximized
at θ0, (ii) Θ is compact, (iii) Q0(θ) is continuous, and (iv) Qn(θ) converges uniformly
in probability to Q0(θ). We have already assumed the first two conditions (Assumptions
7 and 8), thus it remains to show that the last two conditions are satisfied. In order to
prove uniform convergence in (iv), we apply Theorem 2 of Jenish and Prucha (2009),
which requires the uniform Lp-boundedness (LB), p > 1, and L0-stochastic equicontinu-
ity (SE) of the individual likelihood terms as well as the pointwise convergence (PC) in
probability; see the following paragraphs. As the bounds constructed to verify the uni-
form Lp-boundedness and L0-stochastic equicontinuity are uniform in g ∈ Gn, n ∈ N, and
θ ∈ Θ, it follows that the whole likelihood function Qn(θ) also satisfies these conditions
(once they are verified). The L0-stochastic equicontinuity along with the uniform conver-
gence verified for point (iv) below will then imply condition (iii), that is, the continuity
of Q0(θ), and therefore, will allow us to apply Theorem 2.1 of Newey and McFadden
(1994) and to claim the consistency of PMLE.




















































uniformly in n ∈ N and g ∈ Gn, where the first and second inequalities follow by the
triangle and Loève’s cr-inequalities, respectively, whereas the last inequality follows by
noting that dag,n ∈ {0, 1}.
We will show that sup
n,g
E[supθ∈Θ |f 11g,n(θ)|]p < ∞, while the boundedness of the other
terms can be proven in a similar way. By the definitions of f 11g,n(θ) in (4.4) and of the
multivariate normal density function,
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| ln 2π|p + sup
θ∈Θ
















where the result follows by the triangle and Loève’s cr-inequalities. The second and third
terms are uniformly bounded by Lemmas 4.E.1 and 4.E.3. Hence, only the last term has
to be shown to be uniformly bounded. Let ξ(·) be defined in the same way as in (4.D.1),
Lemma 4.D.5, with correlation matrix R11g,n(θ) and correlation coefficient ρ
11
g,n(θ), which
is the off-diagonal element of R11g,n(θ). Then by the elementwise mean value theorem,
there exists ṽ11g,n(θ) with elements between 0 and v
11
g,n(θ) and constants C1, . . . , C8 > 0
with C3, C6 ≥ 1 such that
| ln Φ2(v11g,n(θ), R11g,n(θ))|
≤ | ln Φ2(0, R11g,n(θ))|+



















≤ | ln(C1(1− |ρ11g,n(θ)|)1/2)|
+ C2(1− |ρ11g,n(θ)|)−7 (4.F.4)
×
(








≤ C4 + C5
(




≤ C4 + C5
(




≤ C4 + 2C5C6(|v11g1,n(θ)|+ |v11g2,n(θ)|+ C3)9
= C4 + 2C5C6(‖v11g,n(θ)‖1 + C3)9
≤ C4 + 29C5C6(‖v11g,n(θ)‖91 + C93) ≤ C7 + C8‖v11g,n(θ)‖9,
where Lemma 4.D.5 implies the first equality, the third inequality is implied by Lemma
4.D.6, whereas the fourth inequality follows from Lemma 4.E.2. The conclusion follows
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g,n(θ) is L0-stochastically equicontinuous
The L0-stochastic equicontinuity will be verified using Proposition 1 of Jenish and Prucha
(2009). To apply it, we have to show that the individual likelihood terms are Lipschitz


























∥∥∥∥ · ‖θ − θ•‖,
where we used the elementwise mean value theorem with elements of θ̃ being between







∞ for some p ≥ 1. Similarly to (4.F.1), Loève’s cr-inequality implies that it is enough to







for all a ∈ A. As before, we establish this result for ∂f 11g,n(θ)/∂θ, while the boundedness



















































The first term on the right hand side is uniformly bounded by Lemma 4.E.1. To bound
the second term on the right hand side of (4.F.6), we apply Lemma 4.D.7:
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uniformly in n ∈ N and g ∈ Gn, where the first inequality is implied by Lemma 4.D.8 and
Loève’s cr-inequality. The conclusion follows by applying the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality
to E [supθ∈Θ(‖∂zg,n(θ)/∂θ′‖‖zg,n(θ)‖)]
p and observing that E [supθ∈Θ ‖∂zg,n(θ)/∂θ′‖]
2p
and E [supθ∈Θ ‖zg,n(θ)‖]
2p are uniformly bounded by Lemmas 4.E.4 and 4.E.3, respec-
tively, while the norms of Ωoo−1g,n (θ) and ∂ vec Ω
oo−1
g,n (θ)/∂θ
′ are uniformly bounded by
Lemma 4.E.1.
Finally, by Lemma 4.D.5, the last term in (4.F.6) can be bounded (all symbols defined























































uniformly in n ∈ N and g ∈ Gn, where P (v,R11g,n(θ)) = v′R11
−1
g,n (θ)v and V ∼ N (0, R11g,n(θ)).17
Now we will prove that each term in (4.F.8) is uniformly bounded. By the Cauchy-
17We use V instead of V 11g,n(θ) in order to simplify the notation.
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g,n(θ)) ≤ C1+C2‖v11g,n(θ)‖8 for some
constants C1, C2 > 0.
18 Thus for (4.F.9) to be uniformly bounded, it is enough to show
that E[supθ∈Θ ‖v11g,n(θ)‖]16p and E[supθ∈Θ ‖∂v11g,n(θ)/∂θ′‖]2p are uniformly bounded, which
is the case by Lemmas 4.E.3 and 4.E.4, respectively. The second term on the right hand
side of (4.F.8) is uniformly bounded because infn,g |R11g,n(θ)| = infn,g(1−ρ11
2
g,n(θ)) > 0 and
supn,g supθ∈Θ ‖∂|R11g,n(θ)|/∂θ‖ <∞ by Lemma 4.E.2. Regarding the last term in (4.F.8),
it is not difficult to see from Lemma 4.D.7 on the first order derivative of a quadratic




























∥∥∥∥∥∥∥EV [V V ′|V ≤ v11g,n(θ)]∥∥
≤ C3
∥∥EV [V V ′|V ≤ v11g,n(θ)]∥∥
= C3‖R11g,n(θ)− v11g1,n(θ)ξ1(v11g,n(θ), R11g,n(θ))A1(R11g,n(θ))− v11g2,n(θ)ξ2(v11g,n(θ), R11g,n(θ))A2(R11g,n(θ))
+ (1− ρ112g,n(θ))κ(v11g,n(θ), R11g,n(θ))A3(R11g,n(θ))‖
≤ C4
[
C5 + |v11g1,n(θ)ξ1(v11g,n(θ), R11g,n(θ))|+ |v11g2,n(θ)ξ2(v11g,n(θ), R11g,n(θ))|+ κ(v11g,n(θ), R11g,n(θ))
]
(4.F.10)
for some constants C3, C4, C5 > 0, where the last equality follows by Lemma 4.D.9 and
its notation: recall that V ∼ N (0, R11g,n(θ)) and 2× 2 matrices A1(R11g,n(θ)), A2(R11g,n(θ)),
and A3(R
11
g,n(θ)) are functions of ρ
11











g,n(θ)). It remains to show that
the supremum of the last expression in (4.F.10) with respect to θ ∈ Θ is uniformly
18Note that the numbering of constants is renewed for each part of the proof.
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(|v11g1,n(θ)|+ |v11g2,n(θ)|+ C7)2 + C9
]p
<∞
uniformly in n ∈ N and g ∈ Gn, where the conclusion follows from Lemma 4.E.3 in
the same way as in (4.F.3). This concludes the proof that (4.F.8) and thus (4.F.6) are
uniformly bounded. The SE property thus follows from Proposition 1 of Jenish and
Prucha (2009).










) p−→ 0 as n→∞ for θ ∈ Θ
In order to establish the pointwise convergence, we apply Theorem 4.D.1. As before,
we will establish the result only for d11g,nf
11
g,n(θ); the remaining terms can be analyzed
analogously. We start by proving that the individual likelihood terms are L1-NED on







− ln 2π − 1
2
(









Given that Ωoog,n(θ) is non-stochastic and its determinant is uniformly bounded away
from zero by Lemma 4.E.1, it suffices to establish the L2-NED property for {d11g,n}g∈Gn ,
{z′g,n(θ)Ωoo−1g,n (θ)zg,n(θ)}g∈Gn , and {ln Φ2(v11g,n(θ), R11g,n(θ))}g∈Gn and apply Theorem 4.D.4
and Lemma 4.D.10. In Lemma 4.E.5, we have shown that {d11g,n}g∈Gn is a uniform L2-NED
random field. Now we will apply Theorem 4.D.2 to the remaining two random fields.
Let z
(s)
g,n(θ) = E[zg,n(θ)|Fg,n(s)]. Then by the elementwise mean value theorem, there
exists z̃
(s)











g,n(θ)| ≤ ‖2Ωoo−1g,n (θ)z̃(s)g,n(θ)‖‖zg,n(θ)− z(s)g,n(θ)‖.









g,n(θ)‖zg,n(θ)−z(s)g,n(θ)‖‖r are uniformly bounded,
for some r > 2. Since the elements of z̃
(s)





















elements in [0, 1] irrespectively of s, g, n, and θ, it holds that
sup
s























for some constant C3 > 0 uniformly in n ∈ N and g ∈ Gn by Lemmas 4.E.1 and 4.E.3,

































for some constant C4 > 0. Since









uniformly in n ∈ N and g ∈ Gn by Lemmas 4.E.1 and 4.E.3, condition (iv) of Theorem
4.D.2 is fulfilled. As {zg,n(θ)}g∈Gn is a uniform L2-NED random field by Lemma 4.E.5,
it follows that {z′g,n(θ)Ωoo−1g,n (θ)zg,n(θ)}g∈Gn is a uniform L2-NED random field as well.
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Similarly, let v
11(s)
g,n (θ) = E[v11g,n(θ)|Fg,n(s)] and verify the conditions of Theorem 4.D.2
again. By the elementwise mean value theorem, there exists ṽ
11(s)
g,n (θ) between v11g,n(θ) and
v
11(s)
g,n (θ) such that









‖ṽ11(s)g,n (θ)‖8 + C6
)
‖v11g,n(θ)− v11(s)g,n (θ)‖
for some constants C5, C6 > 0, where the last inequality follows from Lemmas 4.D.5,
4.D.6, and 4.E.2 by the same argument as in (4.F.3). To bound ‖ṽ11(s)g,n (θ)‖8 to verify




8g,n(θ) the 2 × 2 diagonal matri-
ces with elements in [0, 1] such that ṽ
11(s)





































is bounded uniformly in n ∈ N and g ∈ Gn for some constant C9 > 0 by Lemma 4.E.3.
Next, condition (iii) of Theorem 4.D.2 can be verified for some r > 2 and some constant























































E‖v11g,n(θ)‖r + E‖v11(s)g,n (θ)‖r
)














uniformly in n ∈ N and g ∈ Gn by Lemma 4.E.3, where the second and third inequalities
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are implied by Loève’s cr-inequality, while the fourth inequality follows by the conditional
Jensen’s inequality. Finally, condition (iv) of Theorem 4.D.2 can be verified in the same




< ∞, which is the
case by Lemma 4.E.3. As we have shown in Lemma 4.E.5 that {v11g,n(θ)}g∈Gn is a uniform
L2-NED random field, {ln Φ2(v11g,n(θ), R11g,n(θ))}g∈Gn is a uniform L2-NED random field as
well. Thus, by Theorem 4.D.4 and Lemma 4.D.10, it follows that {d11g,nf 11g,n(θ)}g∈Gn is a
uniform L1-NED random field.
Hence, condition (i) of Theorem 4.D.1 is satisfied, whereas condition (ii) is already
verified in the beginning of the proof; condition (iii) is implied by Assumptions 2(i),
2(ii), and 4(i). Since convergence in probability follows from convergence in L1-norm,
Theorem 4.D.1 thus implies the pointwise convergence result.
Proof of Theorem 2: By the elementwise mean value theorem, there exists θ̃n with











Once we show that ∂2Qn(θ̃n)/∂θ∂θ
′ p−→ H(θ0) as n→∞, Assumption 12 will imply that,
with a probability arbitrarily close to 1 as n→∞, ∂2Qn(θ̃n)/∂θ∂θ′ is non-singular and
it holds that
√










Therefore to prove the claim of the theorem, we will first establish that the term
√
n∂Qn(θ0)/∂θ converges in distribution to N (0, J(θ0)) as n → ∞, and we will later
show that ∂2Qn(θ̃n)/∂θ∂θ















d−→ N (0, J(θ0)) as n→∞
We apply Theorem 4.D.3. The individual score components have mean zero because
the marginal likelihood contributions for each group are correctly specified. The re-
maining assumptions of Theorem 4.D.3 concerning L2+δ-boundedness (δ > 0) and NED
properties are verified at a general θ ∈ Θ, but they are applied at θ = θ0.
By Loève’s cr-inequality and d
a
g,n, a ∈ A, being an indicator function, the indi-








<∞ for some δ > 0. The result for a = 11 is a special
case of the uniform boundedness of (4.F.6) verified in the proof of Theorem 1, property
SE; the boundedness of the other terms can be proven in a similar way.
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Now we establish that {d11g,n∂f 11g,n(θ)/∂θ}g∈Gn is a uniform L2-NED random field on



























By Theorem 4.D.4, it suffices to show that each term of the summation is uniformly
L2-NED and to find their NED coefficients. We have already established in Lemma
4.E.5 that {d11g,n}g∈Gn is a uniform L2-NED random field with NED coefficients ψ1/6(s),
where ψ(s) is defined in Assumption 5. Since |Ωoog,n(θ)| is uniformly bounded away from
zero and the norm of ∂|Ωoog,n(θ)|/∂θ is uniformly bounded by Lemma 4.E.1, the first
term in (4.F.11) is uniformly L2-NED with NED coefficients ψ
1/6(s). For the second
and third terms in (4.F.11), we apply Theorem 4.D.2. Let d
11(s)
g,n = E[d11g,n|Fg,n(s)] and
z
(s)




















|d11g,n − d11(s)g,n |+




















































|d11g,n − d11(s)g,n |+ ‖zg,n(θ)− z(s)g,n(θ)‖
)
,
where the second inequality follows by the elementwise mean value theorem with elements
of z̃
(s)
g,n(θ) being between elements of zg,n(θ) and z
(s)
g,n(θ).
By the Cauchy-Schwartz, Minkowski’s, and Liapunov’s inequalities, conditions (ii)
and (iii) of Theorem 4.D.2 are fulfilled if
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g,n ‖2r, and ‖zg,n(θ) − z(s)g,n(θ)‖2r are uniformly bounded for some r > 2. The
boundedness of the first term can be proven in the same way as in (4.F.7) with an
additional application of the conditional Jensen’s inequality. Given the second order













g,n is uniformly L2r-bounded as well, while
the L2r-boundedness of
zg,n(θ)− z(s)g,n(θ)
follows from Minkowski’s and the conditional Jensen’s inequalities and Lemma 4.E.3.




g,n (θ)zg,n(θ))/∂θ follows in the same
way as in (4.F.7), condition (iv) of Theorem 4.D.2 is fulfilled. Furthermore, since {d11g,n}g∈Gn
and {zg,n(θ)}g∈Gn are uniform L2-NED random fields with NED coefficients ψ1/6(s) by
Lemma 4.E.5, Theorem 4.D.2 implies that the second term in (4.F.11) is uniformly L2-
NED with NED coefficients ψ(r−2)/(12r−12)(s) for some r > 2.
Regarding the last term in (4.F.11), it follows similarly with v
11(s)
g,n (θ) = E[v11g,n(θ)|Fg,n(s)]





















× (|d11g,n − d11(s)g,n |+ ‖v11g,n(θ)− v11(s)g,n (θ)‖)
with elements of ṽ
11(s)
g,n (θ) lying between elements of v11g,n(θ) and v
11(s)
g,n (θ). Analogously to









′ and d11g,n − d
11(s)
g,n , v11g,n(θ) − v
11(s)
g,n (θ) are uniformly L4r-
and L2r-bounded, respectively. Given Lemmas 4.D.5 and 4.D.6, the boundedness of the
first term has been established in the proof of Theorem 1, property SE, and the bound-
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edness of the second term can be established analogously. The third term is obviously
uniformly L2r-bounded, while the uniform L2r-boundedness of the fourth term again
follows from Minkowski’s and the conditional Jensen’s inequalities and Lemma 4.E.3.
Given that {dg,n}g∈Gn and {v11g,n(θ)}g∈Gn are uniform L2-NED random fields with NED
coefficients ψ1/6(s) by Lemma 4.E.5, {d11g,n∂ ln Φ2(v11g,n(θ), R11g,n(θ))/∂θ}g∈Gn is a uniform
L2-NED random field with NED coefficients ψ
(r−2)/(12r−12)(s) by Theorem 4.D.2 for some
r > 2. Further, it follows from Theorem 4.D.4 that
{d11g,n∂f 11g,n(θ)/∂θ}g∈Gn
is a uniform L2-NED random field with NED coefficients ψ
(r−2)/(12r−12)(s). Hence, con-
ditions (iii) and (v) of Theorem 4.D.3 are fulfilled, whereas conditions (iv) and (vi) are
satisfied by Assumptions 10 and 2(i), 2(ii), and 9, respectively; condition (vii) is assumed














p−→ H(θ0) as n→∞















For the first claim, we apply Theorem 4.D.1. As before, we establish the results for the
part of the objective function term corresponding to index a = 11 and a general θ ∈ Θ




































We start by showing that d11g,n∂
2f 11g,n(θ)/∂θ∂θ
′ is uniformly Lp-bounded for some p > 1.
Note that d11g,n is an indicator function, whereas |Ωoog,n(θ)| is uniformly bounded away
from zero and the norm of ∂|Ωoog,n(θ)|/∂θ is uniformly bounded by Lemma 4.E.1. It can
be shown using the second order derivative of a determinant in Lemma 4.D.7 that the
norm of ∂2|Ωoog,n(θ)|/∂θ∂θ′ is uniformly bounded as well. Given the second order derivative





′ can be easily established with the
help of Lemmas 4.E.1, 4.E.3, and 4.E.4 (analogously to the Lp-boundedness of the first
derivative in (4.F.7)). Given the third result of Lemma 4.D.5 and Lemma 4.D.6, it can
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′ is Lp-bounded in a similar way as it
was done for the first order derivative in the proof of Theorem 1, property SE.
In order to show that {d11g,n∂2f 11g,n(θ)/∂θ∂θ′}g∈Gn is a uniform L1-NED random field
on the α-mixing random field {ηg,n = (Xsg·,n, Xog·,n, usg,n, uog,n)}g∈Gn , we have to establish
the uniform L2-NED property for {d11g,n}g∈Gn , as is already done in Lemma 4.E.5, and for
the second order derivatives {∂2(z′g,n(θ)Ωoo−1g,n (θ)zg,n(θ))/ ∂θ∂θ′}g∈Gn and
{∂2 ln Φ2(v11g,n(θ), R11g,n(θ))/∂θ∂θ′}g∈Gn
and apply Theorem 4.D.4 and Lemma 4.D.10. It can be done in a similar way as is done
for {z′g,n(θ)Ωoo−1g,n (θ)zg,n(θ)}g∈Gn and {ln Φ2(v11g,n(θ), R11g,n(θ))}g∈Gn in the proof of Theorem
1.
Finally, condition (iii) of Theorem 4.D.1 is fulfilled by Assumptions 2(i), 2(ii), and
9. The convergence of the second order derivative of Qn(θ) at θ0 to H(θ0) follows from
Theorem 4.D.1 and Assumption 12(i) and the fact that convergence in L1-norm implies
convergence in probability.







We apply the strategy used in the proof of Theorem 2 by Xu and Lee (2015a) and
show that {∂2Qn(θ)/∂θ∂θ′}g∈Gn is L0-stochastically equicontinuous because the claim
then follows directly from the proposition concerning the L0-stochastic equicontinuity
given in Andrews (1994). Since the objective function Qn(θ) as well as its second order
derivative are continuously differentiable, the stochastic equicontinuity of ∂2Qn(θ)/∂θ∂θ
′
at θ = θ0 can however be established in a similar way as we have verified it for Qn(θ) in
the proof of Theorem 1, property SE, which thus concludes the proof.
Appendix 4.G Some Additional Graphs
In Tables 4.A.1 and 4.A.2 (Appendix 4.A), the bias, standard deviation, and RMSE of
β̂sn obtained by both HMLE and PMLE when λ
s = λo = 0.85 and 2n = 158 are very
high. Figures 4.G.1 and 4.G.2 show that these results are mainly driven by one Monte
Carlo iteration: Figure 4.G.1 reports the estimates of βs obtained in all the iterations,
whereas Figure 4.G.2 shows exactly the same estimates but after the exclusion of the


































Figure 4.G.1: The estimates of βs obtained in all the Monte Carlo iterations used to con-
struct the bias, standard deviation, and RMSE in Tables 4.A.1 and 4.A.2 in Appendix 4.A
when λs = λo = 0.85 and 2n = 158.
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Monte Carlo iteration
























Figure 4.G.2: The estimates of βs obtained in all the Monte Carlo iterations used to con-
struct the bias, standard deviation, and RMSE in Tables 4.A.1 and 4.A.2 in Appendix 4.A
when λs = λo = 0.85 and 2n = 158 excluding the most prominent iteration in Figure 4.G.1.
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Appendix 4.H Some Additional Technical Lemmas
Lemma 4.H.1. Let X ∼ N (0, 1). Then for any given r ∈ N, there is some constant
C1 > 0 such that for any c ∈ R, E[|X|r|X ≤ c] ≤ |c|r−1φ(c)/Φ(c)+(r−1)E[|X|r−2|X ≤ c]
for r ≥ 2 with E[|X||X ≤ c] ≤ φ(c)/Φ(c) + C1 and E[|X|0|X ≤ c] = 1.
Proof.
Case 1. c ≤ 0:
Consider r = 0. Then E[|X|0|X ≤ c] =
∫ c
−∞ φ(x)/Φ(c)dx = Φ(c)/Φ(c) = 1. If r = 1,





′(x)/Φ(c)dx = φ(c)/Φ(c), where the
second equality follows by observing that φ′(x) = −xφ(x). If r ≥ 2, then by integration
by parts,








































+ (r − 1)E[|X|r−2|X ≤ c].
Case 2. c > 0:
As in Case 1, E[|X|0|X ≤ c] = 1. If r = 1, then









































Consider r ≥ 2. Then by integration by parts, it holds that




















































dx ≤ |c|r−1 φ(c)
Φ(c)
+ (r − 1)E[|X|r−2|X ≤ c].
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Lemma 4.H.2. Let Yg,n = (Ygk,n)
K
k=1 be a K-dimensional random vector. Then for some
p ≥ 1, {Yg,n}g∈Gn is a uniform Lp-NED random field with NED coefficients ψ(s) if and
only if for each k = 1, . . . , K, {Ygk,n}g∈Gn is a uniform Lp-NED random field with NED
coefficients ψ(s).
Proof. We start with the ‘if’ part. By Loève’s cr-inequality, it follows that


























because for each k = 1, . . . , K, {Ygk,n}g∈Gn is a uniform random field.
We continue with the ‘only if’ part:
‖Ygk,n − E[Ygk,n|Fg,n(s)]‖p ≤ ‖Yg,n − E[Yg,n|Fg,n(s)]‖p ≤ tg,nψ(s),
where {tg,n}g∈Gn is the NED scaling factor for random field {Yg,n}g∈Gn with sup
n,g
tg,n <∞
because {Yg,n}g∈Gn is a uniform random field.
Appendix 4.I Proofs of Technical Lemmas in Appendix 4.D
Proof of Lemma 4.D.5. Noting that ∂ ln Φ2(v,R)/∂v = Φ2(v,R)
−1∂Φ2(v,R)/∂v and
∂ ln Φ2(v,R)/∂θ = Φ2(v,R)
−1 ∂Φ2(v,R)/∂θ, we apply differentiation under the integral




















































































































∣∣∣V ≤ v]) , (4.I.7)
where V ∼ N (0, R). The second conclusion follows by combining (4.I.2) with (4.I.4),
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∣∣∣Ṽ2 ≤ v2]) .
(4.I.10)










































































































































Proofs of Technical Lemmas in Appendix 4.D












EV [G(V,R)|V ≤ v]. (4.I.14)
The conclusion follows by combining (4.I.8) with (4.I.9), (4.I.11), (4.I.12), (4.I.13), and
(4.I.14).
Proof of Lemma 4.D.6. We will start with the first claim by deriving the bounds
when (v1, v2) ∈ (−1,+∞) × (−1,+∞) and (v1, v2) /∈ (−1,+∞) × (−1,+∞) and after-
wards we will combine the results.










where ι2 is a 2-dimensional vector of ones. Thus, we need to derive the lower bound
for Φ2(−ι2, R). Since R is a symmetric matrix, there exists an orthogonal matrix O
such that R = ODiag{τ1, τ2}O′, where τ1 ≤ τ2 are the eigenvalues of R. Thus, R−1 =
ODiag{τ−11 , τ−12 }O′. From Exercise 12.39 of Abadir and Magnus (2005), it holds for any
symmetric matrix A that z′Az ≤ maxeig(A)z′z. Hence,
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where the last inequality follows by noticing that τ1 = min{1 − ρ, 1 + ρ} = 1 − |ρ| and





















Case 2. (v1, v2) /∈ (−1,+∞)× (−1,+∞):





; afterwards we will derive the
bound for the entire expression. Let α = z?
′
R−1z? with z∗ = (z∗1 , z
∗
2)
′ = arg min
z
z′R−1z,




































































where the second inequality follows from the following observation: the derivative of
exp(−α/2)(max{6, α}/t)3/ exp(−t/2) indicates that the minimum of this function for
t ≥ α is attained at t = max{6, α}; the minimum of this function is at least 1. The
double integral will be now proved to be bounded by a constant.
Case (i). v1 ≤ −1 and v2 ≤ −1:
If z1 ≤ −1 and z2 ≤ −1, then z′R−1z = ((z1 − z2)2 + 2(1 − ρ)z1z2)/(1 − ρ2) ≥ 2(1 −






















































Proofs of Technical Lemmas in Appendix 4.D






















The first double integral is bounded by a constant as it is shown in Case (i). Note that




























































It concludes the proof that the integral in (4.I.19) is bounded by a constant.






















We have already shown in Case (ii) that the first double integral is bounded by a constant.
For the second integral, note that, if z1 > 1 and z2 ≤ −1, then z′R−1z = ((z1 + z2)2 −





































































It concludes the proof that the integral in (4.I.20) is bounded by a constant. Cases when
v1 ≤ −1 and −1 < v2 ≤ 1 or v2 > 1 can be proven analogously. Thus for some constant
C4 > 0,
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−3/2 exp(−α/2) max{6, α}3
Φ2(v,R)
, (4.I.21)
if (v1, v2) /∈ (−1,+∞)×(−1,+∞). First, we will establish the bound for exp(−α/2)/Φ2(v,R).
The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 3.2 of Hashorva and Hüsler (2003). Let
t = (t1, t2)
′ = R−1z?. Then























































































































































































It follows from the proof of Lemma A.9 by Xu and Lee (2015a) that φ(x)/Φ(x) ≤
2(|x|+ C2). Thus,
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≤ C5(1− |ρ|)−1/2 (|t1|+ C2) (|t2|+ C2) ,
for some constant C5 > 0, since |τ1| ≤ 1.
It is not difficult to see that the solution to min
z
z′R−1z s.t. z ≤ v with (v1, v2) /∈
(−1,+∞)× (−1,+∞) is unique and takes one of the three values (v1, v2)′, (v1, ρv1)′, or
(ρv2, v2)
′ depending on the values of v1, v2, and ρ (similarly to Example 1 in Hashorva
and Hüsler, 2003). If z? = (v1, v2)




(∣∣∣∣v1 − ρv21− ρ2
∣∣∣∣+ C2)(∣∣∣∣v2 − ρv11− ρ2
∣∣∣∣+ C2)
≤ C5(1− |ρ|)−5/2(|v1|+ |v2|+ C2)2.
(4.I.22)
If z? = (v1, ρv1)




≤ C5(1− |ρ|)−1/2(|v1|+ C2)C2 ≤ C5(1− |ρ|)−5/2(|v1|+ |v2|+ C2)2. (4.I.23)
The bound when z? = (ρv2, v2)
′ can be derived analogously. Next, we calculate the bound
for α3:
α3 ≤ (1− ρ2)−3(v21 − 2ρv1v2 + v22)3 ≤ (1− ρ2)−3(|v1|2 + 2|v1||v2|+ |v2|2)3
= (1− ρ2)−3(|v1|+ |v2|)6 ≤ (1− |ρ|)−3(|v1|+ |v2|)6.
Hence,
max{6, α}3 ≤ (1− |ρ|)−3(|v1|+ |v2|+ C2)6. (4.I.24)







≤ C1(1− |ρ|)−7(|v1|+ |v2|+ C2)8, (4.I.25)
if (v1, v2) /∈ (−1,+∞) × (−1,+∞). The conclusion is obtained by combining (4.I.17)
with (4.I.25).
We continue with the second claim of the lemma. If (v1, v2) ∈ (−1,+∞)× (−1,+∞),
then clearly
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where the result follows from (4.I.22) and (4.I.23). The conclusion is obtained by com-
bining (4.I.26) and (4.I.27).
The third claim follows in the same way as in (4.I.16) with −ι2 replaced with the





Proof of Lemma 4.D.7. Given a matrix function F and a matrix X, we proceed
as follows: (i) compute the differential of F (X), (ii) vectorize to obtain d vecF (X) =
A(X)d vecX, and (iii) conclude that ∂ vecF (X)/∂(vecX)′ = A(X) (see Magnus and
Neudecker, 1999, for more details). The differential of the first function is given by









= |F (θ)|(vecF−1(θ))′(∂ vecF (θ)/∂θ′)dθ,
where we used that Tr(A′B) = (vecA)′ vecB and F (θ) is symmetric implying that






)′ ∂ vecF (θ)
∂θ′
.
Thus given the definition of K(θ),
∂|F (θ)|
∂θ
= |F (θ)|K(θ) vecF−1(θ).
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= d|F (θ)|K(θ) vecF−1(θ) + |F (θ)|dK(θ) vecF−1(θ) + |F (θ)|K(θ)d vecF−1(θ)





















where the second equality follows from vec(ABC) = (C ′ ⊗ A) vecB. The result follows.
Next,
d(f ′(θ)F−1(θ)f(θ)) = 2f ′(θ)F−1(θ)df(θ) + f ′(θ)dF−1(θ)f(θ)
= 2f ′(θ)F−1(θ)df(θ) + (f ′(θ)⊗ f ′(θ)) d vecF−1(θ)
=
(
2f ′(θ)F−1(θ)∂f(θ)/∂θ′ + (f ′(θ)⊗ f ′(θ)) ∂ vecF−1(θ)/∂θ′
)
dθ,

















= 2dL(θ)F−1(θ)f(θ) + 2L(θ)dF−1(θ)f(θ) + 2L(θ)F−1(θ)df(θ)





d vecL(θ) + 2 (f ′(θ)⊗ L(θ)) d vecF−1(θ) + 2L(θ)F−1(θ)df(θ)





d vecL(θ) + 2 (f ′(θ)⊗ L(θ)) d vecF−1(θ)
+ (f ′(θ)⊗ f ′(θ)⊗ Ip) d vecM(θ)
+
(










+ 2 (f ′(θ)⊗ L(θ)) ∂ vecF
−1(θ)
∂θ′
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where the second equality follows from vec(ABC) = (C ′ ⊗ A) vecB and for X and Y
being n× q and p× r matrices,
d vec(X ⊗ Y ) = (Iq ⊗Krn ⊗ Ip) [(Inq ⊗ vecY )d vecX + (vecX ⊗ Ipr)d vecY ]
as derived in Magnus and Neudecker (1999, p. 185). The conclusion follows.





























Proof of Lemma 4.D.9. Based on equation (9) in Muthén (1990),







































= 1− v1ξ1(v,R)− ρ2v2ξ2(v,R) + ρ(1− ρ2)κ(v,R),





φ2(v,R), whereas the last equality follows by the definitions of ξ(v,R) and κ(v,R) in
(4.D.1) and (4.D.2), respectively. Symmetrically,
E[X22 |X ≤ v] = 1− v2ξ2(v,R)− ρ2v1ξ1(v,R) + ρ(1− ρ2)κ(v,R).
From equation (11) in Muthén (1990),























= ρ− ρv1ξ1(v,R)− ρv2ξ2(v,R) + (1− ρ2)κ(v,R).
The conclusion follows by noticing that E[XX ′|X ≤ v] = (E[X21 |X ≤ v] E[X1X2|X ≤
v]; E[X1X2|X ≤ v] E[X22 |X ≤ v]).
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Proof of Lemma 4.D.10. The proof closely follows the proof of Theorem 17.9 of
Davidson (1994). Let X
(s)
i,n = E[Xi,n|Fi,n(s)] and Y
(s)
i,n = E[Yi,n|Fi,n(s)]. Then
‖Xi,nYi,n − E[Xi,nYi,n|Fi,n(s)]‖p






i,n )− E[(Xi,n −X
(s)
i,n )(Yi,n − Y
(s)
i,n )|Fi,n(s)]‖p




i,n )‖p + ‖E[(Xi,n −X
(s)
i,n )(Yi,n − Y
(s)
i,n )|Fi,n(s)]‖p




i,n‖2p + ‖E[(Xi,n −X
(s)
i,n )(Yi,n − Y
(s)
i,n )|Fi,n(s)]‖p
≤ ‖Xi,n‖2p‖Yi,n − Y (s)i,n ‖2p + ‖Yi,n‖2p‖Xi,n −X
(s)
i,n‖2p + ‖(Xi,n −X
(s)
i,n )(Yi,n − Y
(s)
i,n )‖p
≤ ‖Xi,n‖2p‖Yi,n − Y (s)i,n ‖2p + ‖Yi,n‖2p‖Xi,n −X
(s)





≤ ‖Xi,n‖2ptYi,nψY (s) + ‖Yi,n‖2ptXi,nψX(s) + tXi,nψX(s)tYi,nψY (s)
≤ ti,nψ(s),
where the first and second inequalities are implied by the Minkowski’s and Cauchy-
Schwartz inequalities, respectively, whereas the third inequality follows by the conditional
Jensen’s inequality and law of iterated expectations; the fourth inequality again follows
by the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality. The final claim of the lemma follows from Definition
2.
Appendix 4.J Proofs of Lemmas in Appendix 4.E


























(‖I2n − λbW bn‖∞‖I2n − λbW bn‖1 ·min{1, σ2})−1 > 0 by Assumptions
1(ii), 2(i), and 7.
(ii) Next, let d, e ∈ {s, o}. Then uniformly in n ∈ N, g ∈ Gn, and θ ∈ Θ, ‖Ωcg,n(θ)‖ ≤





−1‖∞‖(I2n−λeW en)−1‖1 <∞ for some constants C1, C2 > 0. The first inequality is
implied by the equivalence of matrix norms on finite dimensional matrix spaces, whereas
the third inequality follows by compactness of the parameter space. The conclusion is
implied by Assumption 1(ii).
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We will show that ‖∂Ωcg,n(θ)/∂λs‖ is uniformly bounded, while the boundedness of the
other terms can be established in a similar way. For some constant C3 > 0, uniformly in
n ∈ N, g ∈ Gn, and θ ∈ Θ∥∥∥∥∂Ωcg,n(θ)∂λs




























The first inequality follows by the equivalence of matrix norms on finite dimensional
matrix spaces. The result is implied by sub-multiplicity of matrix norms and Assumption
1(ii).
(iii) Note that ‖Ωb−1g,n (θ)‖ = |Ωbg,n(θ)|−1‖Ωbg,n(θ)‖ < ∞ uniformly in n ∈ N, g ∈ Gn,
and θ ∈ Θ by parts (i) and (ii).
Consequently, by Lemma 4.D.8,∥∥∥∥∥∂ vec Ωb−1g,n (θ)∂θ′
∥∥∥∥∥ =
















∥∥∥∥∥ ‖Ωb−1g,n (θ)‖ <∞
uniformly in n ∈ N, g ∈ Gn, and θ ∈ Θ, where the boundedness of |Ωbg,n(θ)| is implied by
the boundedness of ‖Ωbg,n(θ)‖.
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Proof of Lemma 4.E.2. (i) From Exercise 12.39 in Abadir and Magnus (2005), for
any symmetric matrixA and compatible vector x, x′Ax ≥ mineig(A)x′x, where mineig(A)
is the minimum eigenvalue of A. Let τ 111g,n(θ) ≤ τ 112g,n(θ) be the eigenvalues of Σ11g,n(θ) and









τ 111g,n(θ) > 0 by Assumption 6.
Next, note that



























































uniformly in n ∈ N, g ∈ Gn, and θ ∈ Θ because of Lemma 4.E.1 and the first part of this















The uniform boundedness of ‖R11g,n(θ)‖ implies that |R11g,n(θ)| is uniformly bounded as
well. By the first part of the proof, infn,g infθ∈Θ |R11g,n(θ)| = infn,g infθ∈Θ(1 − ρ11
2
g,n(θ)) >
0. Thus, the last term in (4.J.2) is uniformly bounded by noticing that ‖R11−1g,n (θ)‖ =
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|R11g,n(θ)|−1‖R11g,n(θ)‖.
It remains to show that the second term in (4.J.2) is uniformly bounded:∥∥∥∥∂ vecR11g,n(θ)∂θ′
∥∥∥∥ = ∥∥∥∥∂ vec(M11g,n(θ)Σ11g,n(θ)M11g,n(θ))∂θ′
∥∥∥∥
=



















∥∥∥∥+ ‖M11g,n(θ)‖2 ∥∥∥∥∂ vec Σ11g,n(θ)∂θ′
∥∥∥∥ .
The norm of M11g,n(θ) is uniformly bounded due to the first part of this lemma, whereas









We will show that the first term is uniformly bounded, while the uniform boundedness







The first term on the right hand side is uniformly bounded due to the first part of the
lemma. Regarding the second term, note that




it is uniformly bounded by the triangle inequality, the product rule, sub-multiplicity
of matrix norms, and Lemma 4.E.1. The boundedness of ‖∂ vec Σ11g,n(θ)/∂θ′‖ can be
established similarly. It concludes the proof that the second term in (4.J.2) is uniformly
bounded.
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∥∥∥∥(R11−1g,n (θ)⊗R11−1g,n (θ)) ∂ vecR11g,n(θ)∂θ′
∥∥∥∥ ≤ ‖R11−1g,n (θ)‖2 ∥∥∥∥∂ vecR11g,n(θ)∂θ′
∥∥∥∥
is uniformly bounded in n ∈ N, g ∈ Gn, and θ ∈ Θ by the previous results of this
proof.
Proof of Lemma 4.E.3. Employing the equivalence of vector norms on finite dimen-
sional vector spaces and Loève’s cr-inequality, it follows for some constant C1 > 0 that











































































































where the third inequality follows by Jensen’s inequality for convex functions. The con-
clusion is implied by Assumptions 1(ii), 4(ii), and 7.
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where the inequality follows by the triangle and Loève’s cr-inequalities. Given that we
have already shown that the second term in (4.J.5) is uniformly bounded, it is enough










∣∣ysi,n = 1]+ E [|εoi,n(λo0)|p∣∣ysi,n = 1]) .











∣∣ysi,n = 1] <∞




∣∣ysi,n = 1] = E [E [|εoi,n(λo0)|p∣∣ysi,n = 1, Xsn] ∣∣ysi,n = 1] . (4.J.6)











∣∣εsi,n(λs0)] ∣∣ysi,n = 1, Xsn] , (4.J.7)








′ ∼ N (0, [Ωooii,n(θ0) Ωsoii,n(θ0); Ωsoii,n(θ0) Ωssii,n(θ0)]). Thus,
εoi,n(λ
o















































≤ C2 + C3|εsi,n(λs0)|p
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for some constants C2, C3 > 0, where Γ(·) is the Gamma function. The second equal-
ity is implied by the following fact: if X ∼ N (0, σ2), then for any p ∈ (−1,+∞),
E[|X|p] = σp2p/2Γ((p + 1)/2)/
√
π (Kamat, 1953). The conclusion follows by noticing
that Lemma 4.E.1 implies the uniform boundedness from zero of Ωssii,n(θ0) and the uni-
form boundedness of Ωooii,n(θ0) which is implied by the uniform boundedness of ‖Ωoog,n(θ0)‖.
Thus, the expectation in (4.J.7) becomes
E[|εoi,n(λo0)|p|ysi,n = 1, Xsn] ≤ C2 + C3E[|εsi,n(λs0)|p| − εsi,n(λs0) < Ssi·,n(λs0)Xsnβs0, Xsn]














































≤ C2 + C4ϑp/rr (mi,n(θ0))









Ωssii,n(θ0), and ϑr(mi,n(θ0)) ≤ |mi,n(θ0)|r−1φ(mi,n(θ0))/Φ(mi,n(θ0))+(r−
1)ϑr−2(mi,n(θ0)) for r ≥ 2 with ϑ1(mi,n(θ0)) ≤ φ(mi,n(θ0))/Φ(mi,n(θ0)) +C5 and ϑ0 = 1,
for some constant C5 > 0. The second inequality is implied by Hölder’s inequality,
the second equality follows by Lemma 4.H.1, whereas the last inequality follows from
the uniform boundedness of Ωssii,n(θ0), which is implied by the uniform boundedness of
‖Ωssg,n(θ)‖ established in Lemma 4.E.1. Consider r ≥ 2. It follows from (4.J.6) that
E[|εoi,n(λo0)|p|ysi,n = 1] ≤ C2 + C4E[ϑp/rr (mi,n(θ0))|ysi,n = 1]





+ (r − 1)ϑr−2(mi,n(θ0))
∣∣∣ysi,n = 1]p/r











From the proof of Lemma A.9 by Xu and Lee (2015a), it follows that φ(x)/Φ(x) ≤






∣∣∣ysi,n = 1]p/r ≤ 2p/rE [|mi,n(θ0)|r−1(|mi,n(θ0)|+ C6)|ysi,n = 1]p/r
≤ 2p/r
(
E[|mi,n(θ0)|p|ysi,n = 1] + C
p/r
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where the last inequality follows by Loève’s cr-inequality. In order to show that the first
term in (4.J.8) is uniformly bounded, by Hölder’s inequality it is enough to establish































where the conclusion is implied by Assumptions 1(ii), 4(ii), and 7 and Lemma 4.E.1.
It is easy to show using recursion and Hölder’s inequality that the second term
in (4.J.8) is uniformly bounded if E[|mi,n(θ0)|p|ysi,n = 1] is uniformly bounded. This
condition is sufficient for the case when r = 1 as well. It completes the proof that
supθ∈Θ ‖zg,n(θ)‖ is uniformly Lp-bounded.






















uniformly in n ∈ N and g ∈ Gn, where the conclusion is implied by Lemma 4.E.1 and
the previous results of this proof.
In the same way as in (4.J.3), sup
θ∈Θ
‖v11g,n(θ)‖ is uniformly Lp-bounded if sup
θ∈Θ
|v11gj,n(θ)|

































uniformly in n ∈ N and g ∈ Gn, where the conclusion follows by the previous results of
this proof and Lemma 4.E.2.
Proof of Lemma 4.E.4. Applying Loève’s cr-inequality twice leads to the following
212














































The uniform boundedness of the second term can be proven in the same way as the
uniform boundedness of E[sup
θ∈Θ
‖Sbg·,n(λb)Xbnβb‖]p in Lemma 4.E.3. In the same way as in













The first and the last terms in (4.J.10) are bounded by Assumptions 7 and 4(ii), respec-




∥∥∥∥∂(I2n − λoW on)−1∂λo
∥∥∥∥
∞
= ‖(I2n − λoW on)−1W on(I2n − λoW on)−1‖∞ <∞,
(4.J.11)
where the result follows from the sub-multiplicativity of matrix norms and Assumption
1(ii).













































uniformly in n ∈ N and g ∈ Gn. We have already shown in the proof of Lemma 4.E.2 that
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the norms of ∂ vecM11g,n(θ)/∂θ




























uniformly in n ∈ N and g ∈ Gn by Lemma 4.E.3 because ‖qg,n(θ)‖ = ‖S̃sg·,n(λs)Xsnβs‖ =





















We can show that the first term is uniformly bounded in the same way as we proved










































is uniformly bounded. The conclusion then follows by Lemmas 4.E.1 and 4.E.3, the
previous results of this lemma, and by noticing that∥∥∥∥∥∂ vec(Ω̃sog,n(θ)Ωoo−1g,n (θ))∂θ′
∥∥∥∥∥ =








∥∥∥∥+ ‖Ωsog,n(θ)‖∥∥∥∥∂ vec Ωoo−1g,n (θ)∂θ′
∥∥∥∥)
<∞
uniformly in n ∈ N and g ∈ Gn by Lemma 4.E.1.
Proof of Lemma 4.E.5. We start with establishing the uniform Lp-NED, p ∈ {2, 4},
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property for {y∗bg,n}g∈Gn , b ∈ {s, o}, which will be needed later in the proof. Since the
bounds derived in this proof are uniform on Θ, we write for the sake of simplicity θ
instead of θn. Using now the definition of NED and the conditional Jensen’s inequality,
it follows



















































































































b ∈ {s, o}. The first and second inequalities follow by Minkowski’s and the conditional
Jensen’s inequalities, respectively. Given Assumption 7, ty
∗b






b)‖ are uniformly bounded. Since p ∈ {2, 4},






4E‖Xbi·,n‖4 < ∞ by Assumption 4(ii).
Because a normal distribution has infinitely many moments and supn,g E‖ubg,n‖4 ≤
supn,i 4E|ubi,n|4, Assumption 2(i) implies that sup
n,g
E‖ubg,n‖4 < ∞, whereas equivalence
of matrix norms on finite dimensional matrix spaces implies that uniformly in n ∈ N,















for some constant C1 > 0 by Assumption 1(ii). Note that by Assumption 5, lims→∞ ψ(s) =
0. Thus, {y∗bg,n}g∈Gn is a uniform L4- and L2-NED random field with NED coefficients ψ(s).
Recall that d11g,n = 1(y
s
g1,n = 1, y
s
g2,n = 1) = 1(y
∗s
g1,n > 0) ·1(y∗sg2,n > 0). From the proof
of Proposition 2 by Xu and Lee (2015a), it follows that for some constants C2, C3 > 0
and j = 1, 2,
‖1(y∗sgj,n > 0)− E[1(y∗sgj,n > 0)|Fg,n(s)]‖2 ≤ (1 + C2)‖y∗sgj,n − E[y∗sgj,n|Fg,n(s)]‖
1/3
2
≤ (1 + C2)C3ψ1/3(s),
where the last inequality follows by Lemma 4.H.2 and the fact that {y∗sg,n}g∈Gn is uniformly
L2-NED with NED coefficients ψ(s). Since |1(y∗sgj,n > 0) − E[1(y∗sgj,n > 0)|Fg,n(s)]|4 ≤
|1(y∗sgj,n > 0) − E[1(y∗sgj,n > 0)|Fg,n(s)]|2 implies that ‖1(y∗sgj,n > 0) − E[1(y∗sgj,n >
0)|Fg,n(s)]‖4 ≤ ‖1(y∗sgj,n > 0) − E[1(y∗sgj,n > 0)|Fg,n(s)]‖
1/2
2 , {1(y∗sgj,n > 0)}g∈Gn is a uni-
form L4-NED random field with NED coefficients ψ
1/6(s). Given that {1(y∗sgj,n > 0)}g∈Gn
is uniformly L4-bounded, Lemma 4.D.10 implies that {d11g,n}g∈Gn is a uniform L2-NED
random field with NED coefficients ψ1/6(s) + ψ1/6(s) + ψ1/3(s) ≤ 3ψ1/6(s).19
From the definition, zg,n(θ) = y
o
g,n−Sog·,n(λo)Xonβo. By Theorem 4.D.4, it is enough to
establish the uniform NED property for each term of the summation and find their NED










. Since by Lemma
4.H.2 and the previous results of this proof, {y∗sgj,n}g∈Gn and 1(y∗sgj,n > 0), j = 1, 2,
are uniformly L4-NED with NED coefficients ψ(s) and ψ
1/6(s), respectively, Lemma
4.D.10 implies that {1(y∗sgj,n > 0)y∗ogj,n}g∈Gn is a uniform L2-NED random field with NED
coefficients ψ1/6(s) + ψ(s) + ψ7/6(s) ≤ 3ψ1/6(s). By Lemma 4.H.2, the same property is
transfered to {yog,n}g∈Gn . It is easy to see from the proof of {y∗og,n}g∈Gn being an L2-NED
random field that {Sog·,n(λo)Xonβo}g∈Gn is a uniform L2-NED random field with NED
coefficients ψ(s). Hence, {zg,n(θ)}g∈Gn is a uniform L2-NED random field with NED
coefficients ψ1/6(s) + ψ(s) ≤ 2ψ1/6(s).
Finally, since v11g,n(θ) = Diag(Σ
11
g,n(θ))
−1/2(qg,n(θ)−µ11g,n(θ)) and ‖Diag(Σ11g,n(θ))−1/2‖ is
uniformly bounded by Lemma 4.E.2, it suffices to establish the uniform NED property for
qg,n(θ) and µ
11














g,n (θ) are uniformly
bounded by Lemma 4.E.1, {µ11g,n(θ)}g∈Gn is a uniform L2-NED random field with NED
coefficients ψ1/6(s). The conclusion follows by Theorem 4.D.4.
19Note that in this case we can treat ψ1/3(s) as the NED coefficient because 3 can be treated as a part
of the NED scaling factor.
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